U.S. POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA, c. 1960- c. 1990: FROM POLITICAL REALISM TO MORAL ENGAGEMENT

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Abstract

This is a study of United States' policy towards South Africa between 1976 and 1986, the important period in the history of their relationship. It sets out to explain that there had never been a basic shift in successive U.S. policies towards the Republic. The driving force behind the Ford, Carter and Reagan doctrines towards Southern Africa, with focus on South Africa, had been to secure the U.S. national interests____economic and military/strategic. These policies, however, were based on belief of negotiated settlement to achieve majority rule in the region, and were critical of the apartheid system in South Africa.

Throughout the period under discussion, South Africa has never remained important in U.S. policy planning, except the period of the mid 1980s, when it attracted the attention of high-level policy-makers, including the President and the Congress. It was during this time that the Republic appeared as a major political issue of U.S. domestic constituencies and on foreign policy agenda. It was partly because of the well publicized crisis in South Africa, and partly because of the Reagan administration's attitude towards the anti-apartheid groups. The combination of these factors had led the defeat of the Reagan administration's policy of constructive engagement and the implementation of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 in which Congress, under public pressure, deviced its policy towards South Africa.

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Acknowledgement

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INTRODUCTION

The thesis describe and evaluates the main developments in ralations between the United States and South Africa between the period 1976 and 1986. This is not an attempt to promote the policy of a particular administration in the White House, but has been done from an impartial point of view. It reviews the measures adopted by the successive administrations under discussion from condemnation of apartheid to maintaining of free access to South Africa's strategic minerals, to pursue South Africa, in one way or another, to abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, and to gain Pretoria's cooperation in getting the Rhodesian and Namibian issues settled. The Successive policies therefore were pursued in the regional context of Southern Africa, with main focus concentrated on South Africa, because of its geo-strategic location, its mineral wealth, and its anti-Communist posture. It will also examine how South African policy reached at top of the U.S.-Africa policy agenda. In dealing with this, the role of other actors in play, such as Congress and public opinion will be analysed in shaping the course of South African policy the way it took in 1986.

In addition, the objective in this study is also to trace the policy-making process in Washington, i.e the role played by various Executive departments and agencies interested and involved in South Africa policy-making during the period under discussion.

Conceptual Framework

The analysis of U.S. foreign policy has tended to be dominated by two schools: the power school (realists); and the decision-making school. The power or realist school is headed by thinkers, such as Hans J.Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, George Kennan, and Henry Kissinger. The realist theory of state behaviour was built on what Morgenthau described as power politics: "international politics, like all politics is a struggle for power.....statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power."(1) In other words, "the choices that policy-makers make [are] shaped by strategic calculations of power, not by domestic politics or the process of policy-making itself."(2)

The decision-making approach to foreign policy, which started flourishing in the 1950s marked the start of a shift away from traditional approaches which looked to the state as a static unit of analysis, in part inspired by the behaviouralist movement in the study of politics.(3) As opposed to realist thinkers, the "foreign policy decision-making scholars view the nation state as a primary, but not necessarily the sole arena in which foreign policy decisions are made."(4) This model "represents that area of governmental action where domestic and foreign policy interests intermesh."(5) They concentrate "on the behaviour of those who make decisions on behalf of the state,"(6) which is "..... influenced by several elements, [such as] perception, cognition,

memory, choice, and management."(7)

The decision-making approach which is "the most frequently used approach to the study of U.S. foreign policy",(8) has however tended to draw on two different conceptual frameworks: the psychological-perceptual; and the organizational-bureaucratic. The pioneering work on psychological factors in foreign policy decision-making was published in 1962 by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin. Snyder et al.'s central argument is that in order to understand the state's behaviour one must study its "official decision-makers". It is therefore necessary to focus on the elements that influence those official decision-makers in the formulation of foreign policy. The internal and external factors discussed as determinants of action in the system were summed up by Snyder and his colleagues as "spheres of competence", "communication and information", and "motivation". Sphere of competence are the activities of the decision-maker necessary to the achievement of the unit's objectives. Communication and information include meanings, values, and preferences. Whereas "motivations" are "a component of action", which embraces psychological, personality, perception, and value factors that influence the decision-makers, enter the process, and affect its outcome. In sum, the authors placed their emphasis on the psychological environment which influence the decision-makers.(9) "The cornerstone of the school" in the opinion of Bahgat Kornay and his colleagues "is the preposition that decision-makers

respond not to the real world but their perceptions and images of the world, which may or may not be accurate representations of the world reality."(10)

The intellectual evolution of the bureaucratic politics of foreign policy decision-making traces its roots to the theoretical work on bureaucracies by the German sociologist and political economist Max Weber (1864-1920).(11) In the post-World II era, this model has been further developed and refined since the 1970s by scholars, such as Graham T.Allison and Morton H.Halperin,(12) This framework concentrates on the internal politics of bureaucracy on the one hand, and the bargaining that usually takes place among them in decision-making, on the other.(13) The bureaucratic-organizational framework has not only enlarged the arena of the decision-making school to include the role of domestic bureaucratic politics in foreign policy-making, but has refused to see decision-making as a set of delibrate choices made by an individual, even the president or his top aide. State action is not a delibrate choice___rational or otherwise___but an outcome.(14)

In his book 'Essence of Decision', Graham Allison outlined three conceptual models to explain the decision-making process that was employed to reach one decision____the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. Model I is the "rational actor" drawn as by advocates of the power school. His Model II is the "orga~nizational

process". According to this model different organizations within the government which are involved in foreign policy -making process, act according to their respective organizational pressures. Therefore, these constraints limit the options of the decision-maker, and the decision comes as a result of debate amongst them. Allison's third conceptual Model is the "bureaucratic politics" model. He put his emphasis on this model, within which he defines that "foreign policies are the result of bargaining among [various] components of bureaucracy."(15) Allison argues that the "rational actor" model cannot by itself explain foreign policy as has been claimed by the advocates of the power school. "There is powerful evidence" said Allison "that it must be supplemented by a frame of reference that focus on the governmental machine."(16)

Unlike Model I, the bureaucratic politics model identifies no unitory actor (i.e national government) rather many actors as players in the game.(17) Allison's players according to this paradigm consist of: [1] "Chiefs": the President, Secretaries of State, Defence, Treasury, Director of the CIA, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and special Assistant for National Security. [2] "Staffers": the immediate staff of each of the departments and agencies. [3] "Indians": the political appointees and permanent government officials within each of the departments and agencies. And, [4] "Adhoc Players": congressional influentials, members of press, and spokesmen for important groups. (18) When Graham Allison and Morton

Halperin collaborated in the early-1970s, the organizational process model was subsumed by the bureaucratic politics model.(19)

Morton Halperin defines the term bureaucracy as "civilian career officials and political appointees, as well as military forces."(20) According to Halperin, the civilian career officials are likely to have different set of guides from political appointees. The career officials usually support the interests of organizations in which they work. Whereas the interests of political appointees or "in-and-outers" are tied with the banking, legal, business, or academic communities, from which they been recruited and are likely to go back to their respective communities when the President leaves the White House.(21)

In 'Essence of Decision', Graham Allison has further argued that the bureaucratic politics model, which focuses on governmental machinery, could also be broadened by including the role of other actors outside the bureaucracy in foreign policy-making(22) i.e the U.S. Congress and domestic interest/pressure groups. Thomas L.Brewer has labelled the combination and involvement of all these actors in foreign policy-making arena as the "pluralistic-bureaucratic politics model." He observed:

> .....the traditional version of the pluralist model focuses on Congress, the president, and interest group organizations. A recent extension of the pluralist model focuses on the executive branch bureaucracy, and it has been labelled the bureaucratic politics model.(23)

These approaches to foreign policy analysis are by mo means the final or comprehensive answer. "These models could be applied to all countries to some degree, but none is applicable to every country under all circumstances."(24)

As has been discussed in the outset that most of the U.S. foreign policy actions are of non-crisis nature, therefore are decided through the bureaucratic politics in Washington. In the case of U.S. policy towards South Africa____a non-crisis situation____though the core approach in this study will be bureaucratic politics analysis, but "external environment" approach will also help in the explanation of the policy formulation process in this regard.

Although there is a rich literature that deals with various aspects of U.S. policy towards South Africa during this period, this study, however, is an attempt to provide some important insights regarding the involvement of, and relationship between major policy-making Executive departments, agencies and individuals towards South Africa. This analysis addresses the question of how competing departments and individuals had been struggling to assert their respective influence on South Africa policy-making process.

Methodology

This research has drawn upon primary and secondary material ranging from interviews, government documents, to annual reports and speeches. This project is a case study of various aspects of U.S.-South Africa policy which involves individuals and organizations in the policy-making process. The best available method for researching these issues is to interview those persons who have been directly involved in this process. Interviews were conducted in Washington, D.C. with some of the former and current officials in the State, the Defence, and the Commerce Departments, on Capitol Hill, and some of the non-governmental observers interested in U.S.-South Africa policy. Most of the iterviews were open-ended aimed at uncovering the internal bureaucratic and departmental rivalries in the formation of South Africa policy. About 60 people were considered for formal interview in the United States, of whom 26 agreed to be interviewed. The maximum time spent on an interview was about an hour, and most were tape recorded.

Following is the list of persons interviewed in the research:

Pauline H.Baker, Aspin Institute of Humanities, Washington, D.C., July 27, 1992.

Ambassador James K.Bishop Jr., U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Washington, D.C., July 31, 1992.

Douglas Scott, Chief of Economic Modeling Branch, U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Washington, D.C., July 31, 1992.
Nancy L.Kassebaum, U.S. Senator, Washington, D.C., August 3, 1992.

Peter R.Chaveas, Director Office of Southern African Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., August 6, 1992.

Sally Miller, Director of Africa, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., August 10, 1992.

Robert Cabelly, Regional Specialist Africa, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State, August 11, 1992.

Adwoa Dunn-Mouton, Staffer, U.S. Senator Paul Simon, Washington, D.C., August 12, 1992.

Larry Hall, Economic Analyst, U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), August 13, 1992.

Vincent D.Kern, Director Africa Region, International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defence, Washington, D.C., August 17, 1992.

Witney Schneidman, former State Department official, Washington, D.C., August 18, 1992.

Robert B.Brauer, Special Counsel to Congressman Ronald V.Dellums, Washington, D.C., August 25, 1992.

Michael Mir Heydari, Foreign Minerals Specialist, Africa and the Middle East, U.S. Bureau of Mines and Minerals, Washington, D.C., August 26, 1992.

Jeffrey Davidow, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C., August 28, 1992.

Donald F. McHenry, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (1979-81), Washington, D.C., September 1, 1992.

Amit A.Pandia, Counsel, Sub-Committee of International Operations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., September 4, 1992.

Professor I.William Zartman, School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., September 10, 1992.

John W.Padan, Deputy Programme Director for International Activities, Office of International Activities and Marine Minerals, U.S. Department of Interior, Minerals Management Service, Washington, D.C., September 14, 1992.

Mwiza Munthali, Information Specialist, TransAfrica, Washington, D.C., September 15, 1992.

Chester A.Crocker, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (1981-89), Department of State, Washington, D.C., September 15, 1992.

David King, Staffer, Congressman Howard Wolpe, Washington, D.C., September 17, 1992.

James S.Grichar, Senior Economist Office of Mobilization Preparedness, U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Washington, D.C., October 5, 1992.

Morton H.Halperin, Director, Centre for National Security Studies, Washington, D.C., October 6, 1992.

Herry Thompson, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., October 7, 1992.

Richard M.Moose, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (1977-81), Department of State, Washington, D.C., October 7, 1992.

Scope

The time span covered by this thesis is from 1976 through 1986. This has been selected because it is an important period in U.S.-South Africa relations. The starting point is the Ford-Kissinger administration's policy somersault towards Southern Africa in the wake of the emergence of two pro-Moscow governments in Angola and Mozambique on the world map, and protracted armed struggle between respective governments' forces and pro-Western factions. This also marked the beginning of the first U.S. coherent policy towards the region, which started attracting attention and interest of bureaucrats in various departments, and legislators on the Capitol Hill from both sides of the aisle.

In addition, throughout this period a consistent

struggle on South Africa policy between the Executive, on the one hand, and the Legislature and interest group organizations, on the other, could also be found which, in fact is one of the few examples in U.S. foreign policy-making history.

The period is also peculiar because it ends at another turning event in U.S.-South Africa relations which marked the termination of the Reagan administration's policy of constructive engagement, on the one hand, and introduction of a policy devised by Congress, on the other.

Organization and Setting of the Thesis

The first two chapters deal with the overall structure of U.S. foreign policy-making, and the players involved in this arena. These chapters examine in detail the role of the President, the bureaucracy, the Congress, and pressure/interest group organizations in making of foreign policy, both in general and towards Africa as well.

The core of the research is the five case study chapters devided into two sections. The first section examines South Africa policy in the context of what might be called Cold War issues: strategic minerals, nuclear relations, and the intelligence cooperation between both countries. Chapter 3, deals with the issue of four strategic minerals namely: chromium, manganese, platinum group metals (pgm), and vanadium imported from South

Africa. The chapter examines the degree of U.S. 'dependence' on these minerals during the period under discussion. The minerals issue in this study is developed keeping the debate in this regard of last three decades in view in the United States, both within the Executive and the Legislative branches, and the academic world.

Chapter 4, 'U.S.-South Africa Nuclear Relations' evaluates the extent of collaboration between both countries. The chapter is divided roughly into two sections: an era of cooperation, and an era of non-cooperation on these issues. The period of nuclear cooperation between both countries ended during the mid 1970s when the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) challenged the export of enriched uranium to South Africa in U.S. Supreme court. The subsequent passage of the Non-Proliferation Act marked the beginning of an era of open confrontation between two countries on these issues.

The nuclear issue remained an important aspect of U.S.-South Africa relations during the first Reagan term until the promulgation of the Presidential Executive Order of September 1985 which among other things prohibited the sale of goods used for nuclear production to South Africa.

Chapter 5, 'U.S.-South Africa Defence and Intelligence Cooperation', presents the connection of covert activities and information sharing between the intelligence services of both countries. This cooperation, continued for more or less three decades from Truman

administration until the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) which banned U.S. intelligence cooperation with South Africa. Their intelligence sharing had been focused on the Soviet and Communist related activities in the region, on the one hand, and against the black movements both inside and outside South Africa, on the other. The chapter also identifies the role of U.S. intelligence not only to influence South Africa policy, but to pursue its own policy as well, towards the Republic against the U.S. government policy. It became considerably active during the Reagan administration when covert actions were considered as basic part of a foreign policy not only to overthrow the Marxist regimes in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, but to support tyrant friendly governments like South Africa.

Chapter 6, suggests that it was the U.S. Congress, not the Executive branch, which "lit the candle" of the human rights issue in U.S. foreign policy. The chapter further analyses the factors of U.S. congressional and public pressure which brought the issue of human rights to the top of the U.S.-South Africa relations agenda during the mid-1980s. As a result of these pressures, the Reagan administration had to change the course of its policy towards the Republic.

Chapter 7 'The Role of Sanctions in U.S.-South Africa Relations', looks at the history of the sanctions movement in the United States. It examine the factors of the mid -1980s debate on sanctions which made South Africa a major

U.S. concern. The analysis of the mid-1980s includes the congressional consensus on sanctions issue on the one hand, and the Executive-Legislative tug-of-war on the other. In addition, the lack of presidential leadership and the bureaucratic friction in this matter made South Africa one of the major political issues of the Reagan administration.

As a result, Congress under public pressure, passed the CAAA in 1986 to imose sanctions against the Republic to undermine apartheid system. In addition, the Act also adopted some measures to help victims of apartheid in shape of scholarships, legal assistance, and human rights funds.

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CHAPTER I

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING: THE ROLE OF PRESIDENT AND BUREAUCRACY

Introduction

The foreign policy decisions of the United States are the result of various inputs: public opinion, the Congress, the federal bureaucracy, and the President. The foreign policy-making network in Washington, D.C. is complex. "It's like a mix. It's like a seesaw", as one senior official in the U.S. Commerce Department put it.(1) The participants involved in the decision-making process see the issues from different angles and perspectives, and compete to influence the decisions and actions of the government concerning foreign policy.(2)

This chapter will try to address the role of the President, and the bureaucracy, [the Executive branch] in the making of U.S. foreign policy. It will also examine the degree of presidential and bureaucratic interest in African issues. The role of public opinion and Congress in the making of foreign policy will, however, be discussed in the following chapter

1.1 Role of the President

Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. constitution designates the President as Commander-in-Chief of the

Armed forces, assigns him to receive ambassadors, and authorizes him to conclude treaties and appoint ambassadors to foreign countries. While the constitution does not specify any further foreign policy powers, two clauses in particular, the appointment of ambassadors and the negotiation of treaties have particularly been used to extend the role of the President in foreign affairs. America's emergence from a long era of isolationism in the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941, and its consequent rise as a global economic and military leader in the post-War period has led to a growth in presidential powers in foreign relations vis-a-vis the Legislative branch.(3)

To what extent are U.S. foreign policy decisions made by the President and his principal advisers? Hundreds of foreign policy decisions are made in Washington every year. Only major issues of foreign policy reach the President or his top aides. The majority of decisions, therefore, emerge as a result of bureaucratic "pulling and hauling" and compromise.(4) According to President John Kennedy's Special Counsel, Theodore Sorenson, President Dwight Eisenhower once told President Kennedy: "There are no easy matters that will come to you as President. If they are easy, they will be settled at a lower level." (5)

What are those 'major' or 'difficult' foreign policy issues which are decided by President and his top advisers? These are the issues which are important from the U.S.

national security perspective, or which emerge during a crisis situation. These would include the Korean war decision (1950); the Cuban missile crisis (1962); the secret bombing of Cambodia and Laos (1970); the rescue mission of U.S. hostages in Iran (1980); the invasion of Grenada (1983); the air strikes against Libya (1986); the war against Iraq (1991). Almost all these issues or similar sorts of matters have been and are decided by very few people at the top of the administration, including the President himself.

These sort of foreign policy issues are by no means always decided unanimously. For example, during the Cuban missile crisis seventeen top advisers, as well as President Kennedy, were involved in deliberations. Eleven Presidential advisers, alongwith the President himself, favoured the blockade of Cuba. The other six advisers favoured surgical air strikes against the missile sites in Cuba.(6) The decision in favour of the secret bombing of Cambodia and Laos was made by President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger.(7) The Secretary of State, William Rogers only learnt of the bombings from the press. Carter's Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance opposed the decision to attempt a rescue of U.S. diplomats in Iran in 1980, and eventually resigned.

The President's principal advisers in foreign policy matters are of two kinds: those who sit in the Executive Office of the President, such as the White House advisers,

and his Assistant for National Security Affairs; and the senior cabinet secretaries. Who influences the President on foreign policy matters depends upon the style of the President, and therefore varies from President to President and from issue to issue. For example, Jimmy Carter's Southern Africa policy between 1977 and 1979 was mostly influenced by the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance and Ambassador Andrew Young. During Carter's last year or so in the White House, the administration's Southern Africa policy, alongwith other major political issues of the world, became increasingly influenced by his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski.

This does not mean that Brzezinski turned a blind eye to African issues during the early years of the Carter Presidency. For example, soon after Carter's inauguration he tried to influence the administration's Southern Africa policy by ordering the preparation of Policy Review Memorandum-4 which gave importance to South Africa's cooperation in the resolution of the Rhodesian and Namibian issues. This, however, was strongly opposed by Andrew Young, Anthony Lake, and Donald McHenry, who presented their point of view to the President, which resulted in the issue of a Presidential Directive reflecting their policy approach and officially criticizing apartheid for the first time.(8)

After his failure to assert much influence on Southern Africa policy, Brzezinski focused on the Horn

of Africa and linked the regional crisis to U.S.-Soviet relations, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).(9) How much influence Brzezinski exerted on U.S. policy in the Horn vis-a-vis the Soviet Union during Carter's first two years in office is difficult to measure, because "Carter and Vance [still] adhered to an image of global complexity and the pursuit of global community."(10) But his influence grew after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. By this time "Carter and Brzezinski's images overlapped considerably, and together they dominated the making of American foreign policy."(11)

Similarly, the first Reagan administration's Southern Africa policy was influenced by his Secretaries of State, Alexander Haig and George Shultz. His second term Southern Africa policy, until the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986, was influenced by his White House advisers, such as Donald Regan and William Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Of all the U.S. administrations since Richard Nixon's, Reagan's second term presidency has probably been more dominated by his White House staff than by the cabinet secretaries in major domestic and foreign policy-making decisions. From 1985 until his resignation in 1987, the White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan "was the most powerful person who controlled the main levers of the White House power."(12)

Of course the tug-of-war between the President's

advisers is not the only pressure which influences his foreign policy decisions. Other pressures include those from "foreign governments and domestic political concerns,"(13) and a President "will often respond to whichever pressures are momentarily strongest."(14) For example, when the Carter administration joined in voting for the United Nations mandatory arms embargo on South Africa in 1977, it was partly in response to growing Afro-Asian pressure in the United Nations on U.S. to impose economic sanctions against the Republic. Similarly, when President Reagan signed the Executive Order in September 1985 to impose limited sanctions on South Africa, his actions were influenced by congressional and public pressures. In this case, President Reagan was under pressure from his White House advisers and the State Department as well. In this situation Reagan's public comments regarding South Africa sent confused signals to other parties. In Chester Crocker's assessment:

> This varied input was perfectly reflected in the bobbing and weaving of Reagan's own press comments during August and September 1985. One day he categorized the Botha government as"reformist". Shortly afterwards he retracted this judgement as "misleading"(15)

Usually presidents keep very few foreign policy matters of importance in the White House and the rest of the affairs are left to the bureaucracy. For example, President Nixon concentrated on ending the Vietnam war, rapprochement with China, and easing tension with the Soviet Union. President Carter focused on improving relations with the Soviet Union including arms control

agreements, the solution of the Middle East crisis, and global human rights issues. In Brzezinski's account: "Actually in foreign affairs, contrary to public perceptions, Carter was a dominant president. His personal involvement in foreign policy process was assertive and extensive."(16) Whereas President Reagan's attention was focused to contain the influence of the "evil empire"____ the Soviet Union.

Ultimately presidential decisions in foreign affairs are materialized by bureaucrats who can create hindrances to their implementation. The classic example in this regard was the removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey, ordered by President Kennedy twice between August and October 1962. Because of bureaucratic disagreements the missiles were still there even at the time when the Soviet Union announced the withdrawal of its missiles from Cuba on October 28, 1962.(17) Therefore presidents are encircled by an iron triangle of obstacles comprised of bureaucracy, congressional committees, and interest groups.(18)

In sum, whether the foreign policy decisions are made within the "inner-most circle which comprises the President and his closest advisers",(19) or through bureaucratic politics; whether the decisions are small or big; or made in crisis or non-crisis situations, it is the President who is always responsible for policy decisions.

1.2 Role of the Bureaucracy

We have noted that only the most important foreign policy matters reach the President and his principal advisers, and that the majority of decisions are made through bureaucratic politics in Washington. With this in mind, we now move to examine the role of bureaucracy in foreign policy-making.

Much has changed in the foreign policy-making arena in Washington since the United States came out of "historical slumber" of isolation during the Second World War. In its post-War role as a leader of the non-Communist world, the U.S. foreign policy-making bureaucracy has gone through two major transformation one soon after the War, and the other during the 1970s. In 1947 the "National Security Act at one stroke unified the Department of Defence, created the CIA, and established the National Security Council as the principal forum for presidential deliberation and decision in foreign affairs."(20) This was followed by changes during the 1970s in the wake of Vietnam war when Congress passed a series of acts to assert its foreign policy-making role (discussed in chapter II).

These changes have not only influenced the entire character and behaviour of the foreign policy-making system, but diluted the traditional power and authority of the foreign affairs custodian_____the State Department, with the involvement of a large number of Executive departments and agencies in the decision-making process. This in turn, has given birth to a never-ending bureaucratic struggle to influence policy decisions.

It is necessary to distinguish two components of bureaucracy in Washington: the "appointive government" and the "permanent government".(21) The officials who comprise the "appointive government" are those brought in by every new President. Halperin categorizes these officials as "in-and-outers". Their number varies from administration to administration. For example, President Clinton brought in at least five thousand "in-and-outers", including "several hundred secretaries, deputy secretaries, assistant secretaries, and their deputies." The other, and much larger component of bureaucracy is the permanent government employees "who do not change with Presidents, and carry on day to day work of all administrations."(22)

Thus, both categories of bureaucrats serve the same President with different perceptions of national interests. Each policy-making participant's perception of the issue is heavily influenced by his particular concerns.(23) For example, the "particular concerns" of political appointees are usually linked with "their outside professional peer groups"(24) from where they have been selected. Whereas the "concerns" of civil servants are usually tied with their respective organizations in which they work. A career official usually believes that his organization's welfare is important to the national security.(25) In addition, the tug-of-war between ideologues within the bureaucracy to influence foreign policy decisions also plays an important role, what the Bush administration's Under Secretary for Political Affairs called the "Cold War guys [versus] morality guys."

(26)

Although the high level policy-makers, such as the departmental secretaries, deputy secretaries, and assistant secretaries are mostly political appointees of the President, they are usually influenced and "feel pressure from their career bureaucracies not to compromise agency positions",(27) and "often see themselves as their department's representative to the President."(28) Thus, the bureaucratic rivalries, especially among the major policy-making agencies, are frequently identified in Washington, which "has its [own] political culture, its tribal customs, and its idiosyncrasies."(29) "When you say the U.S. administration", said the former British Ambassador in Washington, "I am sorry to be pedantic but there is the Pentagon view, the State Departmental view and the White House view."(30)

One of the important "tribal customs" used by the bureaucracy to influence foreign policy decisions is a leakage of official information to the press, an important part of what Zara Steiner calls "the Byzantine world of Washington."(31) According to Halperin, there are various forms of leaks, such as "private and off-the-record interviews, vague tips to reporters, handing official papers to a reporter, etc."(32) In his opinion "information is provided to the press either to directly affect bureaucratic manoeuvers or to alert and bring into the process participants from outside the bureaucracy".(33) For example, in August 1981, the Washington based

organization TransAfrica, a black American lobby for Africa and the Caribbean, got hold of the State Department's sensitive policy documents towards South Africa and leaked them to the press.(34) The main purpose of "widening the circle" on the part of those who opposed the Reagan administration's South Africa policy was to "spread information to summon political allies within the administration [and] in Congress, [and] to rally public opinion"(35) on U.S.-South Africa policy. Thus each department has its own clientele and its own relations with Congress and certain Committees and Sub-Committees.(36)

In addition, the relationship between an executive department or an agency with the White House is also important in influencing policy. If a department or an agency does not enjoy close ties with the White House it usually loses in the bureaucratic struggle to assert its influence on foreign policy-making.

The Commission on Organization of the U.S. executive branch, generally known as the Hoover Commission, counted in its January 1949 report around 45 executive agencies involved at certain stages in U.S. foreign policy-making.(37) The number reached to fifty according to the 1975 report of the Commission on the organization of the government for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.(38) Among them the Department of State is the major player in this arena. Constitutionally, it is the major supervisory body which engages in both the

decision-making and the decision implementation process.(39)

Apart from the office of the Secretary of State, the Department is divided into "sub-systems", the functional bureaux, the area or geographic bureaux, and the management section. See Table 1.1

TABLE 1.1

Administrative Divisions of the Department of State

SUB-SYSTEMS*	FUNCTIONAL BUREAUX	AREA BUREAUX	MANAGEMENT SECTION
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)	Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)	Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs (EUR)	Executive Secretariate
U.S. Information Agency (USIA)	Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs	Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP)	Protocol
Agency for International Development (AID)	Bureau of Non-Proliferation and Export Controls	Bureau of African Affairs (AF)	Foreign Service Institute
	Bureau of Arms Control and Regional Security	Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA)	Office of Foreign Missions
	Bureau of Public Affairs	Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA)	Administration
	Bureau of Population Refugees, and Migration	Bureau of International Organizational Affairs (IO)	Equal Employment Opportunity Office (EEOC)
	Bureau of Democracy/ Human Rights/ Labour	Bureau of South Asian Affairs	Legal Adviser
	Bureau of Norcotics, Terrorism and Crime		Inspector General
			Foreign Service Grievance Board

CONTINUED

SUB-SYSTEMS	FUNCTIONAL BUREAUX	AREA BUREAUX	MANAGEMENT SECTION
	Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Bureau of Personnel Bureau of Diplomatic Security Bureau of Finance and Management Policy Bureau of Consular Affairs		Civil Service Ombudsman

* John E.Esterline and Robert B.Black in their book ,'Inside Foreign Policy:The Department of State Political Systems', (Mayfield 1975) define these agencies as State Department's sub-systems. (All sub-systems are organizationally independent)

Sources:

1. CSIS Africa Notes, 'Who's Who, and Where: A Guide to Key Personnel in U.S.-African Relations', Number 153, October 1993, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.

2. Esterline, op., cit.

Note: Both the functional and the area bureaux each works under its own assistant secretary of state. However, the management division mainly serves as a communication link between the State Department and the U.S. Congress.

Apart from the State Department, which is the lead agency, the other actors within the Executive branch, who usually play a role in the foreign policy-making system in Washington are defined in Table 1.2

TABLE 1.2

Other Important Executive Departments and Agencies in the Foreign Policy System

DEPARTMENT	AGENCY/BUREAU
The National Security Council (NSC)	The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
The Department of Defence	The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (Advisory role)	The U.S. Information Agency (USIA)
The Department of Treasury	The Agency for International Development (AID)
The Department of Interior	The National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA)
The Department of Commerce	The Export-Import Bank of the United States
The Department of Agriculture	The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
The Department of Labour	The Bureau of Customs
The Department of Energy	

Source:
John E.Esterline and Robert B.Black, 'Inside Foreign Policy: The Department of State Political Systems', Mayfield Publishing Co., California, 1975.

Among these the most pertinent and important are the NSC, and the Defence Department. The NSC is the only component of the Executive Office of the President (EOP) which is exclusively involved in foreign policy-making, and was originally designed to be an advisory forum for the President. Other components of the EOP which are involved to a certain degree in foreign policy-making are: the White House Office; the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); the Council of Economic Advisers; the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative; and the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

The object of the State Department is to coordinate between all these organizations and different entities. Further, since the time of President Lyndon Johnson (1963-69) the system of inter-agency groups has been introduced to coordinate different policies. For example, during Reagan's second term "there were 25 high level inter-agency groups, 55 mid-level inter-agency groups, and more than one hundred other task forces, committees, and working groups."(40) But it is in the State Department where the agenda or policy papers are prepared, which is known as the "initiating of policy".(41) It is noteworthy that participating departments and agencies also have their internal differences concerning any particular policy, but those are usually sorted out within a department or an agency before they are presented in front of the inter-agency discussion.(42)

In addition to the Washington based Executive departments and agencies, Foreign Service Officers,

appointed in various U.S. diplomatic missions worldwide are also an important source of input in foreign policy formulation. These officials are, especially a source of information and a link between their respective host countries and the United States. How much influence a message, a telegram, or a telephone call from a U.S. diplomat abroad carry in Washington during decision-making phase is difficult to measure. In addition to a message coming from a diplomatic mission, information reaches in Washington from numerous other sources as well, both government and non-government. The decision, however, is made according to Washington's own "tribal customs".

On paper the policy-making procedure works pretty much the same from administration to administration, but in practice it may not be progressing in the way it appears in the paperwork. Someone in the bureaucracy might have particular interests and be more involved than someone else. The Bush administration's Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, Ambassador James Bishop Jr. suggested that:

> Any [U.S.] policy is the result of some degree of bargaining among various elements of bureaucracy [in Washington]. Because various elements of the bureaucracy by their very nature have been in different constituencies, so they have different interests. They don't see the situation identically, and there has to be some compromise in order to reach a consensus. (43)

When asked about the formation of foreign policy, Chester Crocker gave this response:

> Well, the broad framework of policy tends to be put forward for discussion at the top level at the beginning of the adminis-

> tration. Certain guidelines would be put on paper and more or less agreed. And that was true not just for the Reagan administration [but] for earlier administrations [as well]. And this is also for Bush administration. You have some efforts on the inter-agency basis to define the broad principles. But having done that a day-to-day conduct of relations is usually at the Assistant Secretary level. (44)

The general practice is that every Executive department and agency in the government that has some interest in its task on any particular policy is asked to submit its views. They all have a chance to have their input. But it does not mean that policy output is always the result of bargaining among all the departments and agencies involved in decision-making. Sometimes the policy decisions are made among the main players, such as the State Department, the White House, and the Defence Department, but usually within the State Department. "The latitudes of bureaucratic politics", said one senior official in the U.S. Commerce Department, "depends upon how connected and how ideological [the] State Department personnel are. Other Executive agencies contribute [in foreign policy-making], but it depends on the State Department's receptivity."(45)

1.3 U.S. Degree of Interest in Africa

Unlike Latin America, Europe, and Asia, (and with the obvious exception of Liberia), the United States has had few traditional links with Africa on such matters as trade and commerce. It was during the Second World War when the United States came into direct contact with Africa.(46) The strategic importance of the continent became perceptable, especially as a result of President Roosevelt's (1933-45) journey via West Africa to meet the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in Morocco in January 1943.(47)

Until the first half of the 1950s nearly the entire African continent, except Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa, was colonized by the European metropoles. Thus the United States, with few exceptions, was not in a position to exert its responsibility towards the continent. However, one of the first early statements of U.S. governmental policy towards Africa was made in May 1950 by the U.S. Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, and African Affairs, George McGhee. In his address before the Sixteenth North West Institute of International Relations, Portland, Oregon, he showed the concern of the Truman administration by saying that his government could not allow Africa to be neglected to the extent that it might meet the same fate as Peoples' Republic of China. He warned that there was still time to act.(48) Such sporadic "Africanist" voices of concern, like

McGhee's, were lost in the predominantly "Europeanist" atmosphere of Washington bureaucracy. Moreover the United States had to withdraw from its traditional role as a candid critic of European colonial rule in Africa, because Western Europe was perceived in Washington as a firm bulwark against Soviet expansionism.(49)

However, it was not until the mid-1950s that the United States began to articulate the need for a "free and friendly Africa" in the wake of the Bundung Conference of April 1955, which gave prominence to nationalist movements in Africa and Asia. A year after the Bundung Declaration, George V.Allen, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs in his policy speech of April 21, 1956 made it clear that:

> All of the so called colonial powers represented on the continent of Africa are our friends and allies in the world-wide contest between the free and the communist world.....A strong, free, and friendly Africa is extremely important to the United States security. (50)

This change, however, became more evident later in 1956 at the time of Suez crisis when the United States did not support Britain and France, the two main colonial powers of Africa. In addition, American attitudes towards Africa also changed with the emergence of civil rights as a more pressing domestic issue.(51)

Eisenhower's last years in the White House bore witness to the climax of independence movements across Africa. By correctly perceiving the wind direction in the continent, the old General made recommendations for

the establishment of the Bureau of African Affairs in April 1957, one month after the independence of Ghana.On his return from attending the independent ceremonies of Ghana, "Nixon, also lobbied for the creation of a separate Bureau of African Affairs to deal with the continent.....in the Cold War battle."(52) The Bureau officially came into existence within the State Department in August 1958, with its own assistant secretary of state. However, the Bureau was more symbolic vis-a-vis other geographic Bureaux in its foreign policy-making influence, especially the Bureau of European Affairs.(53)

During the presidential election campaign of 1960, European colonialism was already nearing its end. "An index to John Kennedy's campaign speeches contained 479 reference to Africa."(54) When Kennedy came into power, his administration paid much more attention to Africa (from Algeria to South Africa) than his predecessors. G.Mennon Williams, an Africa specialist, was appointed as Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. According to Richard Moose, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs (1977-81), "his administration first had the idea of trying to outflank the Marxism in Africa by trying to establish important link and open lines of communication with the then African countries."(55) Or in Brzezinski's opinion: "for Kennedy, it was to move America forward again and in the process to make it more appealing to the developing world."(56) It was also during the Kennedy years in the White House that the Congo crisis

set off all kinds of alarm bells ringing about the threat of Communism and the Soviet influence in the continent.

The Kennedy administration's enthusiasm and interest in newly born African states to "outflank" Communist influence in the continent, and the recognition of their role in international and regional forums, significantly disappeared when Lyndon Johnson came to power after Kennedy's assassination in 1963. This was partly because of the U.S. growing involvement in Vietnam and the domestic civil rights movement, and partly because of the limited nature of issues in Africa during the Johnson administration. It was a period of 'relative calm' in the continent. The majority of black countries had already gained independence, except the Southern portion of the continent where the nationalist movements, a part from the ANC, were still in their formative phase. Therefore, African issues were mainly considered as European concerns with few exceptions, such as the restriction of U.S. Import-Export financing to South Africa in 1964, and the cancellation of all U.S. naval ships' visits to its ports in 1967 in response to Pretoria's refusal to remove colour restrictions from visiting U.S. black crew members.

Lyndon Johnson's successors became preoccupied with the Southern portion of the continent, which became the linchpin of U.S.-Africa policy. This was partly due to the emergence of armed struggles in the region, and partly because of the abrupt collapse of Portuguese colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique in 1975, followed

by an outbreak of armed struggle among the three nationalist movements in Angola. With the inception of the Republican government in the White House under Richard Nixon (1969-74), the National Security Assistant to the President, Henry Kissinger was authorized to prepare a policy memorandum on Southern Africa. The preparation of this study, known as the National Security Study Memorandum-39 (NSSM-39, April 10, 1969) was conducted with extreme secrecy. Among five policy options developed in the study, the National Security Council (NSC) went for option two, also known as the "Tar Baby", which was approved by the President in January 1970. This policy option was based on a "quiet persuasion" to "relax political and economic restrictions on the white states" (57) of Rhodesia and South Africa.

The NSSM-39 is an interesting and valuable study at least from two perspectives: [1] it shows what bureaucracy can do in Washington, D.C. in the field of policy formulation; and [2] it indicates the lack of interest of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in African affairs. (58)

From 1969 until the Watergate scandal of 1972, apart from the NSSM-39, three other NSC study assigments on Africa were prepared. These included: the NSSM-87 (North Africa), January 22, 1970; the NSSM-89 (Southwest Africa), February 12, 1970; and NSSM-115 (Africa), January 25, 1971.(59) Thus between 1972 until Nixon's resignation in 1974, neither the President nor his top advisers, including Henry Kissinger, took personal interest in

Southern African affairs, mostly because of their domestic preoccupation.

A consensus emerged in the United States about the proper response to the threat of Communism in Africa and the Middle East when detente began to crumble in the mid-1970s, certainly no sooner, when the Soviet Union sent Cuban troops to support the MPLA regime in Angola. It was at this stage that President Ford took a personal interest in African affairs and sent the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger to visit Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, Liberia, and Senegal in April 1976. The basic strategy behind Kissinger's Africa visit was to take the initiative in forging rapprochement with black African countries. In his speeches and press conferences in host countries, Kissinger reestablished the U.S. position in Africa.

In his address in Lusaka, Zambia, on April 27, 1976 Kissinger described the American policy towards Africa this way:

> I have come to Africa with open mind and open heart to demonstrate my country's desire to work with you on these great tasks. My journey is intended to give fresh impetus to our cooperation and to usher in a new American policy.(60)

It was during this speech that Kissinger talked about majority rule in Southern Africa. The major thrust of Kissinger's speech, however, was on a "rapid negotiated" settlement for Rhodesia. Thus, the Ford administration's approach certainly moved away from "tacit" support of white minority regimes in Southern Africa. In addition,

the Ford administration's Africa policy also marked the beginning of U.S. policy-making in response to regional events in the continent. The Ford administration's turn-about in U.S. policy was intended to avoid the escalation of racial conflicts in the region.

The years between 1977 and 1981 were America's best years in Africa since the Kennedy administration in terms of presidential interest and initiative. None of the U.S. Presidents since then have been as personally engaged with considerable frequency in African issues as Jimmy Carter. He had paid so much attention to Africa that James Callaghan, then British Prime Minister once remarked: "There seems to be a number of new Christopher Columbuses setting out from the United States to discover Africa for the first time. Africa has been there for a long time."(61)

In 1977 the head of the Carter administration's Policy Planning Staff, Anthony Lake submitted his findings that the policy approach of the NSSM-39 was a failure.(62) Instead of putting emphasis on the strategic dimensions of Southern Africa, the Carter administration emphasized the need for peaceful resolution of conflicts in the region, and seeking an end to apartheid in South Africa.

In order to reduce U.S.-Soviet tension, President Carter appointed Cyrus Vance as his Secretary of State, and Andrew Young, a black-American Congressman, as Ambassador to the United Nations with special African responsibilities. Both men were anti-globalists, and architects of Carter's Africa policy. In addition to Cyrus

Vance, President Carter appointed Warren Christopher, Richard Moose, Donald McHenry, and Anthony Lake, who were also knowledgeable about and interested in Africa.

The Secretary of State in his first major address on Africa before the annual Convention of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People at St. Louis, in July 1977, outlined the following new approach in America's Africa policy:

> Daily headlines should not set our agenda for progress. A negative, reactive American policy that seeks only to oppose Soviet or Cuban involvement in Africa would be both dangerous and futile. Our best course is to help resolve the problems which create opportunities for external interventions. (63)

The Southern Africa issues were at the top of the Carter administration's African agenda. The administration's early Africa policy was based on a belief in the importance of eliminating the unjust system in the region. In its perception social and political injustice, rather than Communism, was the real threat to U.S. interests and influence in the region.

Since the administration's early days President Carter was torn between two policy groups, namely the globalists and the regionalists, led by his Assistant to National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance respectively. Perhaps the Brzezinski-Vance schism on Africa policy was more sharp than any other Third World issue within the Carter administration. As Cyrus Vance has stated in his memoirs: ".....the internal divisions over Africa's place in our

global strategy of managing U.S.-Soviet competition were becoming increasingly difficult."(64)

Against the Vance policy of "African solution to African problems", Brzezinski's thrust was to argue that the Soviet-Cuban military involvement be met forcefully in Africa by supporting militarily those states which would face the possible Communist aggression. Brzezinski pointed out in his memoirs:

> It seemed to me that we had underestimated the Eastern bloc connection in the region and that Andy Young and CY [Cyrus Vance], alongwith most of those at the State [Department] took an excessively benign view of the Soviet and Cuban penetration of Africa, underestimating its strategic implications. (65)

Like the Nixon-Kissinger approach, Brzezinski was looking at Southern Africa from the viewpoint of its geo-strategic importance, whereas Secretary of State Vance, and the President himself (at least until late 1979) were linking the regional problems with human rights issues. Therefore, the Carter administration's policy towards Africa (from 1977 through 1979) was based on not confronting the Soviet-Cuban presence in the continent on the one hand, and condemning the white minority regimes in Southern Africa on the other.

In Vance's account, President Carter's "relatively calm reaction and wait-and-see policy attitude on Soviet-Cuban presence in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Katanga was not popular in Congress."(66) It was only after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 that Carter had to distance himself

quickly from his human rights policy and support for black liberation movements in Southern Africa, and create the rapid deployment force, plus bases for it in Africa and the Middle East. Carter thus adopted Brzezinski's globalist approach "which emphasized the centrality of U.S.-Soviet competition in regional affairs."(67)

In his January 1980 State of the Union Message, known as the Carter Doctrine, President Carter declared:

> Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States and will be repelled by any means necessary including military force.(68)

This speech, therefore, marked the shift from his original policy of accomodation with the Soviet Union to the policy of confrontation.

With the arrival of Ronald Reagan in the White House in January 1981, Africa had to face a U.S. President who was highly uninterested in its affairs. President Reagan's abstract role in foreign policy-making system was not only true in African affairs but other political regions as well. He confined his role only to a few broad themes of foreign policy, especially the containment of Communism. The noted characteristics of the Reagan foreign policy modus operandi was to delegate powers to his cabinet secretaries and their sub ordinates, and to his White House staff. In fact it was only after the Iran-Contra scandal of 1986, followed by the Tower Commission Report(69) which also pointed the finger at the "President's management style", that Reagan was forced

to show a considerable interest in foreign policy-making.

President Reagan's invisible role and indifferent attitude towards Africa are clearly manifested in his thick memoirs, which only contain some brief reference to Angola in the superpower context. The main thrust in the book is given to the Middle East, Lebanon, Grenada, Iran-Contra, and the arms control issues.(70)

Like the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations, the Reagan administration's main interest of Africa policy was in the Southern portion of the continent. The policy which was announced by the new administration was named as "constructive engagement". This policy was based on a "quiet persuasion", as claimed by the administration.

The constructive engagement was a tridimensional policy. First, to build an overall framework for the strengthening of regional security in Southern Africa and to reduce violence. Second, to solve the Namibian issue. Finally, to bring a "positive change" in the racial policy of South Africa. What was new in the constructive engagement was the linkage between the Cuban troops' withdrawal from Angola, and Namibian independence. The architect of the constructive engagement, Chester Crocker gave three reasons for linkage:

> First it was best way to get Namibian independence as we can think about, because it would in fact give a package of which there was something in it for the South Africans to get out of Namibia..... Secondly, the Cubans had no business being in Angola and so for reasons of our Cuban policy and our global policy vis-a-vis the Soviets.....Finally, because the way you can end a logjam in a

> negotiation is by shifting the agenda. That was the only choice.(71)

In fact there was a fourth reason which was probably the most important factor in the linkage affair, and that was Crocker's domestic considerations to 'satisfy' the far right Republican elements. When asked about this his response was:

> Well it was certainly a way of uniting various voices in Washington by bringing together those most concerned about Communism in Angola. It provided a package that Americans could rally around. (72)

Despite "uniting" and appeasing some of the "voices" in Washington, constructive engagement came under severe criticism from five directions. The far right elements in the ruling Republican party and the pro-South Africa bureaucrats in Washington considered it as a continuation of the Carter administration's policy. The more moderate Republicans, such as Senator Nancy Kassabum, labelled it as a "one way street".(73) The Democrats in the United States, and the blacks in Africa portrayed the policy as strengthening the system of apartheid in South Africa. Whereas the far right white elements in South Africa called Crocker an "instigator of Washington's spurious constructive engagement."(74)

A careful analysis of Crocker's Foreign Affairs article entitled, 'South Africa: A Strategy for Change' (Winter 1980/81), and his speech in Honolulu in August 1981, reveals a rational approach towards the Southern African problems. "This was the policy for Southern Africa, not only towards South Africa,"(75) said one of the senior officials on Africa in the U.S. Defence Department. The

question that comes immediately to mind is what were those factors which made it 'unacceptable', especially in the United States? In this regard the following assessments of a Washington-based academic and a former State Department junior official are worth mentioning.

According to Professor William Zartman, "the weakest part of Crocker's operations was the way he handled Congress, and the way Congress handled him. They were very critical of him."(76) In the opinion of a former State Department official, "Crocker had some weakness in his ability to portray effectively a sort of sense of emotional outrage."(77) In sum, the constructive engagement was not really viable in the then existing anti-apartheid mood in the United States, which was in turn affected by those values, beliefs, and traditions, which formed the American political culture. Constructive engagement officially came to an end when the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa concluded in its report in January 1987 that "the administration's strategy of constructive engagement has failed to achieve its objectives in Southern Africa." (78) Despite the Committee's announcement, Crocker was still actively angaged in mediating efforts which resulted in the signing of two accords at the UN headquarters on December 22, 1988. These paved the way for the Namibian independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

1.4 Bureaucratic Structures and Dynamics

The above discussion suggests that the State Department, the Defence Department, and the National Security Council are the major players involved in the U.S. foreign policy-making system. It also indicates that the U.S.-Africa policy-making system has been generally left in the hands of the State Department bureaucracy, with few exceptions, in almost all administrations from Nixon to Reagan. The aim in this section is to describe the bureaucratic organization concerning Africa within the main foreign policy-making organizations, notably the State and the Defence Departments.

In recognition of significance of Africa during the Second World War, a separate office dealing with African issues, especially North of the continent, was established in 1944 in the Near Eastern Division of the State Department.(79)

In 1950 the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs was created under the direction of an Assistant Secretary of State. This Bureau was created in addition to the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, the Bureau of European Affairs, the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, and the Bureau of German Affairs, each under its own assistant secretary of state. Before the establishment of the Bureaux in 1950, they were known as the respective regional offices.

In addition to the creation of the Bureau of Near

Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, an independent Office of African Affairs was also established in the same year under its own Director, which was previously affiliated with the Near Eastern Directorate. In 1957, the year in which President Eisenhower recommended the creation within the State Department of a separate Bureau of African Affairs, the Office of African Affairs was established under the Deputy Assistant Secretary within the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. Joseph Palmer was appointed as its Deputy Assistant Secretary. Between 1950 and 1958 African affairs continued to remain as part of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African affairs. In August 1958, an independent Bureau of Africa Affairs was created within the State Department under its own Assistant Secretary of State, Joseph C.Satterthwaite.

The Bureau of African Affairs, apart from the Assistant Secreatry at its top, has a senior Deputy Assistant Secretary and three Deputy Secretaries. Within the Bureau, Africa South of the Sahara is divided into five zones: the Office of Southern African Affairs (AF/S); the Office of Anglophone and Lusophone West African Affairs (AF/WAL); the Office of Francophone West African Affairs (AF/WF); the Office of Central African Affairs (AF/C); and the Office of East African Affairs (AF/E).

Each area zone within the Bureau is headed by either a Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary or a Deputy Assistant Secretary. The Office of Southern African Affairs is

headed by a Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary. For each zonal office there is also a director, and a deputy director. Apart from the director, two deputies are assigned for Southern Africa. There is usually one desk officer per country, except South Africa, where three desk officers are assigned to deal with the Republic, probably because of the extent of U.S. business links and political interest in the country.

In addition to the State Department, the Defence Department is another major player in the U.S. foreign policymaking system. Until 1956 not a single office specializing in Africa existed in the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs. It was only in 1957 during the Eisenhower administration that the Office of Regional Director for Africa within the Directorate of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs was established. The regional office for Africa, however, continued to work within this Directorate until 1970. In 1970 African affairs were affiliated with the Western Hemisphere Directorate under the direction of the Deputy Assistant Secretary. It was during this time when a separate regional office for Africa was established, both in the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs.

In 1971, Africa was separated from Western Hemisphere, and was affiliated with the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs set-up under a Deputy Assistant Secretary. This arrangement continued until the early

1980s. In 1983, African affairs were taken away from Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and a separate Office of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary/Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa was created within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs. The first Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary/Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs was Noel C.Koch.(80) Currently the Office of African Affairs is working under the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs.

The major analytical arm of the Defence Department, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), now has about 75-80 analysts working on Africa.(81)

The detailed organizational structure for Africa within the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency are hard to provide for obvious reasons related to their confidentiality. What is known in this regard is that currently the "NSC has a senior director who divides his time between Africa and other matters and a full director for Africa." Within the CIA, whose work is divided into analytical and operational activities, African matters are analyzed by the Office of African and Latin American analysis.(82)

1.5 U.S.-Africa Policy-making Apparatus

Larry Bowman has divided U.S. national security and foreign policies towards Africa into three categories. First, "some policies are initiated at the Assistant Secretary level and are approved at the very top by the president and his senior aids; such executive decisions require no legislation." Second, certain policies "are driven by Congressional demands." Third, some policies are "the outcome of intense fighting between different factions within government each aided and abetted by Congressional and nongovernmental allies."(83)

Since the heyday of African independence, U.S.-Africa policy-making has usually been conducted within the State Department and its Bureau of African Affairs. Two other important foreign policy-making actors, the Defence department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), developed their high level of interest in Africa after the abrupt collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in Angola and Mozambique in 1975, followed by the power struggle between pro-Moscow and pro-Western nationalist movements in Angola. (For a detailed account of African specialists and policy-makers see Appendices A and B).

As has been mentioned earlier, during the Carter administration there was a minimal amount of receptivity by the State Department to contributions made by other departments and agencies with regard to Africa policy-making. Therefore, most of the Africa-related foreign policy decisions until the resignation of Ambassador Andrew Young, followed by that of the Secretary

of State, Cyrus Vance in early 1980, were made by the State Department's bureaucracy, what Richard Moose, the administration's Assistant Secretary for African Affairs called the "policy consensus", in an interview with this author. It remain noteworthy that during the Carter administration the entire focus of U.S. Africa policy was on the Eastern and Southern parts of the continent. Talking about policy-making procedure Moose said:

> Anthony Lake, who was the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, myself and Andrew Young were close collaborators on Africa policy. We worked together. There was very little discourse. Sometimes one wanted to push a little bit more than the other. Don McHenry was an important member to this group too. And we did't have inter-agency problems between the departments except Commerce.....I had an easier job than anyone who was ever Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. I was put under an Under Secretary for Political Affairs. The first one who didn't care about Africa and just didn't take any position at all. He just stayed.....Philip Habib, now dead, and a long-time diplomat. Habib would never do what I wanted. His successor was David Newsome. So when you had Newsome, there had me and never mind. The matter I reported to Newsome, Newsome reported to [Warren] Christopher [Deputy Secretary of State]. Christopher reported to [Cyrus] Vance. Vance reported to the President who was advised by Andy Young, and we all shared a common view and concern about Africa.(84)

This kind of coalition, among individuals within the bureaucracy regarding any particular U.S. policy formulation is one of the main characteristics of bureaucratic politics.

During the Carter administration "there was little or no environment for the Defence Department in Southern Africa", said Moose. He further briefed:

> I can't remember they [Defence] had been involved there [during the Carter administration] though they were aware. I mean we had to check them and they never made serious efforts to influence policy. We used the Defence Department at one time for some re-supply operations in Shaba [II, 1978]. The Defence Department became interested after the war in Afghanistan [in 1979] and the Iranian situation got bad and Carter went to his Indian Ocean strategy, then the Defence Department's interest in having bases on [the Indian Ocean] littorals.(85)

Until late 1979, the State Department, despite the policy disagreements with the NSC, seemed to be in full control of U.S.-Africa policy. When this issue was raised with Moose his response was:

> There was a conflict over the Horn of Africa [between the State Department and the NSC]. There was conflict over Angola. But there was never conflict over South Africa. We never had a problem for that..... I don't recall Brzezinski ever having a word to say about South Africa, or Rhodesia, Zambia, never.....I don't recall. I don't think he ever mentioned. He just did not involve. He just left us alone.(86)

The "common view" and "consensus" within the Carter administration regarding Africa policy came to an 'end' after the resignation of Andrew Young and Cyrus Vance. The 'foreign ministry' was shifted from the State Department under Secretary Edmund Muskie to the White House basement under Dr. Brzezinski.

The growing Soviet-Cuban involvement in Southern and East Africa, the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1978, and finally the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan in December 1979, eventually changed the world perception of President Carter, who adopted Brzezinski's globalist approach and quickly moved to military plans to counter

Soviet 'expansionism'.

Under the Reagan style of delegation of responsibility in foreign policy-making, the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs "Chester Crocker had a remarkable degree of autonomy under both [Alexander] Haig and [George] Shultz"(87) in dealing with African issues. As Crocker has mentioned in his memoirs: "By the standards of other U.S. policies in other regions we had a long leash and a high degree of autonomy"(88) in the making of U.S.-Africa policy. Throughout the Reagan administration the focus of U.S.-Africa policy had been on the Southern portion of the continent.

Thus, the degree of autonomy given to the Bureau of African Affairs in foreign policy-making continued until 1985. By this time in a startling volte-face, the U.S.-Africa policy-making network had shrunk to the White House and Congress. In effect Africa policy was taken away from the State Department in what Crocker calls "the great foreign policy robbery." This was really the time when the Secretary of State George Shultz, and Assistant Secretary Crocker wanted to go in one direction while the White House was going in another in relation to Africa policy. In Crocker's own account, by this time:

> .....the free hand we had previously enjoyed became an object of nostalgia. Suddenly we found ourselves ensnared in the polorization, hypocrisy, and purely political logic that just flourished outside our doors in Washington. Africa would now became the ultimate "freebie" in American foreign policy.(89)

Who were the "hypocrits" behind the smoke screen?

Crocker told this author that during 1985 and 1986, President Reagan was mostly listening to his White House Chief of Staff, Donald Reagan and the Director of Intelligence, William Casey.(90) In his memoirs Crocker has also identified Pat Buchanan, the White House Communication Director, as another important member of the group responsible for the Southern African "foreign policy robbery" from the State Department.

The role of the Defence Department in Africa policy -making during the Reagan administration seems to have been peripheral as well, as under the Carter administration. On paper there were in existence "some Policy Coordinating Committees (PCC) which were represented by the State Department at the Assistant Secretary level and in the Defence by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa", as told by an official in the Defence Department to this author. He went on further to describe the way things were formally done. "If the issue in the PCC can't really be resolved then we move up one level, what we call it the Deputy level."(91) It is difficult to provide evidence of bureaucratic "pulling and hauling" on Africa policy between the State and the Defence Departments at the Assistant Secretary level during the Reagan administration. But it can be assumed that because of the Defence's peripheral role in the Africa policy-making process, none of the Africa-related issues would have reached to the Deputies Committee.

In sum, U.S-Africa policy-making during the first Reagan term was under the control of the Bureau of African

Affairs. In its second term, especially between 1984 and 1986 the South African issue came to the top of the Reagan administration's African agenda. During this time the significant discontent between U.S.-Africa policy-makers, especially between the State Department and the White House bureaucracy created a policy vacuum in Washington which was filled by Congress by passing the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) in 1986 to impose sanctions on South Africa.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have tried to discuss the foreign policy-making structure in the United States, the role of major actors in this arena, both in general and towards Africa, and the bureaucratic structure concerning Africa in the State and the Defence Departments.

We have distinguished two situations in which foreign policy decisions are made in Washington, D.C. emergency situation, and non-emergency situation. Only highly crucial foreign policy decisions are made by President and his top advisers. The rest of the foreign policy decisions are made within the State Department, usually with consultations with other major actors, such as the Defence Department and the National Security Council (NSC).

This chapter has also identified that South Africa has never reached a crisis situation in U.S. foreign policy-making. One middle-level official in the Defence Department said:

> I am working since last ten years here [in the Defence Department] but neither of Secretaries said no, here is what I want to do, on anything on Sub-Saharan Africa. I know those things happen to other regions. I know. I [have] worked in [the office of] Middle East [affairs] before I came here. I know you get things back saying "disagree", and remarkable notes from Secretary, Under Secretary, not just in the Defence, in the State [Department as well].(92)

The presidential initiatives and interest in African affairs has usually been in response to African events. For example, the Eisenhower and Kennedy interest in Africa

was in response to newly-emerging nations there and the Congo crisis. President Gerald Ford's response was to growing armed struggle among the nationalist movements in Angola, and the Soweto riots in South Africa during the mid 1970s. On the other hand, Jimmy Carter responded to human rights violations in Southern Africa.

We have also identified that under the successive U.S. administrations from Richard Nixon to Ronald Reagan, African issues had been decided mostly within the Bureau of African Affairs. With this in mind, we now turn to assess the role of Congress and public opinion in the making of U.S. foreign policy, both general and towards Africa.

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CHAPTER II

ROLE OF CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING

Introduction

All U.S. foreign policy decisions ranging from treaties, appointments, and declaration of war to the appropriation of economic loans and military assistance to foreign nations, made by the Executive branch, are subject to congressional approval. On the other hand, on certain foreign policy issues Congress passes acts which become the law of the land to be implemented by the Executive branch. This two-pronged congressional role in foreign policy decision-making makes the Legislative body "approximately co-equal with that of the Executive"(1) in this regard.

However, foreign policy-decisions, such as economic and military assistance to foreign nations, are not usually insulated from the influence of interest group organizations. Notable in this regard are the business groups. In addition, the role of public opinion in foreign policy-making mainly appears when the issue falls within the public limelight and interest, such as Vietnam and South Africa during the Nixon and the Reagan administrations respectively.

This chapter will proceed in two stages. First, to examine the theoretical and practical role of Congress

in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy, followed by its actual involvement in Africa policy-making. Second, to analyse the role and influence of public opinion in foreign policy-making both in general and towards Africa in particular.

2.1 Role of the Congress

The United States' Congress created by Article 1, Section I of the U.S. constitution is empowered to declare war, to ratify treaties, to lay duties, and to regulate commerce with foreign countries.(2) However, the declaration of war, and the ratification of treaties are its most influential foreign policy powers.

How Congress asserts its role and influence in foreign policy-making vis-a-vis the Executive branch has always been controversial because of the unclear constitutional powers assigned to both branches of government in this field. Commenting on the vague power-sharing between the Legislature and the Executive, Hans Morgenthau said the: ".....constitution nowhere makes clear with whom the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy rests."(3) On certain foreign policy issues, the constitution is also not clear about delegating powers. These include for example, neutrality, abrogation of treaties, and the recognition of new governments.(4)

From the time of the adoption of the U.S.

constitution in 1789, foreign policy-making has been predominantly an Executive affair. However, the Legislative branch has sporadically asserted its influence vis-a-vis the Executive in foreign affairs. For example, between Woodrow Wilson's (1913-1921) second term and through the administrations of Presidents Warren Harding (1921-23); Calvin Coolidge (1923-29); and Herbert Hoover (1929-33). During this period Congress demonstrated its capacity to assert itself in the field of foreign policy. The most dramatic example being when the Senate confronted President Woodrow Wilson, refusing to ratify the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 to allow the United States to join the League of Nations.(5)

Thus long before the congressional revolts and reforms of the 1970s, Cabell Phillips, suggested in 1949, that Congress exerts influence on U.S. foreign policy-making in three ways:

> First, the congressional debates certainly influence the decision-making on issues which are very much in the limelight.
> Second, the Congressmen remain in constant contact with their respective constituents, therefore mirror the public opinion on these issues, and pass those bills which are having grass-root support.
> Third, Congress exerts influence through its control of the purse.(6)

In the post-War period congressional assertiveness grew during the Nixon era, as a result of growing U.S. military involvement in the Far East, especially after the revelation of secret bombing in Cambodia and Laos. Congress overrode the presidential veto and passed the War Powers Act in 1973 requiring "the President [to]

inform Congress within forty-eight hours of the introduction of American forces into combat." It further requires "that [President] gain congressional sanction of his action within sixty days; and if Congress refuses that sanction, he disengage within another thirty days."(7) These developments led the then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to acknowledge the role of Congress in the foreign policy-making process. As he observed:

> The decade-long struggle in this century over executive dominance in foreign affairs is over. The recognition that Congress is a coequal branch of government is the dominant fact of national politics today. The executive accepts that the Congress must have both the sense and the reality of participation; foreign policy must be a shared enterprise.(8)

However, the 1970s "political earthquake" in Washington, had vibrations which not only upset the Executive branch, but "shook the old power structure in Congress as well",(9) where authority was controlled only by committee and sub-committee chairmen. The decision-making power and influence of the "old guard", was challenged by new breed of young and more educated Congressmen. As a result, the power flowed from party leaders to individual members of Congress.(10) Unlike the pre-1970s presidents, who dealt largly with party leaders and committee chairmen in major foreign policy decisions, the post-1970s presidents have to 'trade' with almost all the individual members of Congress, what Zara Steiner has called the "535 potential Secretaries of State each of whom feels competent to take the

initiative in foreign affairs."(11)

The passage of the War Powers Act marked the beginning of a series of Acts passed by Congress during the 1970s to assert its foreign policy-making role vis-a-vis the Executive branch. These Acts oblige the Executive branch to take Congress into account before the final decisions on economic and military aid are made and implemented, especially in the field of human rights, and the sale of nuclear related material to foreign countries. The notable developments in this regard were:

1. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973;
2. Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974;
3. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975;
4. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Act of 1976; and
5. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978.

The Foreign Assistance Act was amended in 1973 to authorize the President to deny economic or military assistance to the government of any foreign country which was engaged in practicing imprisonment of its country's citizens for political purposes.(12)

In 1974 Congress passed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act to prohibit the intelligence agency's covert operations, except the collection of intelligence information by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in foreign countries.(13) This was followed by the establishment of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence under the chairmanship of

Senator Frank Church, and Representative Otis Pike respectively in 1975. The Church Committee was formed to investigate the CIA's involvement in alleged assassination plots against foreign leaders,(14) whereas the main focus of the Pike Committee was on the CIA's overseas operations. First, the Committee's report provided evidence of the agency's failure to predict a number of international incidents, including the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Arab-Israel war of 1973, the Portuguese coup of 1974, and India's nuclear test of 1974. Second, the report proved the agency's covert actions in the Italian parliamentary elections of 1972, arms support to Kurds against the government of Iraq, and its involvement in civil war in Angola in 1975.(15)

In addition, the promulgation of the presidential Executive Orders of 1976 and 1978 by Ford and Carter respectively were, in fact mainly based on the recommendations pin-pointed by the above committees. Besides a number of restrictions, both the Executive Orders imposed a ban on the CIA's direct or indirect assassination attempts.(16) Also in 1978, President Carter ordered the Director Central Intelligence (DCI) and heads of other intelligence agencies and bureaux to keep the Senate and House Intelligence Committees regularly informed concerning U.S. intelligence activities abroad. Further the presidential order required to provide any information needed by above committees.(17)

In addition to the Foreign Assistance Act and the

Hughes-Ryan Amendment, Congress passed the International Development and Food Assistance Act in 1975. Section 116 of the Act reads: "No assistance may be provided under this part to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."(18) The next legislation passed by Congress in 1975 was the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Act. (19)

After a long debate between the Executive and the Legislative branches during the Ford and the early Carter administrations, on the question of nuclear exports, Congress passed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act in 1978. The Act "require those states that import nuclear fuel and technology from the United States to accept the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection of all their nuclear facilities."(20)

Thus, the above mentioned legislation passed during the 1970s indicate the congressional intention to share foreign policy-making under powers given it by the constitution. The "constitution" in the words of Professor Corwin "is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy."(21)

However, in the absence of a clear constitutional distinction between a treaty and an executive agreement, modern presidents have usually concluded executive agreements with foreign countries, which are not subject to Senate ratification with two-thirds majority votes,

rather passed by both houses with simple majority votes. For example, "during the first Nixon administration 1,087 executive agreements were concluded, as opposed to only eight treaties."(22)

The congressional involvement in foreign policy-making since the early 1970s "can be deep [but] without being either effective or responsible", say Graham Allison and Peter Szanton.(23) This is mostly because it has too "diverse" a nature to play a leading role in foreign policy-making.

Kegley and Wittkopf have identified at least three obstacles to Congress' foreign policy-making role viz, "parochialism", "organizational weakness", and "lack of expertise."

Kegley and Wittkopf's first factor explains that Congressmen are mostly concerned about the problems and development of their respective constituencies since all members of the House and a third of Senate members bid for reelection after every 730 days. They therefore pay limited attention and spend less time on most foreign policy issues.

According to their second obstacle, the congressional power and authority is dispersed and fregmented. It has become more diluted since the 1970s reforms involving the decentralization of powers from committee to sub-committee, which in turn has reduced the importance and influence of the committees' leadership.

Finally, the authors believe that the lack of

expertise in the foreign affairs field is another hindrance to an effective congressional role in foreign policy-making. Although Congress has tried, for example, to fill that vacuum by creating the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to evaluate scientific and technical proposals, and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to analyse the budget options and to prepare the annual budget resolution; it still lacks a lot in comparison with the Executive branch.(24)

The post-1970s evidence suggest that Congress has usually taken advantage of bureaucratic friction in Washington, D.C, on major foreign policy issues. Those rivalries have proved a driving force which usually activates the otherwise "fragmented" Congress to step in as a united force in foreign policy matters. The best examples in this regard are the bureaucratic friction within the Nixon-Kissinger administration regarding the government's Vietnam policy, and the leakages of secret information to press and Congress, which resulted in the passage of the War Powers Act in 1973. Another example in which Congress took advantage of bureaucratic friction was the Reagan administration's policy towards South Africa. The bureaucratic rivalries in Washington in this regard virtually created a policy vacuum, which encouraged Congress to act against the administration's South Africa policy. As a result, Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) in 1986, to inaugurate its policy towards the Republic. In both cases Congress overrode

the presidential vetos.

In recognizing the congressional role in foreign policy-making, the Reagan administration's Secretary of State, George Shultz, two months after the passage of the CAAA remarked in December 1986: "The administration's doubts about the utility of punitive sanctions were, and are serious. Neverthless, they are the law of the land, and we will enforce them."(25) Despite the congressional activism during the last couple of decades or so in foreign policy-making matters, the evidence suggest that the bureaucracy still control the reins of foreign policy because of its role in implementing laws.

2.2 Role of Congress in Africa Policy-Making

The Congress comprises standing committees, select or special committees, and sub-committees which, in fact are the core of the Legislative body. It is here:

> .....where expertise resides, where policies incubate, where most legislative proposals are written or refined, where many necessary compromises are made, where the public can make its views known, and where members of Congress build influence and reputation.(26)

The number of committees varies from Congress to Congress. For example, the total number of committees and sub-committees in both houses, at the beginning of the 102nd Congress (1991-1993) was 294, of which the Senate comprised twenty committees (standing, special and select, and joint) with eighty seven sub-committees. The total number of committees in the House of Representatives was twenty-seven with one hundred and forty-eight sub-committees.(27)

Of 47 congressional committees, twenty eight are engaged with foreign affairs responsibilities (see Appendix C). Out of that, nineteen were established over a passage of years during the 19th century, two in 1958, and five during the 1970s, the decade of congressional revolts and reforms. These committees, however, are "the most powerful administrative units"(28) in the field of foreign policy-making.

Among these the Foreign Relations Committee, and the Armed Services Committee, in addition to other committees shown in Appendix D, are the most important

in the Senate. Similarly, in the House of Representatives, the Foreign Affairs Committee(29), and the Armed Services Committee are influential in this regard.

Traditionally the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was regarded as an influential decision-making actor in foreign policy, because of its treaty-making power. The role of its House equivalent___Foreign Affairs Committee___on foreign policy questions quickly grew with the emergence of U.S. economic commitments abroad in the post World War II period. The proposals to aid other nations require the consent of Congress.(30) However, the Armed Services Committees of both houses have jurisdiction over defence related policies, such as military assistance programmes.(31)

There are also Africa Sub-Committees in both houses. Throughout the 1980s the Senate Sub-Committee had been chaired by antiapartheid Senators, such as Dick Clark, Nancy Kassebaum, and Paul Simon. Also during the same period the House Sub-Committe had been headed by Congressman Howard Wolpe, a strong opponent of apartheid (see Appendix D). Traditionally the House Sub-Committee on Africa has usually remained active in holding hearings on U.S. policy towards the continent. During the Nixon administration, the then Chairman of the House Sub-Committee on Africa, Charles Diggs announced that he could not continue to represent the United States as a delegate to the 26th General Assembly of the United Nations in 1971 because of the Nixon-Kissinger approach

towards Africa, and resigned in protest from the delegation.(32)

During the early 1960s, Africa was so peripheral in the Senate that after the resignation of Senator Gore from the chair of the Senate Sub-Committee on Africa, no one was willing to chair the Sub-Committee. This trend, however, took a different turn during the mid-1970s when the Senate Sub-Committee on Africa became much visible during the Angola debate. As a result, several Senators became interested in Africa and applied for its membership.(33)

Within Congress there exist a number of caucuses, such as the Polish-Americans, the Italian-Americans, the black-Americans etc. Among them the most effective in mobilizing public opinion has been the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), comprised of black legislators. The CBC was formed in 1971 with a nine members who at that time had only a small role in the congressional power structure. By 1991 its number had reached to twenty-six, comprising twenty-five Democrats, and one Republican.(34)

The CBC is active in influencing U.S.-Africa policy through congressional pressure and private lobbying organizations. The idea for a foreign policy pressure group developed at the Black Leadership Conference, arranged by CBC in September 1976. The conference concluded with a resolution that this sort of gap in black-American influence on U.S.-Africa policy could be filled by establishing a private pressure group. In the following

year TransAfrica was incorporated in July 1977.

The CBC, however, sharpened its tools to influence U.S.-Africa policy shortly before the independence of the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau. With CBC at the forefront, assisted by white liberal Congressmen interested in, and concerned about Africa, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act on December 30, 1974. The new section of the amended Act said, ".....an official statement should be issued of U.S. support for the independence of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau, and of our desire to have good relations with the future governments of the countries."(35) This was followed by the first CBC comprehensive critique of U.S.-Africa policy in December 1975 after the revelation of the covert CIA support for the Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).(36)

As has been suggested Congress has usually taken advantage of bureaucratic friction in Washington D.C. to step in to assert its constitutional role in foreign policy-making. In the case of Angola, among other factors, the bureaucratic rivalry played an important part in stimulating congressional interest in U.S.-Southern Africa policy. The bureaucratic dissension first came to the surface when information regarding the CIA's involvement in Angola was leaked (by those who opposed the Ford administration's policy) to press, and Congress. This was followed by the resignation of Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, in 1976 in protest

against the Ford-Kissinger policy for covert military intervention in Angola. The last nail in U.S.-Angola policy was driven in by the resignation of John Stockwell, the head of the CIA's Angola Task Force.

According to Sullivan Challenor, the CBC played one of the major roles in convincing Henry Kissinger in August 1975 to "make a major foreign policy statement [on Africa] and to take a fact-finding trip to Sub-Saharan Africa."(37) Between the CBC-Kissinger meeting of August 1975, and Kissinger's trip to Southern Africa in April 1976, Congress cut off funds and military supplies to UNITA and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), in December 1975. This, however, also played a role in Ford-Kissinger's turn-about in U.S.-Africa policy. It was during this trip to Africa, that Kissinger extended the hand of friendship to black African states, and talked about majority rule in Southern Africa.

Throughout the Carter administration, the Congressional Black Caucus "was a leading force in the fight to maintain U.S. sanctions against Rhodesia."(38) On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the CBC, as a united force, did not push hard for economic sanctions against South Africa during the Carter administration. In addition, the climate within Congress itself was not favourable in this regard as well.

With the inception of the Reagan administration in the White House in 1981, the United States "entered what might be considered a second postreconstruction phase

during which the gains made by blacks in the late 1960s [were] being eroded,"(39) says Herschelle Challenor. The efforts and appeals made by the black community both inside and outside Congress, and by other sympathetic legislators to end minority rule in Southern Africa, did not receive much attention in the then existing climate in Washington. During the final year of the first Reagan term, Congressman Julian C.Dixon, then Chairman of the CBC wrote:

> Africa unlike so many other geographical areas does not have a powerful lobby in the United States to guard its interests and advocate on its behalf. It is therefore the responsibility of those of us in the U.S. Congress who care about the continent to continue exerting pressure on Pretoria to force it to reevaluate constantly the cost of apartheid.(40)

Throughout the first Reagan term, the CBC and other black pressure organizations consolidated themselves and were waiting for a chance to overturn the Reagan administraion's Southern Africa policy.

The years between 1985 and 1986 were, in fact a period of the greatest foreign policy tension between the Executive and the Legislature since the Vietnam war. Throughout this period South Africa was on top of both the Reagan administration's and the congressional African agendas. By this time the administration's South Africa policy was no longer the preserve of the Democrats. On December 4, 1984, two Republican Senators, Richard G.Lugar (Indiana), and Nancy L.Kassebaum (Kansas) sent a public letter to President Reagan asking him to speak out strongly

against apartheid. In the following year the House of Representatives passed the Anti-Apartheid Act, generally known as the Gray-Kennedy Bill on June 5, 1985 by a vote of 295-127, with 239 Democrats and 56 Republicans.(41) The Gray-Kennedy Bill, however, did not succeed in the Senate.

Between 1985 and 1986, President Reagan vetoed four foreign policy bills. The Congress sustained three and overrode one veto, related to South Africa policy, in which Congress imposed economic sanctions against the Republic. This bill was sponsored by a black legislator, Willaim H.Gray III. The Sanctions debate and its provisions will, however, be discussed in detail in a separate chapter later in this study.

2.3 Role of Public Opinion

"Decision-makers in foreign policy are much more intimately connected with their domestic than with their foreign environment",(42) wrote Joseph Frankel in the early 1960s, when U.S. domestic and foreign policies were becoming significantly intertwined in the wake of its growing military involvement in Vietnam. However, much has changed since then because of the revolutionary developments in electronic media.

How much influence public opinion and domestic interest groups, and organizations exercise in U.S. foreign policy-making is the focus of discussion in this section.

Although the term public opinion is frequently invoked it remains an ill-defined concept.(43) As a consequence of its vagueness(44) it is difficult to measure the extent and response given by governments to the preferences of their citizens in the foreign policy-making arena. Sometimes the individual foreign policy issues which becomes the focus of public attention "can create a domestic environment that policy-makers are unlikely to ignore."(45) These kinds of issues are only brought to public limelight through protracted and hardworking mobilization of pressure group organizations and media

However, public opinion's impact on foreign policy-making has attracted the attention of many scholars who have written both for and against its role in policy-making process. Among those who emphasize its

importance, and support its role are, for example, Lester Markel and Eugene R.Wittkopf. Markel, the philosopher journalist, who held the post of sunday editor of the New York Times during the 1940s, wrote:

> Public opinion, whether it be controlled, as in Russia, or uncontrolled, as in the United States, plays so important a role in foreign policy that it must be treated as a matter of the first importance.(46)

According to Wittkopf, "The public's foreign policy beliefs importantly shape the domestic political environment within which presidents must formulate policy and build support for it."(47)

At least two theoretical models, the pluralist, and power elite, deal with public influence on foreign policy-making. The focus of the pluralist model of foreign policy-making is that "individual Americans influence policy by organizing themselves into groups to petition the government on behalf of their shared interest and values."(48) According to this model all Americans are members of these groups, which are often called interest or pressure groups. Therefore "the public is conceived largely as a heterogeneous and varied society composed of many different groups with different interests."(49) The policy out-put, therefore is the result of a tug-of-war between these groups.

Some critics of this model argue that a small faction of influential individuals, groups and organizations is involved in the policy-making process based on their

particular interests and preferences. Ordinary citizens are bystanders, only casually attentive to the policy-making conflicts.(50)

Another model which concentrates on public influence in foreign policy-making is the power-elite model, as articulated by C.Wright Mills. According to Mills, those individuals who head the military, corporate and governmental departments, in fact make decisions and control America. The family and social interrelationships among the three elites are very close. Moreover, this group of individual decision-makers shares similar origins, education, career and lifestyles.(51)

Thus, the disagreement among the ruling elite model versions exists in relation to the conspiratorial role of the elite. Some versions assume that elites directly and secretly communicate and cooperate with one another during the policy-making process, and that they are therefore conspirators.(52)

In this context the Carter and the Reagan administrations may be treated as examples of conspiracy-oriented theory. In the Carter administration, the focus was on the presence of a large number of Trilateral Commission members in high-level policy-making positions. The Trilateral Commission, which was established on the initiative of the Council on Foreign Relations, was organized in 1973 to coordinate economic policy between the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. Nineteen of the Commission's sixty-five members were appointed to top

positions or served as official advisers in the Carter administration, including Jimmy Carter himself, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Cyrus Vance, Harold Brown, and Walter Mondale.(53)

Similarly, in the Reagan administration at least a dozen top officials and thirty-one advisers were members of the Council on Foreign Relations.(54) These included, for example, George Bush, Casper Weinberger, George Shultz, Alexander Haig, Donald Regan, and William Casey.(55).

The power-elite theories assume there is no such conspiracy but rather a convergence of interest among economic, military, and governmental elites that lead them to prefer similar policies.(56) In sum, only a few thousand top-echelon individuals could influence foreign policy decisions in the United States.

However, the above models suggest that there are many kinds of public, not a single public. Gabriel Almond and many other observers who follow his pioneering work about the role of public opinion in foreign policy-making, are of the belief that U.S. public is divided into segments in this regard.(57) Almond divided the U.S. public into three parts; "the mass public", "the attentive public", and "the opinion elite" public. He argued that the mass or general public consisting of about seventy-five to ninety percent of the adult population is uninformed about specific foreign policy issues. They usually share the belief and values of their leaders when they elect or select them. Therefore this group of the public does

not affect the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy.

The second segment of Almond's public, "the attentive public", consists of more or less ten percent of the adult population, which is informed and interested in the country's foreign policy. This group of people usually reads the New York Times , the Washington Post , and other equally important newspapers, and periodicals, and are generally associated with various interest groups or ethnic organizations. This segment of the public, says Almond, provides a liaison between the vast majority of ordinary citizens and the "elite public".

The "Opinion elite public"____Almond's third category ____is composed of one to two percent of the adult population of the country. These are the people who in fact formulate the policy options through their writings in newspapers, books etc, and in seminars from various platforms. In turn, their ideas are being discussed by policy-makers during the policy-making process. The members who constitutes this category of public, for example, includes syndicated columists; academics; staff members of the most powerful House and Senate committees; such as the armed services, and foreign affairs committees; the Representatives and Senators etc.(58)

During the last two decades or so, the American public have become more interested in international politics and foreign policy matters, mainly because of the tremendous developments in both printed and electronic media. For example, television shaped the attitudes of

the American public through intense coverage of the mid -1980s' violence in South Africa and the domestic sanctions debate against the Republic.

In addition to the role of media, the mobilization of public opinion is another important factor which cannot be neglected in this area. For example, it would be fair to cite the role played by anti-Vietnam leaders in mobilizing the public opinion against U.S. policy towards Vietnam. The mobilization of public opinion in this case, however, seems to have been tied to the course of events in South East Asia because of the escalation of war during the Johnson and the early Nixon administrations. "The percentage of Americans who said it had been a mistake for the United States to send troops to Vietnam ranged from over 25 percent (in 1965) to 58 percent (in 1969)."(59)

However, despite the rise of anti-war sentiments in the United States, public opinion was not the major driving force which compelled the policy-makers to change the course of Vietnam policy, rather one of the many factors. These included for example, "the lack of military progress.....casualities caused by military engagement, and great economic cost of the war."(60)

As has been discussed above, the central assumption of the pluralist model is that the public has an impact on the course of policy through interest group organizations. What are interest groups? David Truman in his celebrated book, 'The Governmental Process:

Political Interests and Public Opinion', has defined the term as referring to:

> .....any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavio[u]r that are employed by the shared attitudes.(61)

According to the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences it is "a voluntary association of individuals who band together for the defense of an "interest".....the term may be used interchangeably with pressure groups...."(62), what Joseph Frankel calls "a fashionable term for sactional organizations which exercise influence on politics."(63) Christopher Hill suggest that pressure groups should be distinguished from interest groups. Not all interest groups are pressure groups. Pressure groups mostly act on government, whereas interest groups act on society in general. They have a wider function to try to convince fellow citizens.(64)

Keeping the nature of American pressure groups in view, Gabriel Almond identified seven major categories of U.S. pressure groups which are involved in foreign policy politics, including organized labour, such as the American Federation of Labour, and Congress of Industrial Organization; business organizations, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and National Association of Manufacturers; agricultural groups, such as the Farm Bureau Federation; veteran groups, such as the American Legion; women's groups, such as the American Association of University Women; religious groups, such as the National

Council of Churches; and ethnic groups, such as Jews etc.(65)

How much influence a particular interest group wields in the foreign policy arena is hard to measure. In Milbrath's opinion the interest group influences are great when the issue is not in the limelight.(66) As opposed to the influence of an interest/pressure group, the general public reaction emerges effectively when the issue is in the limelight, such as during the Vietnam war, and the mid-1980s' crisis in South Africa.

As compared to other major pressure groups which are interested in foreign policy decision-making,"the ethnic groups participation on foreign policy issues remained low until the early 1970s."(67) These groups includes for example, the Jewish-Americans, the Irish-Americans, the Polish-Americans, the black-Americans etc.

Of all the ethnic minorities, the Jewish-American lobby usually exert great influence in determining the course of U.S. policy towards Israel, since its creation in 1948. Sherman Adams, an assistant to President Eisenhower, pointed out the influence of the Jewish lobby by saying:

> Any attempt to give aid to Arabs always met with opposition behind the scenes in Washington, where the members of Congress were actually aware of the strong popular sentiments in this country for Israel. Had the members of Congress either underestimated or overlooked the strength of such feeling they would have been quickly reminded of it by the alert representatives of the many well-organized pro-Israel lobbies that were

always effective and influential in the capital.(68)

During the first half of the 1970s the influence of ethnic groups on foreign policy-making became more significant when Congress passed two pieces of legislation, probably under the influence of the Jewish-American and the Greek-American lobbies. In 1972 Congress passed the Jackson-Vanil Amendment to tie in the Soviet Union's most-favoured nations status with the Soviet willingness to allow its Jewish citizens to emigrate to the country of their choice. A second bill passed by Congress, in which the Greek-American lobby played an important role, enforced an arms embargo on Turkey in 1974 over its occupation of northern Cyprus.(69)

Unlike the Jewish community, the black-American ethnic minority, which comprises at least 13 percent of the population of the United States, who have always had an interest in Africa, have had a little influence in determining the course of U.S. policy towards the continent of their ancestors,(70) despite their effectiveness in mobilizing public opinion as in case of South Africa.

Until now we have discussed the power of public, and interest/pressure group organizations to influence foreign policy decisions in the United States. With this in mind we have to focus our attention on the role of Africa-related pressure groups in the making of U.S.-Africa policy.

2.4 Role of Pressure Groups in Africa Policy-Making

As has been mentioned in the previous section (2.2), within Congress Africa-related policy issues have usually been activated by the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and white liberal Congressmen interested in African issues. Outside Congress the black American mobilization over U.S. policy towards Africa in the 1970s and 1980s involved mass activities such as demonstrations by Afro-oriented organizations, and black community mobilization through organizations, such as TransAfrica.(71) However, since the inception of the Carter administration in 1977, with its emphasis on Southern African issues, the primary focus of Afro-oriented organizations both inside and outside Congress had been on South Africa.

It must be noted that out of more or less 12 prominent U.S. national anti-aparthied organizations whose primary focus was on the apartheid regime of South Africa, there have been three predominantly black organizations: the Washington based TransAfrica, the New York based National Black United Front, and the Congressional Black Caucus, composed of black-American legislators.(72)

The pressure groups in this discussion, however, refer to black-American ethnic groups who have been and are interested in U.S. policy towards Africa. The role of the anti-apartheid groups most of whom came into existence since 1962(73), will be discussed in a separate chapter dealing with sanctions issue later in this study.

Traditionally the black-American organizations have had a little influence in making of U.S.-Africa policy. But "....there has consistently existed a base of interest of these organizations which has been delegitimized by racial subordination."(74)

Since the early nineteenth century, the black-Americans started developing an interest in Africa related foreign policy issues through social and political organizations. Notable in this regard are: the American Colonization Society (ACS), created in January 1817; the Council of African Affairs (CAA), which came into existence in 1937; the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), founded in 1953; the American Society of African Culture (AMSAC), created in 1957; the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa and African Liberation Support Committee (ANLCA), founded in 1957; and TransAfrica, established in 1977.(75)

Until the heyday of African independence during the late 1950s and the early 1960s, black-Americans and their grass-root organizations placed special emphasis on, and were more interested in, cultural links with the continent of their ancestors.(76) From the American Colonization Society (ACS), until the establishment of TransAfrica in 1977, the major protest made by black-Americans was during the inter-War period at the time of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia as early as 1935. The major focus of this protest was against the U.S. government's neutral attitude in this conflict.

However, despite their lesser political clout, the

major achievement of these organizations in the opinion of Peter Duignan was the establishment of the African Affairs Division in the State Department.(77)

The early 1970s was a period of political unheavals in the United States, which affected black-American politics as well. As a result of their internal divisions, the African Liberation Committee (ALSC), formed in the 1960s, fragmented into various groups. The most successful of such groups is TransAfrica. Currently it is the major black-American political pressure group in the United States which tries to influence U.S. policy towards Africa and the Caribbean basin.

Jimmy Carter's victory in the presidential elections in 1976 opened up new avenues for black-Americans to influence the Carter administration's Africa policy. President Carter's early Africa policy was much influenced by Andrew Young, a black-American, who was appointed as a U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (1977-79). In addition, President Carter appointed more blacks to high-level State Department posts and as ambassadors than any other Chief Executive in U.S. history.(78) The most prominent after Young was his deputy Donald F.McHenry, who led the Contact Group of five Western powers, formed by the United Nations in 1977, to negotiate the Namibian settlement. However, after Young's resignation in 1979, because of his alleged meeting with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) representative to the UN, McHenry succeeded him as U.S. Ambassador to the UN.

Thus the black-American organizations both inside and outside Congress continued their grass-roots work throughout the first Reagan term. One of the important developments of the mid-1980s' was the presidential election campaign of 1984. In this regard the presidential candidate "Jackson's campaign was an important instrument in carrying policy issues directly to the prospective voter....."(79)

The black-American ethnic group tried throughout the 1970s, and the early 1980s to influence the U.S.-Southern Africa policy and to gain acceptance for economic sanctions against South Africa, through demonstrations and other peaceful mobilization and methods, but did not achieve its objectives because of unfavourable circumstances. Thus, the success of an ethnic group like black-Americans, which is not politically and financially influential like Jewish-Americans, needs favourable surroundings in addition to public mobilization to influence policy decisions. Among all ethnic pressure groups in the United States, the black-American group is most probably the only one which has been trying through mass activities to influence U.S. policy towards Africa.

In sum, the mid-1980s' wave of black-American influence on U.S.-Africa policy seems to be receding. This does not mean that ethnic politics will disappear; it could reappear again in future with the same force and fervour.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have seen that Congress has become effective in some major foreign policy issues since the 1970s, such as Vietnam, Angola, South Africa, etc. In these cases Congress has dictated policy. These examples also suggest that congressional interest usually develops and becomes effective when the issue is in the public limelight and when there is a serious bureaucratic rivalry on a particular policy issue.

It has further suggested that interest groups, such as business, military__industrial groups etc, seem to be effective on policy decisions, because most of the issues do not come to public notice. So far as the role of the general public is concerned, it only becomes effective in certain circumstances, for example, in relation to Vietnam, and South Africa. Unlike the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, currently the U.S. public interest in foreign affairs seems to be diminishing with growing domestic economic pressures and unemployment. The U.S. public is concerned about domestic issues more than foreign affairs. One cannot say with certainty how long this trend will last.

In sum, neither Congress, nor interest groups, nor ethnic organizations influence the day-to-day conduct of foreign relations in the United States.

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1. ".....all activities involving direct or indirect attempts to assassinate any individual and all paramilitary activities shall be prohibited except in time of war."
2-a "The Director of Central Intelligence notify the Committee in writing, stating in detail the nature, extent, purpose, risks, likelihood of success, and costs of the operation."
2-b "The President shall certify in writing to the Committee that such covert operation is required to protect the national security of the United State.

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44. A.V.Dicey called public opinion a "body of beliefs, convictions, sentiments, accepted principles, or firmly rooted prejudices, which, taken together, make up the public opinion of a particular era....." Quoted in Cecil V.Crabb, Jr., 'American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age', 3rd edition, Harper and Row, Publishers, New York, 1972, p. 146.

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In his thoughtful essay written in 1949, Kriesberg explains that it is the American people who in fact "make or break our foreign policy." His mass public is divided as follows:
About 30 percent of the electorate, on the average, is unaware of almost any given event in American foreign affairs.
About 45 percent of the electorate is aware of important events in the field but cannot be considered informed. These people retain little information. Although they may follow discussions of the issues of foreign policy, they cannot frame intelligent arguments about them.
Only 25 percent of the electorate consistently shows knowledge of foreign problems.

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CHAPTER III

STRATEGIC MINERALS AS A FACTOR IN U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA POLICY

Introduction

The issue of non-fuel minerals imported from Southern Africa has always been on the policy agenda in Washington ever since the Second World War, with varying degrees of concern, heightened for example during the Korean war in the early 1950s, but subsiding soon after and reviving again in the late 1960s with the Soviet naval build-up in the Indian Ocean, followed by the emergence of the pro-Moscow governments in Luanda and Maputo in the mid 1970s, the Soviet-Cuban military presence in Angola, and growing tensions in South Africa. It was in the wake of these events that policy-makers began to think about U.S. dependence on South African minerals and a possible disruption in the flow of their supply as a serious national problem. Since then a series of mechanisms, such as strengthening the national stockpile, research and development, and search for new sources outside South Africa, have been undertaken to deal with these situations.

This chapter is an attempt to examine first the economics and politics of strategic minerals; then the U.S. minerals policy; and finally the relationship between strategic minerals policy and other aspects of South Africa

policy will be analysed.

3.1 The Economics and Politics of Strategic Minerals

Since the 1960s, studies by different U.S. Executive agencies and departments, as well as others done by various individuals, groups, and organizations, have developed a variety of terminologies to define minerals as specified, critical, identified, certified, and strategic. For the purposes of this study, however, the term strategic will be used. At least two factor make minerals strategic: on the one hand, where they are imported by the industrial world, and on the other, they are most crucial to the advance of modern technology. Thus, for example, according to the U.S. Strategic and Critical Minerals Stockpile Revision Act (50, U.S.C 95) strategic materials are those which

> (a) would be needed to supply the military, industrial, and civilian requirements of the United States during an emergency, and; (b) or not found or produced in the United-States in sufficient quantities to meet such needs. (1)

In Michael Shafer's opinion "these minerals bear the title strategic not because they are critical and irreplaceable in general, but because they are critical in certain specific defence related uses,"(2) such as jet turbines, armaments etc. The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment in its report on import vulnerability (1985) employed the term strategic to cover both criticality and vulnerability of non-fuel minerals imported by the

United States. The vulnerability, however, refers here to the dependence of the United States for supplies of these minerals mostly from one source. In the assessment of one of the foreign minerals specialists in the U.S. Bureau of Mines and Minerals, Washington D.C., the term strategic "is very dependent upon whom you talk to?"

> Like the auto industry in the United States may be defined as an strategic industry. Why? Because they provide employment for several million people. Because it is major industry in the [U.S] mid-west and Michigan and so on. So for that matter strategic materials would include the commodity which using auto industry specifically, for instance the platinum group metals because its major application in catalytic convertors makes it strategic. Usually the term implies a nation's perception of vulnerability to supply disruption and the need to safeguard industry from the repercussions of the loss of suppliers.(3)

Thus, to make the concept clearer we should look into the uses of five strategic minerals, under discussion in this chapter, which are considered critical to the defence industries.

The main metallurgical uses of Chromium are to improve hardness, impart high temperature strength, and prevent rust in steel. It is therefore, essential for stainless steel. The aerospace industry is one of the major users of chromium, particularly for the production of steel and nickle-based alloys. Chromium is required for the production of certain alloys needed for jet engines and gas turbines. It is also used as a colouring agent and in the production of refractory materials, such as brick to line furnaces used in high temperature metallurgical smelting.

Manganese is used in iron and steel-making and as an alloying element to harden and strengthen steel. It is also used to make batteries and chemicals.

Six related metals constitute the platinum group (pgm). They are platinum, palladium, iridium, osmium, rhodium, and ruthenium. In the United States, Western Europe, and the Far East, the use of platinum in catalytic convertors in automobile exhaust system has created a large demand. In addition, these metals have a large application in jewellery in Japan. These metals are also used in other applications, for example, platinum-iridium alloys in computer memory devices etc. Pgm are also used in the production of nitrogenous fertilizers.

The main use of vanadium is as an alloy in high strength low-alloy steel used in high-rise buildings, bridges, oil and gas pipelines, especially under arctic conditions, and autos.

Cobalt is an essential component of various alloys because it imparts heat and wear resistance, high strength and superior magnetic qualities. It is also very important in the making of electrical products.(4)

Little information is available concerning the use of strategic minerals by the defence industrial sector. Pure chrome can be used to form a super-alloy for use in jet engines, missiles, gun and other weapons system, as well as in other high stress applications. Cobalt is also very much important to defence related industries because of its use in jet turbines, and high temperature

resistive alloys. Finally, the use of vanadium in aerospace industry is also important in this regard.

Most of the minerals studies done in the industrial West are based on U.S. sources and data. Tables 3.1 to 3.5 in this section are also prepared from various U.S. government sources which give the percentage of total world production of the above mentioned strategic minerals from 1976 to 1988.

Table 3.1 shows that the Republic of South Africa is the world's largest single producer of chromium, followed by the former Soviet Union as the second largest. Albania, Turkey, and Zimbabwe also produce chromium in good quantity. There are adequate prospects to increase the production of chromium in these countries.

According to the U.S. Bureau of Mines and Minerals Yearbook (1986), "no chromium ore was mined in the United States except for a small amount produced in 1976." The U.S. Bureau of Mines Bulletin 697 (1987) estimates that South Africa controls access to 99 percent of the world's known chromium resources. It also has the world's largest resource and reserve base, as well as the largest production capacity. South Africa, by virtue of its dominant position, has the greatest influence in setting the floor prices of chromium and ferro-chromium (refined chrome).(5)

Table 3.2 indicates that the former Soviet Union is the world's leading producer of manganese ore, followed by South Africa. Manganese is also mined in Australia,

Table 3.1
CHROMIUM: MAJOR WORLD PRODUCERS
(thousand short tons Gross Weight)

COUNTRY	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
ALBANIA	915	970	1,090	1,120	1,190	960	960
BRAZIL	205	342	297	375	385	261	304
FINLAND	193	193	196	195	193	454	380
PHILIPPINES	475	475	592	618	631	484	355
SOUTH AFRICA	2,656	3,372	3,466	3,634	3,764	3,164	2,385
TURKEY	640	560	415	500	440	466	449
U.S.S.R	2,300	2,400	2,550	2,700	3,200	3,240	2,650
ZIMBABWE	952	747	527	597	611	591	476

(CONTINUED)

COUNTRY	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
ALBANIA	960	720	825	850	830	750
BRAZIL	304	259	189	222	225	230
FINLAND	271	445	506	768	543	700
PHILIPPINES	294	260	272	174	187	190
SOUTH AFRICA	2,460	3,407	3,689	3,907	3,789	4,200
TURKEY	564	487	588	543	600	625
U.S.S.R	3,240	2,940	2,940	3,185	3,150	3,240
ZIMBABWE	476	476	536	533	570	600

Source: Minerals Yearbooks, U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines Washington, D.C.

Table 3.2
MANGANESE ORE: MAJOR WORLD PRODUCERS
(Thousand short tons, Gross Weight)

COUNTRY	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
AUSTRALIA	2,340	1,513	1,376	1,836	2,161	1,555
BRAZIL	1,869	1,670	2,113	1,490	2,400	2,251
CHINA	1,100	1,200	1,400	1,650	1,750	1,760
GABON	2,443	2,039	1,830	2,535	2,366	1,641
INDIA	2,022	2,055	1,787	1,934	1,813	1,682
SOUTH AFRICA	6,010	5,564	4,758	5,712	6,278	5,555
U.S.S.R (former)	9,520	9,470	9,984	11,292	11,300	10,090

(CONTINUED)

COUNTRY	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
AUSTRALIA	1,238	1,492	2,038	2,208	1,818	2,043	2,189
BRAZIL	2,580	2,306	2,969	2,781	2,973	2,282	2,094
CHINA	1,760	1,760	3,200	2,900	3,000	3,000	3,000
GABON	1,667	2,058	2,336	2,579	2,767	2,649	2,480
INDIA	1,596	1,455	1,346	1,367	1,337	1,436	1,459
SOUTH AFRICA	5,750	3,181	3,361	3,969	4,100	3,188	3,792
U.S.S.R (former)	10,830	10,890	11,100	10,900	10,300	10,400	10,100

Source: Mineral Yearbooks, U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, Washington, D.C.

Table 3.3

PLATINUM GROUP METALS: MAJOR WORLD PRODUCERS

(Troy ounces)

COUNTRY	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
AUSTRALIA: metal content from domestic nickle ore							
Palladium	7,950	9,581	9,500	8,500	10,545	12,896	13,379
Platinum	3,158	3,697	3,500	3,000	2,058	2,093	2,388
CANADA: PGM from nickle ore	416,821	465,371	346,213	185,000	410,757	382,658	228,425
SOUTH AFRICA: PGM from platinum ore	2,700,000	2,870,000	2,860,000	3,200,000	3,100,000	3,110,000	2,600,000
U.S.S.R PGM from nickle coper ore	2,800,000	2,900,000	3,050,000	3,200,000	3,100,000	3,110,000	3,500,000
U.S.A: PGM from gold-copper ores	6,116	5,545	8,246	7,300	3,348	7,318	8,033
ZIMBABWE							
Palladium	NA	NA	NA	NA	6,784	5,200	2,000
Platinum	NA	NA	NA	NA	2,990	2,300	1,200

Table 3.3

PGM (CONTINUED)

COUNTRY	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
AUSTRALIA: metal content from domestic nickle ore						
Palladium	12,000	16,815	15,304	13,760	15,800	13,200
Platinum	1,900	2,122	3,054	3,697	4,200	3,400
CANADA: PGM from nickle ore	223,925	348,216	337,088	391,917	351,407	368,383
SOUTH AFRICA: PGM from platinum ore	2,600,000	3,500,000	3,700,000	3,960,000	4,220,000	4,285,000
U.S.S.R: PGM from nickle copper ore	3,600,000	3,700,000	3,800,000	3,850,000	3,900,000	3,900,000
U.S.A: PGM from gold-copper ores	6,257	14,635	W	W	W	W
ZIMBABWE:						
Palladium	2,000	1,222	965	1,125	932	1,000
Platinum	1,200	772	611	836	579	600

W---withheld to avoid disclosing proprietary data.

Source: Minerals Yearbooks, U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines Washington, D.C.

Table 3.4

VANADIUM: WORLD PRODUCTION FROM ORES, CONCENTRATES AND SLAGS: MAJOR WORLD PRODUCERS
(Short tons of contained vanadium)

COUNTRY	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
CHINA: slag product	NA	NA	2,200	4,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
SOUTH AFRICA: contents of pentoxide products	3,169	4,059	4,023	4,300	4,500	4,648	3,981
Contents of vandiferous slag products	7,716	8,329	8,377	9,300	9,500	9,260	8,930
U.S.S.R (former)	8,800	10,000	10,500	11,000	11,000	10,000	10,500
U.S.A:(recoverable-vanadium)	7,376	6,504	4,272	5,520	4,806	5,126	4,098
Vanadium pentoxide products	NA	NA	NA	NA	1,520	1,900	1,513

Table 3.4

VANADIUM (CONTINUED)

COUNTRY	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
CHINA: slag product	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
SOUTH AFRICA: contents of pentoxide products	4,117	6,633	6,537	6,350	4,580	5,600
Contents of vandiferous slag products	5,620	7,165	8,912	10,580	11,131	12,460
U.S.S.R (former)	10,500	10,500	10,500	10,600	10,600	10,600
U.S.A: (recoverable-vanadium)	2,171	1,617	W	W	W	W
Vanadium pentoxide products.	1,893	1,701	2,695	2,330	2,508	3,252

W---- Withheld to avoid disclosing company proprietary data.
Source: Mineral Yearbooks, U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, Washington, D.C.

Table 3.5

COBALT: MAJOR WORLD PRODUCERS
(Short tons)
Mine output, metal content

COUNTRY	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
AUSTRALIA	600	1,100	1,500	1,700	2,177	1,616	1,500
CANADA	1,495	1,637	1,360	1,522	1,767	2,293	1,548
CUBA	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,900	1,778	1,890	1,820
SOUTH AFRICA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
U.S.S.R (former)	2,000	2,100	2,150	2,000	2,300	2,400	2,500
ZAIRE	12.100	11,600	14,660	16,535	17,000	12,460	12,460
ZAMBIA	2,398	1,878	1,911	3,500	4,850	4,410	3,584

(CONTINUED)

COUNTRY	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
AUSTRALIA	1,500	2,064	2,500	2,608	2,640	2,420
CANADA	1,747	2,125	4,556	5,418	5,490	6,094
CUBA	1,820	3,079	3,280	3,300	3,500	4,400
SOUTH AFRICA	NA	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,600	1,600
U.S.S.R (former)	2,600	5,700	6,000	6,200	6,200	6,300
ZAIRE	12,460	57,194	64,375	73,575	64,000	56,000
ZAMBIA	3,527	10,185	12,800	12,700	13,100	14,700

Source: Minerals Yearbooks, U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, Washington, D.C.

Brazil and Gabon. Manganese production in the United States consist of only a small quantity of low grade material for brick colouring. "The only production and shipment of material containing 5 percent or more manganese is mined in Cherokee County, South Carolina, by brick contractors and manufacturers."(6) These domestic sources are very uneconomical.

Table 3.3 shows that South Africa is the leading producer of platinum and the former Soviet Union is the main producer of palladium. Canada stands third as a producer by virtue of its recovery of platinum as a by-product of nickle production. The Stillwater mines at Montana is the only producing pgm mine in the United States. The U.S. Bureau of Mines states that there are possible domestic pgm deposits in Alaska and Minnesota. According to the Minerals Yearbook (1990, p. 745) in the future most new production capacity for pgm is expected to come from South Africa.

Table 3.4 shows that South Africa is the world's largest supplier of vanadium ores. The former Soviets' vanadium production is almost equal to that of South Africa but is mainly consumed domestically. Other major producers of vanadium are the People's Republic of China, and the United States. The U.S. Bureau of Mines reported in 1988 that the Wilson Spring, Arkansas deposits is the only domestic deposit to be mined exclusively for vanadium. Other potential deposits are in Colorado, Ihadho, and New Mexico.

Table 3.5 indicates that Zaire is the leading producer of cobalt in the world, followed by Zambia and the former Soviet Union, number two and three respectively. In the case of cobalt, South Africa is not a major supplier, but Zaire and Zambia are the leading exporters of cobalt to the United States. They transport most of their cobalt to the United States and her industrial allies through South Africa. However, "there are large amounts of potentially recoverable cobalt in the United States, in particular the copper-nickle Dulath Cabbro in Minnesota, but none of the deposits are producing at this time."(7)

Thus, the above figures show that South Africa is the leading world producer of chromium, platinum, and vanadium. The former Soviet Union leads the world in production of manganese, and palladium. Canada is the third largest producer of platinum group metals after South Africa and the former Soviet Union by virtue of its recovery of platinum as a by-product of nickle production. Zaire and Zambia, and the former Soviet Union are the largest producers of cobalt.

Table 3.6 shows the annual data for consumption of these minerals as of 1987. The U.S. Minerals Commodity Summaries (1988) published the following figures of U.S. import reliance on five strategic minerals from South Africa during 1987:

Table 3.7 shows U.S. import reliance on these minerals in general and from South Africa in particular.

Table 3.6

Annual Consumption of Minerals

Platinum Consumption			**Annual Data**
Former Soviet Bloc	0.7	Million	Troy Ounces
U.S.A.	1.0	=	=
West Europe	0.4	=	=
Japan	1.0	=	=

Chromium Consumption			**Annual Data**
Former Soviet Bloc	1.0	Million	Troy Ounces
U.S.A.	0.4	=	=
West Europe	0.7	=	=
Japan	0.5	=	=
Others	0.4	=	=

Manganese Consumption			**Annual Data**
Former Soviet Bloc	3.1	Million	Short Tons
U.S.A.	0.7	=	=
West Europe	2.0	=	=
Japan	1.4	=	=
China	0.7	=	=
Canada	0.2	=	=
Others	1.0	=	=

Vanadium Consumption			**Annual Data**
Former Soviet Bloc	14.0	Thousand	Short Tons
U.S.A.	4.8	=	=
West Europe	4.5	=	=
Japan	3.6	=	=
China	3.0	=	=
South Africa	1.4	=	=
Others	0.5	=	=

Cobalt Consumption			**Annual Data**
Former Soviet Bloc	13.0	Million	Pounds
U.S.A.	17.0	=	=
West Europe	13.0	=	=
Japan	0.8	=	=
Others	0.3	=	=

Source: U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 'Oversight Hearings Before the Sub-Committee on Mining and Natural Resources of the Committee of the Interior and Insular Affairs, 100th Congress, First Session December 10, 1987, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

Table 3.7

	U.S. Import Reliance (percentage)	Imports From South Africa (percentage)
Manganese	100	28
Chromium	75	47
PGM	88	51
Vanadium	54	50
Cobalt	86	71*

* From Zaire and Zambia, through South Africa's transportation system.

In addition to imports from South Africa, the United States minerals import reliance on the former Soviet Union during the same period was as follows:

Table 3.8

U.S. Import Reliance on the former Soviet Union

1987	(percentage)
Manganese	00
Chromium	02
Platinum Group Metals	07
Vanadium	00
Cobalt	00

Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, 'Strategic Minerals: Extent of U.S. Reliance on South Africa', Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C, June 1988.

In the light of above figures for the U.S. percentage of world production and its consumption of strategic minerals, it is safe to say that U.S. domestic

production of these minerals cannot keep pace with domestic industrial demand, both civilian and military. The gap between what the United States produces and what it needs is considerable in almost all categories. A high standard of living in the United States and her industrial allies is sustainable only by regular consumption of these key non-fuel minerals.

The Republic of South Africa has an estimated 58 percent of the World's chromium reserves, 82 percent of its platinum group metals, 50 percent of its vanadium, 90 percent of its manganese,(8) (see Appendix E) and deposits of almost all minerals of significance to the United States, the Western Europe, and Japan.

However, Japan has been the biggest customer for South African strategic minerals, especially chromium, ferro-chromium, and platinum group metals. In 1984 Japan reasserted itself over the United States as the largest consumer of platinum.(9) This upward trend continued until October 1985, when Japan announced that it was imposing trade sanctions against South Africa.(10)

Long before the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) in 1986, Japan, because of possible future supply disruption in the flow of strategic minerals from South Africa, has been funding the mining groups in neighbouring areas and the Latin American countries. The chromium mines of the Philippines and New Caledonia, and the manganese mines of Australia and India have all received Japanese financial backing. "The Overseas Economic

Cooperation Fund is also involved in a number of major exploration programmes in Papua-New Guinea. Shaba [Zaire], Malaysia, and Indonesia."(11)

Apart from the search for alternative sources of strategic minerals outside South Africa, the Japanese have established a stockpile of strategic minerals, comparatively smaller than the U.S. stockpile. "The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), budgeted about $ 16 million to purchase stockpile materials in fiscal year 1989 (April 1, 1989 to March 31, 1990)".(12)

The above analysis has shown that minerals under discussion in this chapter are essential and critical for both civilian and military uses. Although their concentration is in South Africa and in the former Soviet Union, they are also mined in Southern Africa, Canada, Australia, and other countries as well.

3.2 U.S. Minerals Policy: An Overview

Shortly after the First World War, and again in 1930, the U.S. Congress held a series of hearings on resource supply problems, which resulted in the Strategic and Critical Minerals Stockpiling Act in 1939.(13) The passage of the Act marked the beginning of modern U.S. minerals policy, and has provided the basis for minerals stockpile activity as well. The Second World War again highlighted the vulnerabilities in minerals supply. In 1946, based upon the war time experience of coping with shortages in raw materials supplies, Congress amended the Stockpiling Act of 1939, and the national defence stockpiling programme was begun in earnest.(14)

In the immediate post-World War II years (1946-48) the United States was dependent on the Soviet Union for almost its entire supply of chromium and manganese.(15) The Berlin crisis of mid-1948 raised the question of U.S. dependence on the rival Soviet Union for these minerals. The looming danger of a cut-off of Soviet supplies became reality when "in December 1948, it notified shippers of impending cut backs in chromium and manganese sales, a more long anticipated."(16) The Soviet embargo on minerals export to the United States was a political action. It was in response to the U.S. cut-off of export of machinery and scientific equipment to the Soviet Union. As a result, "the Republic of South Africa, Turkey, and India boosted their exports of manganese and chromium to the United States to replace supplies lost from the Soviet Union."(17)

Ever since that time the United States has been fully aware of its weak non-fuel minerals position. The cut-off of the Soviet supplies did not seriously hamper the U.S. defence industry's ability to meet Korean war needs(18) in the early 1950s. But the war and its defence requirements did create an awareness within the defence and other policy-making branches of the great strategic importance of minerally rich Southern Africa.

By acknowledging the importance of South Africa as a major source of strategic minerals in the region, the United States, just three months after the Soviet cut-backs of chromium and manganese, "up graded its diplomatic representation in the Republic to the ambassadorial level,"(19) in March 1949. Two comprehensive steps to study the country's strategic minerals requirements were taken during the Truman administration (1945-53). First, the Defence Production Act, approved by Congress in September 1950, second, Truman's Material Policy Commission of 1952, more commonly called the Paley Commission. The major emphasis of the Defence Production Act was to provide specific authority for allocations and priorities according to its Title I. And Title III of the Act had been focused on reducing the country's dependence on foreign sources and expanding the domestic mobilization of strategic minerals.

The Paley Commission, which was formed to examine where the country was heading in the next quarter century, concluded in its report:

> The United States must reject self-sufficiency as a policy and instead adopt the policy of the lowest cost acquisition of materials wherever secure supplies may be found: Self-sufficiency, when closely viewed, amounts to a self-imposed blockade and nothing more.(20)

Why did the Paley Commission recommend the "rejection of self-sufficiency" in the field of strategic minerals? And, who were the secure suppliers of strategic minerals outside the Communist world? The background of members of the Commission, and the then existing U.S. policy towards South Africa could provide the answer to these questions. Almost all the members of the Commission were aware of the fact that South Africa was the only major producer of strategic minerals in the so-called free world, with cheap labour, secure investment, and its massive return. "William Paley himself was the president of the Columbian Broadcasting System. Other members of the Commission included: George R.Brown, president of the Brown Engineering Corporation; Arthur H.Bunker, president of the Climax Molybdenum Company (mining); Eric Hodgins editor for the Fortune magazine; and Edward S.Mason, Dean of the Harvard School of Public Administration, and the former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs."(21) All the Commission members were either businessmen or defenders of the U.S. corporate interests. Therefore, they saw the national interests with their respective corporations' perspectives. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Paley report remained an important instrument in the making of the U.S. minerals policy.

It was during this time that Congress, on Truman's recommendations, reexamined the stockpile programme and provided substantial funds for stockpiling strategic minerals.(22) The Truman administration's concern in this regard was continued by the Eisenhower administration (1953-61). In assessing President Eisenhower's commitment Eckes has noted:

> Through the mid-1950s, the Eisenhower administration pursued a systemic policy of building up material stock piles, and the explanation for this vigorous policy rests with Eisenhower himself. The old general believed raw materials were better than gold; "the materials within our stock piles represent insurance against disaster" he told friends at a White House stag dinner. In 1956, when other members of the National Security Council suggested the government economize and cut back on its mobilization stock pile, because raw materials reserves caused uncertainty in the commodities markets and because these inventories seemed anachronistic in an age of atomic war, Eisenhower stood firm.(23)

Most of the materials now in the U.S. stockpile were acquired during the 1950s.(24) Table 3.9 shows the stock of five strategic minerals in U.S. National Defence Stockpile as of 1987.

Throughout the 1960s the strategic minerals issue remained overshadowed by the successive administrations' preoccupation with the Vietnam war. It, however, reemerged during the first part of the 1970s when U.S. minerals vulnerability during peace time became apparent after the Arab oil embargo of 1973. The current consistent initiatives taken by U.S. policy-makers regarding the importance of strategic minerals can be marked from the

Table 3.9

STRATEGIC MATERIALS IN THE NATIONAL DEFENCE STOCKPILE
(As of September 30, 1987)

	Units	Inventory	Value $ (m)	Inventory months of peace time Imports	Acquisitions Since 7.30.79
Chromium	Short tons	1,300,000	1,103	50	-
Cobalt	Pounds	53.000,000	360	37	12.200,000
Manganese	Short tons	1,900,000	430	58	-
PGM					
Iridium	Troy ounces	30,000	11	18	12,600
Palladium	Troy ounces	1,265,000	175	11	9,600
Platinum	Troy ounces	453,000	268	05	-
Vanadium	Short tons	700	09	05	181
	Total.....		2,926		

Source: 'U.S. Minerals Supply and South Africa: Issues and Options', Hearing before the Sub-Committee on Mining and Natural Resources, Washington, D.C., December, 10, 1987.

late 1970s. Events such as the fall of the Shah of Iran; the Soviet activities in Afghanistan; and the Soviet-Cuban military activities in minerally rich Southern Africa and the strategically important Horn of Africa had a deep impact on the whole spectrum of International Relations. It was during the Shaba II crisis of 1978 in minerally rich Zaire, which caused the disruption in the flow of cobalt for a short period, that attention was sharply focused on strategic minerals.

In response to the Shaba crisis Congress reacted quickly by revising and upgrading the prior law related to Stockpiles in 1979. Among other measures, the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Revision Act specifically declared that stockpile of minerals are for the purposes of national defence, emergency, or war. Before the revision of the Act the stockpile of minerals had been used for price controls during the Johnson and Nixon presidencies.

From 1980, several reports dealing with supply vulnerability and substitutes for strategic minerals were prepared in the United States including:

[1] 'Import of Minerals from South Africa by U.S. and OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] Countries.' Prepared for the Sub-Committee on African Affairs of U.S. Senate, 96th Congress, 1980.

[2] 'Sub-Saharan Africa: Its Role in Critical Mineral Needs of the Western World.' A Report Prepared by the Sub-Committee on Mines and Mining of the Committee on the Interior, and Insular Affairs of U.S. House of Representatives, 96th Congress, July 1980.

[3] 'U.S. Minerals Vulnerability: National Policy Implications.' Report presented in the House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 1980.

[4] 'U.S. Minerals Dependence on South Africa.' A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 97th Congress, October 1982.

[5] 'Strategic Minerals: Technologies to Reduce U.S. Import Vulnerability.' Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) Report, 1985.

[6] 'Strategic Minerals.' 101st Congress, House of Representatives Report, July 11, 1989.

Apart from these policy Reports, a number of Laws regarding the strategic minerals policy have been passed in the United States since the late 1970s. Notable in this regard were:

[1] Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act, passed in 1980.

[2] National Materials and Minerals Policy Research and Development Act passed in 1980, places increased emphasis on materials research and development in the United States.

[3] National Critical Materials Act was passed by Congress in 1984. It directed the establishment of a National Materials Council in the Executive Office of the President to assist in Executive branch strategic materials policy formation and coordination and to oversee the Federally Advanced Research and Development Programme.

In addition to congressional reports and Legislative Acts, presidential initiatives since the 1970s are also an important indications with regard to strategic and critical minerals. Significant in this regard were:

[1] Carter's Non-Fuel Minerals Policy Review of 1977.

[2] Reagan's National Material and Minerals Programme Plan and Report to Congress, 1982.

[3] Creation of Office of Strategic Resources within the Department of Commerce, 1983.

[4] Creation of National Strategic Materials and Minerals Programme Advisory Committee with the Department of Interior, 1984.

[5] Revised Stockpile Recommendation, 1985.

[6] Executive Order which assigns the Department of Defence as a National Defence Stockpile Manager, 1988.

While these policy reports, Legislative Acts, and presidential initiatives emphasize the importance of strategic minerals for the economic health of the United States, and its dependence on South Africa, they also suggested further efforts in the field of research and development to provide substitutes for these minerals, and to increase domestic mining capability in this regard.

The above discussion suggests that the first and foremost deterrence against any disruption in the flow of strategic minerals supply has been and is the national defence stockpile, capable of meeting the defence requirements for three years in case of national emergency or war. The overall responsibility for the formulation of stockpile management lies on the shoulders of the departments of Defence, Commerce, and State.

Until the Presidential Executive Order of February 25, 1988, the overall responsibility for buying, selling and managing the strategic minerals stockpile was shared between the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the General Services Administration (GSA). Both were considered as lead agencies in this regard. In addition,

both agencies had also been involved in mediating between several government agencies involved in securing material supply. However, due to congressional frustration at the split in responsibility for the stockpile between FEMA and GSA, President Reagan appointed the Department of Defence (by EO 12626) as sole manager of stockpiling responsibilities.(25) Currently the only responsibility of FEMA in this regard is to support research and development activities, such as exploration and materials data, recycling, substitution and material property data. Other offices involved includes the Department of Commerce which prepares case studies of material problems, and the Department of State which "is responsible for assessing the political reliability and economic stability of foreign suppliers."(26)

Apart from the U.S. government stockpiles, a privately held stockpile defence against short-term interruption also exists in the inventories of strategic minerals of major consumer companies in the country.(27) In testifying before the Sub-Committee on Mining and Natural Resources on December 10, 1987, Paul Krueger the then Assistant Associate Director FEMA, said

> The stockpile currently [1987] contains 70 materials of approximatly $ 8 billion. Stockpile inventory is stored at over 100 government and privately owned sites in the United States.(28)

Table 3.10 indicates the estimates of demand for strategic minerals in the United States in the year 2000.

When this author asked officials about stockpile

Table 3.10

U.S. BUREAU OF MINES ESTIMATES OF PROBABLE DEMAND FOR STRATEGIC METALS IN THE YEAR 2000

Sector	Chromium 1000 tons (percent)	Cobalt 1000 tons(percent)	Manganese 1000 tons (percent)	Platinum Group 1000 tons (percent)
Transportation	170 (22)	10,000(32)	510 (36)	950 (28)
Construction	160 (20)	0 (0)	300 (21)	240 (07)
Machinery	120 (15)	5,000 (17)	220 (16)	0 (0)
Electrical	90 (12)	4,000 (13)	85 (06)	490 (15)
Refractory	30 (04)	(**note, 1**)	0 (0)	220 (06)
Chemical	100 (13)	11,000 (35)	75 (05)	820 (24)
Other	110 (14)	1,000 (03)	230 (16)	670 (20)
Total.....	780 (100)	31,500 (100)	1,420 (100)	3,390 (100)

Note 1 Statistics on use of cobalt in glass and ceramics were combined with those on paint and chemical uses in 1983.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Commodity Profile, 1983.

policy their responses were as follows:

The Bureau of Mines official: "Well I guess you can call it psychological for the extent that it makes you feel comfortable, kind of like an insurance you take in case of something happening. At the same time it is from the tactical point of view that if you have stockpile then you don't have to be worried about labour strikes etc., in South Africa. If it lost months, no problem."(29)

An official in FEMA: "I think again it is the part and parcel of the fact that.....It seems to me that if the Korean war had not occurred.....the U.S. took the Korean war as a signal of the Soviet intentions that they would get ready to launch an attack on Europe. This was a precursor. Given what happened after the war, the loss of the atomic bomb secrets, and things like that..... it seems to me that shaped the thinking of the Truman administration, Eisenhower too [regarding the minerals stockpiling]."(30)

Thus, the stockpiling of strategic minerals by these agencies is exclusively designed to keep the United States secure against any disruption in the supply of strategic minerals.

In addition to the national stockpile, another prevention against the supply disruption of minerals is domestic mining in the United States_____although not fully exploited yet.

There is vast unknown and untouched mineral wealth in the United States but "the full potential for the resources" says Ewan Anderson, "has not been assessed due to a number of factors including difficult terrain, hostile climate, lack of infrastructure, and the influence exercised by environmental interests."(31) According to an official in FEMA "since December 1984 firms in the United States have been allowed to finish their exploration on wilderness areas previously claimed by states." He further went on to say, "it is a very difficult process..... you can get mining engineers, geologists that are in the business of looking for viable deposits. It takes so long. It's going to take you four, six may be ten years to open the deposit."(32) (See Appendix F)

Although domestic sources for cobalt and chrome do exist, there are no minable sources for manganese. In addition, a search for sources of minerals in U.S. has spread from land to the continental shelf and to the sea bed. "The development of off-shore resoureces is of long term significance and the United States expects to commence exploration in the mid 1990s."(33)

It is important to note that after eight years of deliberation, the United Nations' General Assembly adopted the Law of the Sea Convention on May 31, 1982,

and declared the ocean resources of the world to be the common heritage of mankind, what Joseph Nye calls the "international seabed mining regime." According to Nye, these regimes deal with everything from monetary issues to international trade, management of national resources to conservation of species and to the control of armaments.(34) He has pointed out that the existence of international regimes allows for greater moderation in foreign policy and reduce the degree of the constant risks that statesmen encounter.(35)

The United States has not accepted the "rules" and "norms" of the Law of the Sea Convention. Besides other objections, it opposes the treaty on selling its advanced mining technology to the international sea bed authority and fears that the treaty could serve as a precedent for international production control on landbased minerals.(36)

Successive U.S. minerals policies and various mechanisms to cope with problems of disruption in supply, gave birth to a serious debate on the question of U.S. dependence on South African strategic minerals. In this regard various interested individuals, groups, and non-governmental organizations have been engaged in research both inside and outside the United States, especially in the academic world.

One school of thought, which has influenced the perceptions of U.S. policy-makers towards South Africa since the 1960s, is what might be called the "alarmist" group of writers, Congressmen, and bureaucrats, which in turn was motivated by business group organizations. This school of thought, in fact the descendent of the Paley Commission of 1952, has painted a gloomy picture of U.S. import dependence on South African minerals. It was inclined towards the white minority regime of South Africa and had always supported the status quo on the one hand, and bitterly opposed U.S. sanctions aginst the Republic, on the other. Since the 1960s the group had been 'headed' by a former Congressman from Nevada, James D.Santini, Chairman of the House Sub-Committee on Mines and Minerals (1974-82), a person who had always advocated the "resource oriented foreign policy of the United States." After his fact-finding trip to Zaire, Zambia, and South Africa in 1980, Santini recommended that:

> Zaire and Zambia were too unstable to be relied upon for strategic minerals and that America thus has a vital interest in the survival of South Africa as a Western ally. (37)

In the literary field, G.H.Black, for example, is the main advocates of this school. In addition, various organizations, such as the Foreign Policy Association, the Ford Foundation Southern Study Group, the American Geological Institute, and magazines, such as Fortune, and Business Week have all focused on the "dangerous reliance" of the United States on South African strategic minerals. Another concern of the alarmist school was of a possible formation of cartel among Southern African mineral producers to be used as a political weapon against the West as had been done by the Arab oil-producing countries of the Middle East.(38) Directly or indirectly, they have all been supporters of the status quo in South Africa.

However, the alarmist way of thinking, which had dominated U.S.-South Africa minerals policy since the early 1960s, was challenged by a different school of thought, in the late 1970s, both inside and outside Congress. This school has questioned the "conventional wisdom" of the "dangerous reliance" of the United States on South African strategic minerals. The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and other pro-sanction groups in Congress, academics, such as Michael Shafer (Harvard University), Julian Simon (Illinois University), Hanns Maull (University of Munich), and the Scandinavian Institute of African Affairs, Uppsala, Sweden, for example, are the advocates of this school. They are of the opinion that the United States has not been "dangerously reliant"

on South Africa, and that alternative sources do exist in other countries of Southern Africa as well. They argue that substitutes for almost all the strategic minerals under discussion, except platinum and chromium, are available to a certain extent, and could be recovered through recycling methods. They further point out that in the event of short or, even mid-term disruption in the supply of these minerals, for a variety of reasons the United States minerals stockpile could fulfill both civilian and defence requirements. Thus, the major focus of their criticism against the alarmist thinking is that it has ignored the important factor of price elasticity effects on the supply and demand of these minerals.

In support of their arguments, this school provides past examples of four major disruptions, in the flow of non-fuel minerals to the United States. The first cut off of supplies of chromium and manganese was from the Soviet Union during the late 1940s. This was followed by disruption in flow of Canadian nickel due to a miners' strike in 1968, the Arab oil embargo of 1973, and disruption in the flow of cobalt from Zaire during the Shaba II crisis of 1978. According to this group, these instances did not, in any way create the conditions for a national emergency in the United States.

Thus, the above discussion suggests that U.S. dependence on South African strategic minerals can be reduced by looking for an alternate sources outside South Africa, by creating substitutes for these minerals through

research and development, and by accelerating the methods of recycling. Above all, the main deterrence against minerals disruption is the existence of the national defence stockpile.

3.3 Strategic Minerals and South Africa Policy

The successive minerals policies towards Southern Africa have always been formulated against the perceived background of the region's unstable nature and its crucial minerals importance. One common thread which runs through these policies was Washington's diplomatic efforts to defuse regional tensions, especially in South Africa and to save the region from violent change which would damage the Western access to minerals. Despite this common approach, the degree of presidential interest in minerals policy varies from president to president. The notable difference in this regard was between Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan's personal initiatives.

Though the passage of important Acts and policy reports concerning strategic minerals during the Carter administration clearly indicate the importance of minerals import, but the President's personal attention was focused more on the issue of human rights violations in the region and his early vocal condemnation of apartheid in South Africa.

Throughout the administration's tenure the Executive and the Legislature did not make any shift in minerals policy, both in general as well as towards South Africa. Within Congress the "alarmist" group under the leadership of Congressman Santini was still influential in this area. Carter Non-Fuel Minerals Policy Review of 1977 was in fact the direct result of a meeting between President

Carter and Congressman Santini, in which the administration recognized the importance of strategic minerals for the overall economic health of the United States, and its producer South Africa in the 'free world'.

However, Reagan was the first President after Eisenhower, who showed a keen interest in strategic minerals because of their defence related importance. "Several key nominees [of the President elect Reagan], including those who became the Secretary of Defence, the director of the CIA, and the Secretary of State, had shown great interest in the subject of strategic minerals."(39)

Like its predecessors', the foundation of the Reagan administration's South Africa policy was based on the country's mineral wealth and its geographic location. Just three months after coming into power, Reagan in an interview with the CBC television on March 3, 1981 declared his administration's perspective towards South Africa by saying: ".....can we abandon a country that strategically is essential to the free world in its production of minerals....."(40) Reagan, who was uninterested in African affairs, made another statement in 1982 by declaring: "The United States is a naval power by necessity, critically dependent on the transoceanic import of vital strategic minerals."(41) His personal concern in this regard had been shown by the Secretary of State George Shultz in early 1985 in a major policy address: "South Africa is not a small island. It is a regional powerhouse endowed with vast minerals resources....."(42)

Like any policy formulation, the minerals policy is also made at two levels. At the upper level certain broad-based guide lines are established; then it is left in the hands of middle and lower-level officials to formulate and implement them.

Thus, in the case of U.S.-South Africa minerals policymaking, which has been and is part of an overall minerals policy, a number of executive departments and agencies have remained involved. The responsibilities of these selected agencies are divided into three broad categories: policy development, research and development, and the securing of materials supplies and their maintenance (stockpiling). In previous sections we have explained in detail about strategic minerals supplies, especially from South Africa, stockpiling arrangements and efforts made with regard to domestic mining. In this section we have to look into the involvement of agencies in the policy development process, which in turn is divided into five categories; policy coordination, budget review, research and development coordination, problem assessment, and statutory responsibilities.

On the policy coordination side two agencies: the Cabinet Council and the National Critical Materials Council (NCMC) are involved. The NCMC, established in 1984, "consist of 25 members to be appointed from representatives of industry, small business and consumers,"(43) to assist and advise the President on strategic materials policy. The NCMC is also involved

in other policy development areas, such as budget review, research and development coordination, reports to Congress, problem assessment, and statutory responsibilities.

The role of the Defence and the Commerce Departments in policy development is in three areas: reports to Congress, problem assessment, and statutory responsibilities.

The research and development coordination responsibilities lies with the Departments of Defence, Commerce, and Interior, the Bureau of Mines and Minerals, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Science Foundation.

Within the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of Mines and Minerals is the most important on the analytical side. An official in Bureau said:

> We were involved in defining each of these minerals and we were involved in recommending to the State Department. Our role was to technically evaluate the situation and make recommendations that, yes, we use these commod ities here in the United States. Here in Bureau [we] look to those supply and demand, the usage, and in touch with the consumer and supplier and so on.(44)

During the period under discussion in this study strategic minerals policy has always remained insulated from public pressure. Throughout their struggle, the Africa related pressure groups, such as TransAfrica and Free South Africa Movement (FSAM), focused their attention on disinvestment and divestment, but never insisted on a ban on South African minerals import. This was partly because of their recognition of the strong influence of

business and defence interest groups on minerals policy-making, and partly because of their perception that they would not be able to mobilize public opinion on this issue. In addition, the minerals issue is purely a technical matter beyond the reach of public and Africa related pressure groups, only to be left in the hands of specialized agencies and bureaucrats.

In the opinion of one of the activists of FSAM ".....these issues were never looked at separately in the movement context. They were all part of one.....All the issues had to some extent a kind of a one thing of equal importance."(45) But the anti-apartheid record suggest that all these issues were not of "equal importance", rather attention was focused on investors to sever financial links, and on consumers to boycott those companies and corporations doing business with the racist regime. For example, in January 1986 FSAM organized a boycott of Shell Oil to pressurize its parent company, Royal Dutch Shell, to close down the petroleum and mining operations of Shell South Africa. This action, however, was supported by president of the United Auto Workers Union (UAWU) by cutting off their Shell credit cards. Neither the president of the UAWU, nor the anti-aparthid movement talked about the boycott of platinum imported from South Africa, which was used in catalytic convertors of automobile exhaust system. It would have been difficult for anti-apartheid movement to mobilize public opinion on this very technical question of minerals.

In early 1988, TransAfrica published a report card based on responses of presidential candidates of both parties regarding their would-be administration's Southern Africa policy. With regard to South Africa, questions were asked about the U.S. ban on computer sales and oil company investments, and prohibiting diamond imports in the United States, but nothing whatsoever was asked about strategic minerals.(46)

The same tendency to ignore the minerals issue was evident in the tougher sanctions bill passed by the House of Representatives in August 1988, which excluded strategic minerals. The second of the six new sanctions banned "all imports from South Africa; except for strategic minerals essential for the economy or defence....."

Finally, the interest group organizations, such as business groups, were as much active and effective in minerals policy-making as they were during the previous administrations. This was despite the fact that by this time it was clearly established by certain Congressmen, individuals, and organizations, not only in the United States but other countries as well, that the United States was not "dangerously reliant" on South African minerals.

The degree of influence of commercial groups in policy-making in the United States can be realized when the presidential candidate, who latter became the President, pointed the finger at the President of the United States. Thus in the presidential debate of 1976 Jimmy Carter disclosed that President Ford, under pressure

from the atomic energy lobby, put pressure on Congress "to hold up non proliferation legislation until the Congress agreed for an 8 billion program[me] for private industry to start producing enriched uranium."(47) Ford, moreover, did not deny the charges.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have argued that South Africa is the leading producer of four strategic minerals out of five under discussion: namely chromium, manganese, platinum group metals, and vanadium; with, cobalt exported to the United States from Zaire and Zambia through the South African transport system. We have also identified that the United States has never remained "dangerously reliant" on South African strategic minerals, as has been portrayed by interest groups and their clientele both within the bureaucracy and Congress.

In the case of cobalt, manganese, and vanadium, alternate sources outside South Africa exist in Southern Africa, Russia, the Peoples' Republic of China, Australia, Gabon etc. So far as platinum and chromium are concerned, no alternate sources outside South Africa and Russia exist at the momemt. In addition, no substitutes for platinum and rhodium are available currently.

On the decision-making front, the Executive and the Legislature have always been cooperative in this regard; whereas the public was never mobilized on this issue by anti-apartheid groups.

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2. Michael Shafer, 'Minerals Myth', Foreign Policy, No., 47, Summer, 1982, p. 159.

3. Interview with Michael Mir Heydari, Foreign Minerals Specialist, Africa and the Middle East, U.S. Bureau of Mines and Minerals, Washington, D.C., August 26, 1992.

4. Uri Ra'anan and Charles M.Perry (eds), 'Strategic Minerals and International Security', Pergamon Brassey's, Washington D.C, 1985. Africa Confidential, Vol., 24, No., 10, May 11, 1983. And, Minerals Yearbook 1988, Vol., 1, U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, Washington, D.C., 1990.

5. As opposed to chromium, "the price of platinum is determined in London and New York. Therefore, the South Africans are not quite happy the way the price of platinum is determined by open market. They argue that they produce platinum and price is being fixed in New York and London. They have been talking about the future marketing of platinum in Johannesburg, so as to fix quota and contol the price. Because platinum price is rather low right now. Historically much higher than gold but now ten dollars higher than gold." Interview with Michael Mir Heydari.

6. Minerals Yearbook, 1988, Vol., 1, U.S. Department of Interior, Washington, D.C., 1990, p. 651.

7. ibid., p. 665.

8. South Africa Information Digest, 1991, South Africa Foundation, Johannesburg, 1990.

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28. U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines Study, December 13, 1987, Washington, D.C., 1987.

29. Interview with Michael Mir Heydari.

30. Interview with James S.Grichar, Senior Economist Office of the Mobilization Preparedness, U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C., October 5, 1992.

31. Ewan W.Anderson, 'Strategic Minerals: The Geopolitical Problems for the United States', op., cit., p. 132.

32. Interview with James S.Grichar.

33. Ewan W.Anderson, 'Strategic Minerals: The Geopolitical Problems for the United States', op., cit., p. 133.

34. Joseph S.Nye, 'Should We Cut Our LOSes? U.S. Foreign Policy and International Regimes', Institute for Marine Studies, University of Washington, Seatle, 1981, p. 2.

35. ibid., p. 34.

36. Africa Research Bulletin, Vol., 19. No., 4, May 31, 1982, pp. 6427-6428.49.

37. Enver Carim, 'Africa Guide 1983', World of Information, Essex, 1983, p. 31.

38. According to Michael Mir Heydari, "there is concern at the moment if there is cartel between Russia and South Africa. There have been some talks and some collaboration between the two countries in the area of mineral industry. Western countries are concerned that they may form cartel. Now from my point of view it is not feasible. They would not simply do it because knowing South Africa, the way their private industry is dominated by private and huge companies even they compete among themselves. Two major platinum producers in South Africa are basically rivals. If any thing if they wanted to collude, they collude among themselves. I don't think there is a possibility of cartel. But neverthless there is a concern here, they may impact the price. But cartel only works if there is a shortage in the market.....If there is excess in the production and demand is low, cartel doesn't work. Cartel only works if there is a shortage in the market. Right now the demand of minerals is soft and there are a number of producers. Defence industry is not the consumer anymore and that commercial airlines.....their demand is low."

39. Ewan W.Anderson, 'The Structure and Dynamics of U.S. Government Policy-making', op., cit., p. 49.

40. Transcripts of televised interview, 'A Conversation with the President', CBC News Special Report with correspondent Walter Cronkite, March 3, 1981, p.8.

41. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Technology, 'Emerging Issues in Science and Technology: A Compilation of Reports on Congressional Research Service Workshops', 96th Congress, 2nd Session, Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., December 1980, p. 91.
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CHAPTER IV

U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA NUCLEAR RELATIONS

Introduction

In addition to South African strategic minerals required for the U.S. defence and civilian needs, the collaboration between both the countries in nuclear matters was also connected with a related strategic mineral ___uranium___needed by the United States for building its atomic arsenal in the struggle with the rival Soviet Union. South African raw uranium played an important role in the shaping of early U.S. policy towards South Africa, until it became available from other sources outside the Republic, since the late 1960s, including domestic mining in the United States.

U.S.-South Africa nuclear relations can roughly be divided into two periods. First, the years of open cooperation in this field from 1950 until the mid-1970s. Second, a period of non-cooperation between 1977 and 1986 when the South African nuclear programme began to be perceived as a problem. During this period the Carter and the Reagan (probably from 1983 onwards) administrations attempted to persuade South Africa to abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968.(1)

The focus in this chapter is on the period between 1977 and 1986, which started with the Carter

administration's concentration on the South African nuclear programme. This was followed by the U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act in 1978. The Act prohibited the export of nuclear-related material and technology to non-signatories of the NPT, including South Africa. The period ended with another showdown when Congress imposed sanctions against the Republic in 1986, which among other things, banned all nuclear related material including computers.

Before examining the limits of their nuclear relationship, it is necessary to discuss briefly the historical perspectives of nuclear collaboration between both the countries.

4.1 Historical Background, 1950-1976

At the time when a new world order was emerging after the Second World War, the U.S. atomic monopoly was broken by the Soviet Union in 1949. This was followed by Great Britain (1952), France (1960), the People's Republic of China (1964), and India (1974), which tested atomic devices and became members of the so-called nuclear club. As a result, a keen competition to acquire the most sophisticated and fatal weapons started amongst the nuclear powers.

In order to build up its strategic arsenal, the United States required large dependable supplies of natural uranium. South Africa was one of the leading producers of this mineral, where uranium was discovered

on the Witwatersrand during the mid-1920s. Until the Second World War, little attention was paid to the discovery of uranium in South Africa. After the War the United States and Great Britain began negotiations with the government of South Africa, which resulted in an agreement in 1950 between the three countries. According to the agreement, the United States and Great Britain were to provide capital and nuclear expertise in exchange for South African uranium.(2) The terms of the agreement specified that South Africa was to sell the entire production of its uranium to the United States and Great Britain. The key strategy behind the deal was to reduce the likelihood of the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations. Partly because of the strategic nature of uranium, then a scarce mineral, and partly because of security considerations, no further information regarding the tripartite agreement was made public. Thus, uranium became a leading factor in the first phase of post-World War U.S.-South Africa relations.

With the help of the United States and Great Britain, South Africa opened its first uranium processing plant at West Rand Consolidated Mines in 1952. This was followed by Deggafontein Mines Limited, Blyvooruitzicht Gold Mining Company Limited, and Western Reefs Exploration and Development Company Limited. These plants extracted uranium from gold ores, relatively rich in uranium, followed by eighteen more plants of the same nature. The South African gold ores represented one of the world's largest

sources of uranium.(3)

By the end of the 1950s, South Africa's uranium production reached to its peak of 4954 tons annually.(4) In the following decade, with the declining demand for uranium, mostly because of the growing U.S. domestic production, many plants were closed down in South Africa.

The 1950 tripartite agreement was followed by the famous Eisenhower speech in the United Nations' General Assembly on "Atom for Peace" in 1953, which Joseph Nye has described as the beginning of the "international nuclear regime."(5) In his speech, Eisenhower also recognized the importance of uranium supplying countries(6), thus specifically indicates the significance of South Africa, then the main producer and supplier of raw uranium in the non-Communist world.

One year after Eisenhower's speech of 1953, the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which strictly prohibited any nuclear cooperation with other nations, including the exchange of information, was revised. This established the legal basis and conditions for U.S. atomic cooperation with many other nations, allies as well as friendly nations. The amendment was made two years after the British atomic test which made Washington realize that the United States could not control the spread of nuclear weapons. Three years later, on July 8, 1957 the United States and South Africa entered into a ten-year agreement on the peaceful uses of atomic energy, which marked the beginning of an era of nuclear cooperation between both

countries. The 1957 agreement was amended and extended on June 12, 1962, and July 17, 1967. It was later renewed on June 20, 1974 to extend until the year 2007.(7)

The agreement proved to be beneficial for South Africa in three respects. First, it provided a launching pad for the emergence of South Africa's uranium industry. Second, it cleared the way for its access to Western nuclear know-how. Finally, it achieved the opening of training facilities for the members of its Atomic Energy Board (AEB)(8) in the field of advanced nuclear technology. Training for AEB members was provided in the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the Argonne National Laboratory, in Tennessee, and Illinois, U.S. respectively.(9) The close cooperation between both the countries in this field was further extended in 1958, when a joint U.S.-South African team observed a secret U.S. nuclear test off the South African coast. In addition to obtaining training for AEB members and access to U.S. nuclear information, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)(10) membership was also of great importance for South Africa in terms of acquiring the latest information on nuclear technology through its library and technical assistance.(11)

Under the terms and conditions of the 1957 agreement, the United States government had to construct a research reactor in South Africa. Allis Chalmers, an American firm, designed and built the South African research reactor to be known as SAFARI-I (South African Fundamental Atomic

Research Reactor) near Pretoria, which came into service in 1965. The United States provided 231 pounds of enriched uranium for SAFARI-I between the period 1965-74, enough to make ten medium sized nuclear bombs.(12) Apart from Allis-Chalmers, other U.S. firms, such as U.S. Nuclear, Gulf Oil, and Texas Nuclear were instrumental in providing nuclear material to South Africa. "In effect the entire range of U.S. research and development on nuclear power was made available to South Africa for SAFARI-I,"(13) delivered under the Eisenhower's "Atom for Peace" programme, which in fact, made South Africa's nuclear development possible. In 1981, Dr. de Villiers, Chairman of the AEB, who succeeded Dr. Abraham J.A.Roux, the founding father of the South Africa's nuclear research, described the involvement of SAFARI in three major research programmes: production of isotopes for use in medical research; neutron-activation analysis for medical purposes; and fundamental research in material testing.(14)

The growing nuclear proliferation in the world during the 1960s aroused considerable attention and concern in the United States and the Soviet Union. To limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world, which "both the superpowers believed would threaten their control over world order",(15) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed in London, Moscow, and Washington, D.C, in June 1968. Two other members of the nuclear club, France, and the People's Republic of China refused to sign the Treaty.(16) Article I of the Treaty reads:

> Each superpower State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, and not to anyway assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to maunfacture or otherwise acquire nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II of the Treaty restricted all the non-nuclear signatories (currently more than 140 states) from acquiring nuclear weapons, related technology, and material by any means whatsoever. Suspected nuclear weapon states, such as Argentina, India, Israel, Pakistan, and Taiwan have not signed the treaty yet.

Despite the U.S. non-proliferation policy, cooperation with South Africa in the nuclear field continued even after the NPT. Although it is difficult to distinguish between peaceful nuclear technology and its nuclear weapons uses, it has been suggested that the United States had violated and breached its obligations as a nuclear supplier signatory of the Treaty. An official said:

> No. I never saw it that way. I am sure somebody can make the argument that wanted to. They can try to make the argument. But I don't think. For example, Ambassador Kennedy [Richard, currently working in the State Department] and others who worked on that [NPT] they say, if someone who is not a party to the Treaty asks for technical advice, especially regarding a physical security, safety etc, we [U.S.] will give them. Even now we will give them, to Argentina, Brazil Chile, some other countries...(17)

Despite these claims, there were numerous examples of nuclear cooperation between both countries. In spite

of South African Prime Minister Vorster's announcement in July 1970 that his country had developed a new and "unique" method of enrichment, "computers were licensed for export in 1971, 1972, and 1973 for the use in South African enrichment plant"(18) at Valindaba, near the National Nuclear Research Centre at Palindaba, in the Transvaal. A year later, the U.S. Government approved a sale of special computers to go to South Africa in 1974 to help enrich its own uranium through Foxoboro Company of Foxoboro, Massachusetts. These computers were specially designed for nuclear research work.(19) Inside the Foxoboro Company, the sale went under the code name "Project Houston" in order to "discourage questions."(20) At the time of this sale, the United States was aware that the Republic had a surplus of more than 80 pounds of highly enriched uranium, enough for about five nuclear weapons.(21) In the same year, Dr. Albert of the South African Atomic Energy Board declared that:

> Any third year student in physics has the know-how to make the atom bomb, and a fourth year student can do it better. Obviously, any nuclear body here or elsewhere will be able to do it even better than a fourth year student.(22)

Dr. Albert's comments seems to have been intended to hint that South Africa had a nuclear capability, and was ready to work with Washington in its struggle to contain the influence of international Communism. They were also an indication to South Africa's neighbouring countries and its black nationalists of the availability of "an ultimate deterrent" against confrontation with

the white minority regime.

U.S. deliveries of enriched uranium and other related assistance to South Africa continued until 1975, when court action in the United States by the Congressional Black Caucus, forced a temporary halt in supplies.(23) (See Appendix G). In response to growing congressional activism in 1975(24) to pass non-proliferation legislation, the Ford administration took the first initiative in May 1975 when it called for a conference of nuclear suppliers to curb nuclear spread. They met six times between May 1975 and April 1976.(25)

The concern over South Africa's enrichment plant as a threat to nuclear proliferation became an important factor in U.S. nuclear policy during the final year of the Ford administration. The cessation of the shipments of enriched uranium for its SAFARI and Koeberg reactors, and the forced withdrawal from its contracts to obtain two General Electric power plants for Koeberg because of congressional opposition, in fact became a leverage to prevent the Republic from acquiring nuclear weapons and to accede to the NPT. But the leverage did not work at this stage. In response to U.S. pressure, Prime Minister Vorster in an interview in March 1976 refused to sign the NPT. Soon after his interview the South Africa Electric Supply Commission announced in May 1976 that an agreement had been signed with a French consortium to obtain a power plant. By that time the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in his testimony told the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee that Pretoria had "the technical ability to take steps toward[s] making a bomb."(26)

It was during this time that uranium oxide prices climbed sharply from less than U.S. $ 8 per pound in 1974 to U.S. $ 40 per pound in 1976 because of the construction of nuclear power plants in many countries. As a result, South Africa started renovation and reopening of its existing uranium plants. The price increase and the soaring demand for uranium further reduced the U.S. leverage on South Africa to adhere to the NPT and to accept international safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities. Consequently, the United States cancelled all its preexisting contracts in this sphere.

By now South Africa had attained considerable independence, and diverted to France and West Germany for further assistance in the field of nuclear technology, as well as established close contacts with fellow pariah states, such as Israel and Taiwan.(27) The government of South Africa transferred to French and German suppliers because they "didn't trust American suppliers [and] because they knew about our [U.S.] politics,"(28) said Chester Crocker. The Congressional Black Caucus and some liberal Congressmen, and anti-apartheid groups had already started sharpening their tools against U.S.-South Africa nuclear cooperation. In addition, nuclear proliferation had also became one of the major issues of the 1976 presidential election campaign in the United States.

During the last days of the Ford administration, the Uranium Enrichment Corporation of South Africa had approached a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in November 1976, requesting him for a training position for one of their personnel in laser isotope separation technology, which was then a new method for enriching uranium. In his statement before the House Sub-Committee on Africa, Ronald Seigal, a Research Staff Officer at the MIT, publicly noted that "the request was turned down after informal consultations with some [U.S.] government agencies." He further added "we understand that various other places, such as Los Almos, and other government laboratories working in this area were also approached."(29) It is not known whether they succeeded in achieving access to those laboratories.

In 1976 the then chairman of the AEB, Dr. Roux acknowledged the U.S. assistance and help in nuclear field by saying:

> We can ascribe our degree of advancement today in large measure to the training and the assistance so willingly provided by the U.S.A during the early years of our nuclear programme, when several of Western world's nuclear nations cooperated in initiating our scientists and engineers into nuclear science.....even our nuclear philosophy, although unmistakably our own, owes much to the thinking of American nuclear scientists.(30)

Against this background, Crocker told the author:

> In fact what the West did in my view since 1960, was roughly to create South Africa a pariah state. A state which began to feel increasingly isolated and to behave like an isolated regional superpower. And the more isolated it was, the more irresponsible

> it was in many ways. So you saw the huge investment in their nuclear programme to build up the capacity of their own enrichment process which they imported basically from Germany.(31)

According to the United Nations Special Committee report on apartheid, at least 90 South African nuclear scientists had completed their assignments in the United States by mid 1977.(32)

Until the 1975 U.S. court decision to suspend the provision of enriched uranium to South Africa, and the advent of nuclear non-proliferation as an issue in the 1976 presidential election campaign, the nuclear cooperation with South Africa was believed by the Nixon and the Ford administrations to be an essential factor in their relations. The nuclear relationship was believed to be an important instrument for influencing the government of South Africa to carry on its policy of doing nothing in the marketing of its large production of natural uranium, which, in the opinion of the Republican presidents, would have increased the number of nuclear weapon states in the world.(33) According to the National Security Study Memorandum-39, this kind of assurance was given by the then South African government, i.e that "it would do nothing in its uranium transactions to increase nuclear proliferation."(34)

Despite these assurances South Africa continued to supply uranium to some 'selected' importers, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Israel, Iran, Japan, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. These countries

could have been considered by Washington as 'responsible' members of the international community or, simply the U.S. pressure did not work to stop South Africa from its 'selective' uranium exporting policy.

Thus the era of open nuclear ties between both countries ended during the mid-1970s, and an age of non-cooperation on these issues started with the advent of the Carter administration to the White House in 1977.

4.2 The Carter Administration and the South African Bomb

In May 1975 Governor Jimmy Carter, who was then planning to run for the presidential election made non-proliferation one of the major election issues. In his speech in the United Nations he advocated a complete U.S. moratorium on the testing of all nuclear devices. Carter further proposed: "that we [U.S.] not ship any more atomic fuel to a country that refuses to comply with strict controls over the waste which can be reprocessed into explosives." He also advocated that the United States ".....stop the sale by Germany and France of processing plants to Pakistan and Brazil."(35)

When Carter entered in the White House as President in 1977, at least six countries____Brazil, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, Israel, and South Africa____were trying to or had already acquired nuclear technology. Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan (which bought their nuclear plants from France), and Brazil (which had a deal with West Germany for nuclear reactors and enrichment technology), headed the administration's priority list. The United States was much concerned about Brazilian efforts to go nuclear because it did not want to see a nuclear power in its own backyard. Between January and March 1977 Carter sent Vice President Walter Mondale, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Bonn to convince Germany to cancel its nuclear deal with Brazil. The deal, however, went astray

because Brazilians couldn't afford the reactors. (36) The case of Israel was different from the other countries. "Neither Congress nor the administration___any administration___would press the Israelis for information.....The intelligence community was warned against giving information about Israel's program[me] to other agencies."(37) So much so, the Symington Amendment "which bans [U.S.] aid to countries that buy or sell uranium enrichment and reprocessing equipment without attaching various safeguards.....was written in a fashion that exempts Israel from the penalty."(38)

The case of South Africa was yet another situation. As one of the biggest uranium producers in the world, South Africa disclosed the operation of uranium enrichment plant in 1975. The Carter administration was concerned that "it would be a serious blow to non-proliferation efforts, creating a situation where a country outside international nuclear agreements becomes an 'out law' nuclear supplier to any country that wanted to buy enriched uranium for peaceful or military purposes."(39)

Long before the emergence of the Carter administration, South Africa had already explored the possibilities of nuclear cooperation with West Germany and France. For example, West Germany and France started training South African nuclear scientists in 1962 and 1966 respectively. In 1969 West Germany began training South African scientists in the jetnozzle techniques for uranium enrichment. Outside Europe, Israel was its major

partner in this area. Both countries signed a scientific agreement in 1976, possibly including the nuclear field.(40)

In 1977 the technological capability of South Africa included

[1] SAFARI-I research reactor, fuel supplied by the United States from 1965 through 1976, under subject to IAEA safeguards.

[2] SAFARI-II research reactor, designed in South Africa, went critical in 1967.

[3] Uranium enrichment plant at Ucor, Valindaba, which was mostly the result of scientific cooperation with West Germany, became operational in 1975.

[4] Two nuclear reactors for electricity generating at Koeberg, supplied by France, became operational in 1982 and 1983 respectively.

[5] By mid 1977 more than 155 American nuclear technologists and scientists had visited South Africa to provide assistance and training and 90 South Africans had visited the U.S. to receive training and practical experience.(41)

Against this background the Carter administration had probably one form of pressure to convince the South African government to abide by the NPT, namely to cease the supply of enriched uranium for SAFARI-I, and to stop enriching South African uranium for its French supplied two nuclear reactors at Koeberg.

The administration's early nuclear policy towards South Africa, represented a major change in U.S. strategy in this regard. Carter's predecessors in the past had 'pushed' South Africa to adhere to the NPT, but did not threaten to stop the supply of uranium fuel. The Carter administration, despite putting pressure and cutting off

fuel supplies (for SAFARI-I) and other related material, preferred to keep dialogue open with South Africa "in order to prevent it from any such 'irresponsible' behaviour."(42)

The efforts taken by the early Carter administration to bring South Africa into the NPT fold were shattered when on August 8, 1977, the Soviet news agency TASS announced that South Africa had completed arrangements to detonate a nuclear device in the Kalahari desert. This not only caused serious concern in the United States and the West, but exposed the inefficiency of the U.S. intelligence agencies. In the opinion of Professor William Zartman: "I don't think we were aware of the exact state of the South Africans in nuclear activities."(43)

Soon after the Kalahari incident, the U.S. Ambassador in Pretoria was directed by the State Department to ask the South African government for assurances in this matter. The South African response was made public by President Carter in his press conference on August 23, 1977:

> In response to our direct inquiry and that of other nations, South Africa has informed us that they do not have and do not intend to develop nuclear explosive devices for any purposes, either peaceful or weapon; that the Kalahari test site, which has been in question, is not designed for use to test nuclear explosions, and that no nuclear explosive test will be taken in South Africa now or in the future.

President Carter went on to say:

> We will also renew efforts to encourage South Africa to place all their nuclear power production capabilities under inter-

> national safeguards and inspections and encourage them, alongwith other nations, to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.(44)

Why did the Carter administration accept the South African assurances? The administration was aware that confirmation of South Africa's development of nuclear weapons would damage its global nuclear posture,(45) on the one hand, and would be counter-productive in Africa, on the other. Accepting the South African assurances, the Carter administration "rejected an African call at the UN/OAU meeting in Lagos for an end to nuclear collaboration with South Africa."(46)

However, just one week after President Carter's declaration at a press conference about the "South African assurances", the Republic's Finance Minister Owen Horwood said in a political gathering in Durban on August 30, 1977 that South Africa "reserves the right to deviate from its assurances." He went on further to declare:

> I think it is time we told Mr. Carter, and a few other people, that if we did at any time wish to do other things with our nuclear potential we will do so according to our own decision and our own judgement..... President Carter does not ask us when he wants to do anything. If he thinks he is free to dictate to us, then he is simply saying 'might is right' and that he can prescribe moral norms and lay down the law to everyone else simply because he is head of a great country of 225 million people. I reject that position entirely.(47)

Despite the early Carter administration's persuasion, South Africa did not show any inclination to join the NPT or accept the requisite International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards for its nuclear facilities.

In addition to its nuclear cooperation with West Germany and France, and with the fellow pariah states of Israel and Taiwan, the South African government knew that the Carter administration's efforts were focused more on the Rhodesian settlement and the Namibian independence issues than on the Republic. Moreover the fact that Washington had to acquire South African help and cooperation in both the cases, only made the white minority regime more defiant of U.S. pressure. In turn, these situations further reduced the administration's leverage to bring South Africa within the NPT fold.

In addition, South Africa never wanted to open up its uranium enrichment plant at Palindaba for international inspection for a number of reasons. First, it considered that joining the NPT would damage its secrecy, and the future prospects of uranuim enrichment commercialization. "The South African officials had already estimated in 1975 that it could bring the country an additional U.S. $ 400 to 500 million a year from enriched uranium sales."(48) Second, South Africa was demonstrating its explicit capacity to defend itself without outside help and cooperation by criticizing and defying the U.S. pressure. Further, this was an important psychological factor to boost white morale in the Republic.

However, in pursuit of the Carter administration's nuclear non-proliferation policy, Congress passed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) in 1978. According to the Act, the United States could not license the export

of nuclear fuel or reactors to any state which did not accept international safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities. The passage of the Act was to convey the message to South Africa to accede to the NPT so as to create the possibility of resolving the differences on the then existing nuclear enrichment service control between both countries. In response to the Act, South Africa announced that it would pursue its independent enrichment process.

The Carter administration's vulnerable position with regard to South African nuclear development is reflected from the President's letter to Douglas Fraser:

> The question of our nuclear relationship with South Africa is extremely difficult, and must be seen in the light of our overall nuclear non-proliferation objectives as well as bilateral considerations. In our view there is serious danger that a complete break would result in South Africa following a go-it-alone path, which would have serious repercussions for the stability of Southern Africa and defeat our efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.(49)

It seems significant that before the passage of the NNPA South Africa had already acquired the nuclear technology. Seven months after the passage of the NNPA, the South African Prime Minister Vorster visited the United States. In his televised interview with the ABC on October 23, 1978, Vorster claimed that "he has never promised Carter that South Africa would not develop nuclear arms," though he reiterated: "We are only interested in peaceful developments on nuclear facilities."(50)

Eleven months later, in September 1979, South Africa

was once again involved in controversy when a detonation took place somewhere in the Indian or the South Atlantic Oceans, suspected to be an Israeli-South Africa venture. Five weeks later President Carter in a press conference said: "We have been and are continuing to try to follow up that initial observation. There is no certain answer yet that anyone can derive."(51) By this time the African National Congress (ANC) reacted very quickly and sharply. They had put the entire responsibility for that scenario on the Western countries. The South African Foreign Minister, Roelof Botha (Pik Botha) denied knowledge of any nuclear test conducted by South Africa. He said in a press conference, "I know absolutely nothing about the matter_____why don't you ask the Russians, or Chinese, or even the Americans for that matter?"(52)

The American answers and conclusions were various and different. A panel of scientists formed by the White House came to the conclusion that the flash was not from a nuclear explosion. On the other hand, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the U.S. Naval Laboratory, reached different conclusions.(53) Apart from these agencies, the State Department received an intelligence report from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of a low-yield nuclear blast on September 22, 1979 in an area which included South Africa. A Carter administration's official said the alleged South African nuclear explosion in the South Atlantic:

> I still have not seen any convincing basis for that. I was instrumental in getting

> arrangements for the U.S. to base collection aircraft in the area and we covered it, and we covered the area very extensively. With the kind of air sampling collection activities we should have found any evidence of such a blast,had it occured. We never found evidence. Is that conclusive? Probably not. But it supports my belief in the absence of any evidence that nothing happened. I am prepared to believe that there was some formal collaboration between Israel and South Africa. But I don't have anything solid to support that. We know that Israel and South Africa collaborated on many other types of weapons projects and had intelligence exchanges and personnel exchanges. I am prepared to believe that two of them collaborated. But we cannot.....but it is totally outside the knowledge or approval of the U.S. government.(54)

Another official said:

> As far as I know there was none. Never was any. Certainly not. Since I have been around I read all those files [in the Defence Department] about this unexplained light in the sky [in September 1979]. People think perhaps it was an Israeli or South African nuclear test. I don't know whether it was or not. (55)

According to Crocker, some U.S. experts had concluded that it was a South African neutron bomb test, in collaboration with Israel.(56)

This time South Afrca's reaction was very harsh. In his remarks in October 1979, Foreign Minister Botha said:

> It is like a cowboy not knowing how to handle his gun or walk tall any longer..... I say to you [Carter] stop displaying this nervousness [in world affairs] accept the role of an anti-Marxist state. You are frightening your friends and appeasing your enemies.(57)

Thus accepting the minimal degree of influence on South Africa in this regard, the Carter administration by this time virtually stopped pushing the Republic further into a corner and voted against its expulsion from the IAEA in December 1979. The non-aligned and Eastern bloc countries defeated the Western and industrialized nations' move to save South Africa's membership. Two years earlier, in June 1977 South Africa was already unseated from the IAEA's Board of Governors. However, the reason for U.S. support in favour of the continuation of South Africa's membership in IAEA was two-fold. First, by this time the Carter administration had realized that South Africa would not accede to the NPT. Second, with the emergence of the new world situation and the growing superpower tension, especially after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, the issues such as human rights and nuclear proliferation were overshadowed by security policy issues. In turn, the superpower tension reduced the U.S. pressure on suspected or potential nuclear powers, notably South Africa and Pakistan.

Three months after Botha's remarks, President Carter in his State of the Union message in January 1980, came out of his "nervousness", "accepted the role of an anti-Marxist regime", and turned aside from an accomodation policy with the Soviet Union to the realism of power politics. His early tough policy stopping nuclear spread in the world was lost in the deserts of Rajasthan, when the "Senate on September 24, 1980 upheld the President's

decision to ship 38 tons of nuclear fuel to India for its Tarapur power plants_____a major foreign policy victory for President Carter,"(58) but a great defeat for Jimmy Carter. The shipment of nuclear fuel to India was granted, despite the fact that India refuses to sign the NPT and to open up all of its nuclear facilities to international inspection.

It can therefore be argued that President Carter, who made the nuclear proliferation issue one of the main slogans of his presidential election campaign in 1976, had to tone down his criticism on nuclear issues. Nuclear proliferation was no longer a foreign policy priority of his administration by the end of his term in office. In sum, the Carter administration's early pressure on the Republic in this regard could be considered a well calculated move to satisfy the growing domestic pressures, both inside and outside Congress. These forces were less critical of the administration because of its approach of open condemnation. For example, the Democratic controlled House Sub-Committee on Africa held only one exclusive series of hearings on U.S.-South Africa nuclear relations between June 30 and July 12, 1977.(59)

In addition, during his administration these pressure groups were still in their formative phase and had been engaged in mobilizing public opinion on this issue. Carter's personal interest in non-proliferation thus encouraged these groups and brought the issue into the public limelight.

4.3 U.S.-South Africa Nuclear Collaboration, 1981-1986

Unlike the Carter administration, the Reagan administration connected nuclear issues with the global strategic aims of the East-West confrontation and supported the national security constraints of friends and allies all over the world, regardless of their respective form of government and human rights record. The administration thus, revived the Nixon-Kissinger version of detente. Within the framework of armed diplomacy, the Republic of South Africa, alongwith other U.S. 'friends', had benefitted militarily and politically under the administration's security programme. Since the Republic of South Africa was regarded as a main actor to contain Soviet influence and designs in Southern Africa, its nuclear programme was perceived as an "internal matter". The remarkable development in U.S.-South Africa relations, which reached their lowest ebb during the Carter administration, was the adoption of the policy of constructive engagement. The dominant theme of this policy was not abrupt breach with previous U.S. policies towards Southern Africa, but the nuclear cooperation between both the countries reemerged with the inception of the Reagan administration. When this author asked Crocker about this his response was:

> I am not aware of a nuclear cooperation during the years I was in the government [1981-89]. In fact there was a lot of nuclear pressure pressing them [South Africa] hard to sign the NPT from 1983-84 all the way

around until the end of the Reagan administration.(60)

Crocker's response suggest two things. First, that nuclear collaboration reemerged between both countries with the inception of the Reagan administration, in contravention of the official U.S. policy, at least between the period 1981 and 1983-84. Second, it seems that during the same period the United States did not put pressure on Pretoria to abide by the NPT. According to Crocker's secret policy paper(61) prepared for a meeting with the South African Foreign Minister Roelof (Pik) Botha: "The discussion with South Africans will cover three discrete areas: Namibia, U.S.-South Africa nuclear cooperation, and general bilateral issues.....OES Assistant Secretary [U.S] Jim Malone will conduct separate discussions with Brand Fourie [South Africa] on the nuclear issues."(62)

Another State Department's secret memorandum prepared for the same meeting pointed out that South Africa would request two things: either to lift the ban and fulfill the 1974 fuel agreement for the Koeberg reactors, or to allow export permits to be issued for fuel delivery through France. On the South African position regarding the NPT, the same paper said ".....South Africa cannot in the interest of its own security sign the NPT and thus set the minds of its would be attackers at rest....." (63)

The Reagan administration, instead of allowing South African uranium enriched in the United States to

be sent directly to the Republic for its Koeberg power reactors, found certain loopholes in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. The Act did not cover the brokering ventures of U.S. companies, which were not required to report any deal to the U.S. Department of State or seek its permission in advance for the sale.

In 1981 two American firms, Edlow International Inc., and SWUCO had served as brokers for enriched uranium for the Koeberg plant obtained from a Swiss utility through a French enrichment plant.(64) Crocker's comment on the loopholes in the Act was:

> That was part of the price of realism. Because if we didn't allow that to go ahead and do it anyway probably.....But that's true there was third party possibility. And the French had no shame. French would sell to anybody, including you guys [Pakistan].(65)

It cannot be said with certainty whether this was an oversight of the framers of the Act or a deliberate loophole to open up commercial avenues for U.S. companies in case of public and political resentment in the United States against trade links with South Africa.

In addition to the above mentioned indirect sale through U.S. companies, South Africa had also succeeded in buying enriched uranium, most probably from Italy and West Germany during the same period. The People's Republic of China was also considered as a fuel supplier to South Africa through European brokers. It had long been suspected of having secret nuclear contacts with Pretoria.(66)

However, one particular direct export, helium-3,

a by-product of the U.S. nuclear weapons programme to South Africa, had been a matter of great concern to Congress during the early years of the Reagan administration. In 1982, Charles H.Percy, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings, especially on the proposed export of helium-3 and other nuclear material and technology to South Africa. Richard Kennedy, then U.S. Under Secretary of State for Management, in his testimony responded to the questions asked by Senator Percy this way:

> Q. Why are we exporting helium-3 to South Africa?
> A. No decision has been reached. It is still under careful consideration.
> Q. Is it true that helium-3 can be used to make tritium?
> A. The answer to this is yes.
> Q. Does it mean that helium-3 can be used in a nuclear explosion?
> A. Helium-3 can be used to make tritium, which can be used in a nuclear explosive.
> Q. What is our policy with respect to nuclear cooperation with South Africa?
> A. We don't have any nuclear cooperation essentially with South Africa at this point (67)

One year before Kennedy's testimony, in which he denied "any nuclear cooperation with South Africa", the Reagan administration did facilitate the indirect supply of enriched uranium to South Africa, coupled with the exchange of visits between nuclear scientists of both countries. Two South African scientists visited a United States facility in 1981, followed by a visit of four U.S. scientists to Valindaba, South Africa's unsafeguarded uranium enrichment plant.

In addition to hearings, Senator Percy asked the Commerce Department for further information regarding the proposed export of helium-3 and related material. In response, the Commerce Department disclosed that between January 1981 and May 1982, the Department approved five export licenses for purchase for South Africa's nuclear programme. Those included computers, multi-channel analysers, and vibration test equipment. The computers main function was said to be in nuclear weapons research.(68)

Unlike the Carter administration's policy, which kept dialogue open with South Africa without supplying computer technology and related nuclear material, the Reagan administration believed in supplying a 'limited' nuclear export and technology to South Africa as a means of encouraging a constructive nuclear dialogue with her. Based on that policy, the first Reagan administration eased export restrictions on nuclear equipment to South Africa. A study by the U.S. General Accounting Office, commissioned by Representative Howard Wolpe, then Chairman of the House Sub-Committee on Africa, revealed that South Africa was the third largest recipient of such exports in 1982.(69) These exports, among other nuclear related equipment, included "high tec computers which could be used to model nuclear explosions."(70) This was followed by delivery of the Department of Energy (DOE) enriched uranium in August 1983. Four months later, in December 1983, Framatome of France and the Fluor Corporation of

the United States were granted the maintenance contracts for the Koeberg power plant.(71)

Despite all this evidence of direct and third party trade to transfer nuclear technology, Reagan officials dealing with South Africa in different Executive departments and agencies, had either been denying any nuclear cooperation, or defending the exports and policies of the administration towards the Republic. The following are some examples which clearly indicate the lack of the presidential leadership on the one hand, and the nature of the organizational interests in Washington, on the other.

George Bradley, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Department of Energy:

> In case of South Africa it has remained the firm policy [of the Reagan administration] that no direct export of nuclear fuel and significant nuclear equipment to that country should take place unless and until it accepts complete safeguards, and have continued to urge South Africa to adhere to the NPT to achieve that objective. (72)

Bradley's statement also indicates that the administration did facilitate indirect or third party sales of nuclear fuel and other related equipment.

As opposed to Bradley, Carlton Throne, Chief of the International Nuclear Affairs Division had this to say:

> We believe this approach [of supplying nuclear technology] is the best means of encouraging a constructive nuclear dialogue with South Africa while assuring that any items provided by the U.S. are provided under strict possible controls against their misuse.(73)

According to James R.Shea, Director, Office of the International Programmes, Nuclear regulatory Commission:

> .....few export transactions that have occurred [1981-82] with South Africa in nuclear related areas which are significant from a non-proliferation standpoint.(74)

Finally, George Trail, the U.S. Consul General in Johannesburg, described in September 1983, "that trade with South Africa was still subject to very tight restrictions imposed by Congress on the sale of such sensitive items as arms, nuclear materials and computers." (75) These "sensitive items" had already been exported to South Africa during the first two years of the Reagan administration.

When this author asked Crocker, his response was:

> So we talked to them [South Africans] about nuclear issues, pressing them. We said to them if you sign [NPT] it would become possible for us to resume normal safeguarded nuclear commerce with you. So it was a quid pro quo kind of discussion.(76)

But the above examples clearly suggests that "normal nuclear commerce" with South Africa was already going on despite the April 1981 South African official announcement that it had "recently succeeded in producing a limited quantity of 45 percent enriched uranium 235, which has been processedinto fuel elements."(77) Four years later, "Pretoria acknowledged it could build a nuclear weapon if it chose, but that it had no need for one."(78)

At least two factors contributed towards U.S. nuclear exports to South Africa during the first Reagan term.

First, the Republic of South Africa was considered as an staunch ally and a bulwark against the growth of Communism and the Soviet influence in the region. It was clear that the Soviet Union under the Brezhnev Doctrine (1968)(79) played a significant role in Southern Africa with the goal of influencing South Africa. This was obviously evident in its activities in Angola in the shape of about 50 thousand Cuban troops. This, however, played an important role, especially under the first Reagan administration in the policy aimed at removing the Soviet influence from the region. According to a U.S. Senator Nancy L.Kassebaum. "I don't think that the Soviet Union was ever a major factor in South Africa, because we never saw South Africa going to go to the Soviet side."(80) But certainly it was a factor in the region. An official in the State Department told this author, "I tell you what it did do, it distracted people from South Africa for years."(81)

The question that comes immediatly to mind is how far was South Africa able to check the Soviet and Communist growth and influence in the region, keeping the Republic's vulnerable position in view? Or was South Africa in a position to drive the Soviet-Cuban troops and advisers out of Angola? Crocker's position was different from the rest of the Reagan administration on this issue. He recalled that,

> .....there was a time, I think they believed they could actually break the Soviets in Angola. And we told them that was impossible. You do not break the Soviets in Angola. The Soviets may break themselves in Angola. (82)

Another factor which had been considered by the Reagan administration (at least in private) was the notion that if the United States did not sell nuclear material to South Africa, then other nuclear exporting nations would do so.

Meanwhile there had been a growing feeling among black South Africans during the Reagan administration that either in the event of a defeat in a conventional war with its neighbours, or because of the growing black threat for whites within South Africa, the Republic would use nuclear weapons as a last resort.(83) In 1986, Bishop Desmond Tutu expressed his concern:

> I myself actually fear that in the end because they [South African regime] are so irrational that they seem to have a Samson complex.....They are going to pull down the pillars and everyone must go down with them.....as most of us believe, they do have nuclear capability. I don't put it past them to have their own version of a scorched earth policy. (84)

Unlike the Carter administration, the U.S. nuclear policy towards South Africa under the first Reagan term was brought to public attention by Congressmen sympathetic to the black cause in South Africa, and the Afro-American pressure groups, such as TransAfrica, and the Washington Office on Africa. In this they were joined by certain elements within the bureaucracy who usually opposed the

Reagan administration's nuclear policy towards South Africa, and in turn formed a tripartite 'alliance' to make the growing nuclear cooperation between both countries into a public issue. As a result, a substantial number of congressional hearings regarding the export of nuclear related goods and technology in general, as well as towards South Africa, were held in both houses of Congress during 1982, and 1983.

During that period the Commerce Department approved licenses for the export of nuclear related equipment, and the export of helium-3 to South Africa. Consequently, these exports were terminated because of the growing congressional pressure and public protests organized by the Washington Office on Africa during 1983, under the name of the Campaign to End U.S.-South Africa Nuclear Collaboration.(85) Further, the public outcry, plus the threat of congressional sanctions against South Africa, forced the administration to tighten export controls. The mounting public pressure resulted in the passage of the sanctions bill by Congress in 1986 which terminated nuclear cooperation with South Africa.

In sum, the Reagan administration's 'limited' nuclear cooperation with South Africa did not succeed in convincing the Republic to abide by non-proliferation. The administration's focus, however, was on the Namibian independence issue rather than domestic political change in South Africa. In this pursuit, because Washington needed South Africa's cooperation, it did not put pressure on

the Republic in this regard. Even if South Africa had joined the NPT it would have not eased the growing domestic pressure on the Reagan administration. By now the balance had already been shifted to Congress and the public, which wanted the imposition of comprehensive sanctions against the Republic.

Conclusion

The early U.S-South Africa uranium extraction cooperation, which entered into a phase that embraced the transfer of nuclear know-how and material to South Africa, fostered South African nuclear development. South African nuclear capability is the result of scientific exchange and technology(86) with the United States between the period 1950 through the mid-1970s. Throughout this period South Africa benefitted from the United States in this field.

From the mid 1970s until the passage of the NNPA in 1978, the U.S.-South Africa nuclear policy was a part of the general nuclear export debate between the Ford /Carter administrations and Congress, which concerned the policies, rules, and decision-making in this regard.(87)

Thus, both the Carter and the Reagan administrations perceived nuclear relations with South Africa from different perspectives, and tried to bring the Republic within the NPT fold. What differentiated the Carter administration from its successor was that nuclear related

material which reached South Africa between 1977 and 1980 was "outside the knowledge or the approval of the U.S. government," whereas during the Reagan administration nuclear related material was sent to South Africa with the consent of top level policy-makers, probably including the President himself. But nuclear material which reached South Africa during the first Reagan term, however, was not the major lifeline through which South Africa gained its nuclear strength. By then the sources were diverse and many, including its domestic capability.

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CHAPTER V

U.S-SOUTH AFRICA DEFENCE AND INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION

Introduction

"An army without secret agents is like a man without eyes and ears", wrote Sun Tzu, a Chinese philosopher in 4th century B.C. Throughout the recorded history of conflict, secret agents have been used to gather information about enemy/enemies' movements, both war and peace time. What has made contemporary espionage different from the early period are various technological developments.

The Soviet domination of the East European countries and the commencement of the U.S. containment doctrine in the aftermath of the Second World War marked the beginning of the Cold War era. The West was particularly concerned about the growth of Communism and its possible control of the Third World resources needed for Western industrial development and survival.

In Africa, the Southern subcontinent was the most important because of its strategic minerals production, discussed in chapters three and four. To secure free access to those minerals, and to keep an eye on oil shipping lanes connecting the Middle East with the West, against possible Soviet interruption, the United States needed the cooperation of countries in the region. The

geo-strategic location and military capability of South Africa made it most attractive for the United States ____a suitable area to which she could reach out to share intelligence and develop cooperation against the manoeuvrings of a common enemy_____the Soviet Union.

Our knowledge of the long-standing intelligence cooperation between the U.S. intelligence community, especially the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), and their South African counterpart, the Bureau for State Security (BOSS), later the National Intelligence Service (NIS) is very limited. That on the basis of the available secondary sources, coupled with empirical evidence of a primary character, it can be said that the CIA's activities in South Africa were extensive. First, the agency and its South African counterpart participated in joint covert operations in the Congo in the 1960s, and in Angola against the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the mid-1970s. Their liaison also covered information sharing regarding the Soviet movements in Southern Africa, and the Indian and the South Atlantic Oceans. Second, since the early 1960s, the CIA, on the one hand, cooperated in intelligence sharing concerning the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) movements with the South African intelligence entity, and on the other, tried to groom a future Black leadership, such as Chief Gatsha Buthelezi. Finally, since South Africa's official announcement of its uranium enrichment

plant in 1970, its nuclear weapons programme had been a matter of concern and interest for the U.S. intelligence community, especially the CIA.

This chapter addresses two basic questions. [1] How important was U.S./South Africa intelligence cooperation in Southern Africa? [2] How far did the U.S. intelligence agencies pursue their own policies in the region? Before analysing these issues, it is important to outline briefly the historical evolution of the intelligence organizations of both the countries.

5.1 Historical Development

Intelligence means the gathering of political, economic, and military information and other data concerning the activities of a potential enemy.(1) Information can be accumulated independently or in collaboration with other friendly intelligence agencies. There are of course various ways of gathering the required information. Intelligence is as old as war itself. In the recorded human history of five thousand years, the conduct of espionage could be found in ancient China and India in the distant past, as well as in Greek city states. The Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu (quoted above) in his book 'The Art of War', described the employment of secret agents as follows:

> Now there are five sorts of secret agents to be employed. There are native, inside, doubled, expandable, and living.

> When these five types of agents are all working simultaneously and none knows these methods of operations, they are called "The Divine Skein" and are the treasure of a sovereign.(2)

Broadly speaking, it was only after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 that the "treasure of a sovereign" began to take shape in the modern nation states.

Since its birth in 1776 until the Second World War (1939-45), because of its "isolationist" policy in world affairs, the U.S. intelligence bureau had only to gather information during war times. There was no peacetime intelligence service in the country throughout that period. It was only during and after the Second World War that the "United States learned the art of clandestine intervention from the British Secret Service, which had several centuries' experience applying such methods in the Crown's colonies and protectorates."(3) Thus, five months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt (1933-45) decided to create a peace time intelligence bureau on July 11, 1941. This was then known as the Office of Coordination (OCI). After its failure to gather advance information of the Japanese attack, the OCI was reorganized in June 1942 to became the Office of Strategic Service (OSS).(4)

The U.S. intelligence community became more assertive after the War when the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as two great rival powers in the world. As a result, the first well-organized, peace-time intelligence

service in the United States___the CIA___ was created under the 1947 National Security Act. In addition, the National Security Council (NSC), an advisory forum to the President of the United States on national security threats and goals, was also created under this Act. "Since then the intelligence community has been a key element of U.S. foreign and national security policy."(5)

The U.S. intelligence community is divided into defence and civilian agencies. The agencies within the Department of Defence include:

[1] National Security Agency (NSA)
[2] Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)
[3] Army Intelligence
[4] Naval Intelligence
[5] Air Force Intelligence

The civilian agencies consist of:

[1] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
[2] State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (BOIR)
[3] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
[4] Division of Intelligence (Atomic Energy Commission)
[5] Treasury Department's Intelligence Agency

What differentiate the CIA from the rest of the U.S. intelligence community is its "Directorate which covers three basic types of clandestine operations: espionage, counter-espionage, and covert actions."(6) The agency is infamous for its alleged assassination plots against foreign leaders, masterminding coups d'etat, and arming anti-Communist guerrilla organizations around the world.

In the wake of the Vietnam defeat and the Watergate

scandal during the early 1970s, the U.S. Senate Investigative Committee under the leadership of Senator Frank Church, and the House Select Committee on Intelligence under the chairmanship of Representative Otis G.Pike were appointed by mid-1975 to review the covert activities and operations of the U.S. "invisible kingdom". Philip Agee, who had spent twelve years as a CIA agent and insider, has pointed out that "the Pike report has turned a blind eye on CIA's liaison operations with foreign intelligence and security services." In Agee's opinion, "the Committee considered the matter too hot to handle."(7) The important aspect of the CIA's cooperation with fellow agencies in friendly countries had also been ignored by the Church Committee(8), which had focused its attention on alleged CIA involvement in assassination plots against foreign leaders. These included, for example, Patrice Lumumba (the Congo), Fidel Castro (Cuba), General Rene Schielder (Chile), and President Ngo Din Diem and his brother Ngo Din Nho (South Vietnam).

Unlike its American___CIA___which has nothing to do with the internal security of the United States, the South African National Intelligence Service (NIS) had not only to preserve the internal security of the country, but to insulate it from external covert threats as well. With the inception of the Nixon administration in January 1969, the relations between both the countries were placed within the broader framework of strategic considerations. It was during his administration that close contacts

were established between the CIA and the friendly intelligence agencies worldwide. As a result, the CIA was much influenced by the host countries' intelligence agencies in framing its intelligence activity. Within this framework of broader cooperation, the Republican Intelligence (RI) of South Africa was reorganized with the help of the CIA. Consequently, the Bureau for State Security (BOSS) was created in May 1969, under the heavy hand of General Van den Bergh. Coincidently, Richard Nixon's National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger was authorized to prepare a secret Southern African policy paper___the National Security Study Memorandum-39___during the same period.

However, due to the Muldergate scandal, and the subsequent resignation of Prime Minister Vorster in September 1978, General Bergh had to resign, BOSS was restructured, and renamed as the Department of National Security (DNS). During the mid 1980s, the intelligence service was once again reconstituted and currently functions under the name of the National Intelligence Service (NIS).

Another factor which strengthened the ties between the two countries in this regard was the development of the space technology by the end of the 1950s, when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik-I, the first space capsule to orbit the earth. The Soviet space monopoly was broken by the United States a year later in 1958, which soon after started negotiations with South Africa for the

construction of satellite tracking stations.(9) The cooperation between the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the U.S. space agencies, however, had already been started soon after the Sputnik-I launch. As a result, both countries entered into an agreement on National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) satellite tracking stations, signed on September 13, 1960 in Pretoria. The object of the agreement as announced was to "cooperate for peaceful uses of outer space and the facilities established shall not be used for purposes of a military nature." The importance of the U.S. space programme's reliance on South Africa was submitted to President Nixon in a secret memorandum fourteen months before the formal agreement was signed between both the countries. The document reads:

> The NASA unmanned planetary exploration spacecraft, as they have in the past, must continue to depend heavily upon the tracking stations located in South Africa in achieving mission success.....The South African NASA tracking facilities is a vital element in a global network of stations which provides the total communications link with our planetary-bound flight spacecraft.
>
> The NASA station was located in South Africa, both because it had the proper geographic location in relation to the other stations of the Deep Space Network (which are spaced 120 [degrees] apart and because it is uniquely located to allow the precise tracking of Cape Kennedy launching spacecraft during the critical phase just after the spacecrafts are placed into planetary bound trajectories (post injuction-phase)(10)

Throughout the contract period, the programme was conducted by NASA and the CSIR, the cooperating agencies of both countries. In addition to NASA's tracking stations,

"the United States had established a Defence Department (DoD) tracking station near Johannesburg for the purposes of South Atlantic Missile Test Range."(11)

The United States decided to close down its facilities in 1974 and did not renew the contract with the Republic. At least two factors contributed towards the closure of tracking stations. First, growing congressional opposition during the Nixon era, and second, the NASA and the DoD reached the conclusion that the stations in South Africa were no longer required for research and development of missiles.(12)

5.2 CIA-NIS Covert Operations: An Overview

The closer intelligence cooperation and information sharing between both the agencies dates back to the 1950s. It was during the Truman administration that the CIA began developing its relations with its South African counterpart,(13) alongwith the Western European intelligence services, and with its Turkish, Yugoslav, Taiwanese, and Thai counterparts(14) to contain the growth and influence of Communism.

The first CIA-South African intelligence agency covert operation was in the Congo in the early 1960s, which became the centre of international attention and the first arena of East-West Cold War competition politics in Africa. "Colonel Mike Hoare, a South African citizen had led 500 mercenaries to help the CIA to put down the Communist inspired insurgents in the Congo."(15) Thus,

the Congo crisis marked the beginning of the first U.S. coherent policy towards Africa on the one hand, as well as providing the first Soviet foothold in the continent, on the other.

In additon to their covert activities, the CIA was pretty much involved in creating a rift in black unity in South Africa so as to break their united force. According to Gordon Winter, a former BOSS intelligence officer, who defected from the Bureau in May 1979, "He [Bergh] said [to Winter] the CIA had helped to create the split in the African National Congress in 1959 which had given birth to the Pan-Africanist Congress."(16)

During the late 1960s, the CIA and its South African counterpart were involved in covert operations as far as Eastern Nigeria, where the Ibo region split off from the federation and became the independent state of Biafra in 1967. After three years bloody civil war Nigeria was reunified in 1970. Winter gives the inside story:

> Years later [after the civil war] I was told at high level in BOSS that Mr. Botha [then Defence Minister] had been asked to send the troops by American CIA, which had masterminded Colonel Chukwuemeka Ojukwu's proclamation of 30 May 1967 that Biafara was to be an independent state. I was told that P.W.Botha had also sent a special contingent of experienced South Afircan fighter pilots to Biafra. I was so facinated by this information that I did some private research on the subject, and uncovered the fact that several South African pilots had flown Czech made jet fighter bombers for Biafara. They did so well that six Egyptian MIG fighters were captured and then used by the Biafarans in air battle.(17)

As opposed to the CIA-BOSS support to oil-rich

Biafra, the federal government of General Yukobu Gowan was militarly supported by the Soviet Union not only to gain Nigerian oil concessions but also to secure a firm foothold in West Africa. Just like cobalt in the Congo, the security of the oil supply from Nigeria to the West was the main concern at stake and the reason for involvement.

The long-standing intelligence cooperation between both countries became more evident during the Nixon-Kissinger era when covert activities were seen as a fundamental part of their foreign policy conduct to overthrow the Marxist regimes in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. According to Stephen Talbot, the National Security Study Memorandum-39 (NSSM), which guided U.S. policy towards South Africa, was based in part on CIA reports, which in turn were reliant on data provided by BOSS and the Portuguese secret police.(18) Talking about the CIA-BOSS cooperation during the Nixon administration, Moose said:

> .....certainly during the Nixon administration there had been collaborated intelligence operations, or there had been exchanges of intelligence between the United-States and South Africa. The South Africans provided the intelligence about the air and naval spaces around South Africa to U.S. government. They provided some information about Communist and Marxist or other subversive activities in the region. The United States, I don't think that South Africans, the South Africans undoubtedly had a lot to say to the U.S. government about subversive activities in their own country. The U.S. government probably provided then some information about Soviet or Communist bloc activities in the region.

> I don't know. But I don't have the impression that the United States provided the South African government with intelligence about anything yet, might know about, what was going on inside South Africa. I don't believe that our intelligence services were very well informed about any of them. I think they tended to take whatever the South Africans gave them and to evaluate it. But they never had much of the collective operation inside South Africa itself. I am speaking the time prior to the Carter administration.....But I feel reasonably confident about what I just told you.(19)

The relationship between the CIA and its South African counterpart entered into a more active phase after the Portuguese coup in 1974, where the CIA failed to notice "cracks in the facade". Subsequently, Angola and Mozambique emerged as pro-Moscow governments on the spectrum of the international system in 1975. This development brought the Southern subcontinent of Africa into the arena of Cold War competition where both the superpowers and their regional allies were engaged overtly or covertly to wipe out each other's influence and political growth in the region. The CIA-BOSS common enterprise in this struggle was to help overthrow the Marxist government of Agostinho Neto (1975-79) of Angola. to protect their economic and political interests in the region.

During the mid 1970s, the U.S. intelligence community was a newcomer in the region with little or no experience or understanding of revolutionary movements there. In addition, it lacked an insight into the Afrikaner society in South Africa or any sort of working relationship with the African National Congress (ANC).

Thus, the U.S. intelligence entity had to work on different fronts in collaboration with BOSS and the Rhodesian (Zimbabwe) Central Intelligence Organization (CIO).

One of the most revealing studies of intelligence cooperation between U.S. and South African intelligence agencies during this time was the book, 'In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story', by John Stockwell, the former head of the CIA's Angola Task Force during the mid-1970s, who later resigned in protest against the agency's policies. He noted that "the CIA has traditionally sympathized with South Africa and enjoyed its close liaison with BOSS."(20) Stockwell argues that in its hunt for military advisers for anti-MPLA groups in Angola, the CIA found South Africa the most attractive source, which not only provided advisers to UNITA and FNLA, but eventually its armed forces entered in the war against the ruling MPLA.(21)

Within the ruling National Party there was discontent with Prime Minister Vorster's Angola policy in collaboration with the CIA. The then Defence Minister P.W.Botha "had always warned H.J. [General van den Bergh] that the CIA would eventually doublecross South Africa"(22) in this regard. The dissent group was "claiming that Vorster and van den Bergh were just CIA-dominated kittens who were suckling at the teats of that political hyena Henry Kissinger."(23)

However, events exactly happened the way Botha had

foreseen when the CIA support to UNITA and FNLA was stopped by Congress by means of an amendment to the U.S. Arms Export Control Act, known as the Clark Amendment in 1976.(24) The Amendment was signed into Law by President Gerald Ford on February 9, 1976. It remains noteworthy, however, that the decision to support the UNITA and FNLA militarly was made by the State Department under Henry Kissinger. When Botha became Prime Minister in 1978 he "publicly accused Washington of encouraging and than abandoning Pretoria's abortive 1975-76 invasion of Angola."(25)

In January 1978 President Carter signed an Executive Order which tightened the control over CIA's clandestine operations, especially through the prohibition of assassinations.(26) In the second week of May 1978 the CIA Chief Admiral Stansfield Turner, along with Brzezinski's adviser, David Aron approached Senator Dick Clark to ask if he would agree to a plan to give American arms to UNITA through a third party.(27) According to Senator Clark, "it is increasingly clear that President Carter had made the decision to reinvolve the United States in the Angolan civil war."(28)

In relation to CIA-BOSS Moose responded that

> Now at the beginning of the Carter administration we formally ended all forms of intelligence cooperation with the South African government. Even all kinds of information exchanges.....We ended all kinds of governmental exchanges. And that was reasonably effective. I believe it was 99 percent effective. In retrospect, I believe that some of our U.S. intelligence agencies

> without the knowledge of President and against his explicit direction neverthless maintained some level of clandestine exchange with South Africans, providing some types of information about Soviet bloc activities around the area. It was outside the law. It was the kind of thing that unfortunately CIA has done from time to time. The CIA and our military intelligence believed that it was very important for them to maintain some of the ties because South Africans were the only really effective non-African intelligence operations in the area. But that was wholly illegal, and the people who were doing it were acting totally against policy. In fact, I repeatedly sought to check this and was assured by the CIA, by Mr. Clair George,(29) who is currently being tried for lying to Congress. I repeatedly asked about this really, and was assured by the CIA that nothing of the sort was going on. Now I know they lied to me. But that was wholly irregular.(30)

Against Moose's account of a "99 percent effective" ban on contact, the CIA was pretty much active in South Africa and was working over the heads of the State Department bureaucracy. In January 1979, Anthony Sampson of the Sunday Observer interviewed the former BOSS chief General Bergh on the telephone and asked him whether "the CIA might have become less friendly [with South Africa because of the Carter administration's policy]. General Bergh's response was: "That's a lot of bull. On the contrary only today I had lunch with a friend of mine who is back here on holiday, who is very senior in the CIA."(31)

Another example of clandestine CIA activities involving its South African counterpart was the embarrassment caused by the Muldergate scandal, in which both the agencies were shown to be engaged in illegal

activities to improve the white minority government's international image.(32) As a result, Prime Minister Vorster and his Information Minister Cornelius Mulder had to resign in September 1978, and power went into the hands of the far right elements in the National Party, under the leadership of F.W.Botha.(33) Sean MacBride, the recipient of the Nobel (1974) and Lenin (1977) Peace Awards, and the American Medal for Justice (1978) is of the opinion that in all these criminal actions to obtain the services of "opinion formers and decision-makers" in the United States and elsewhere throughout the world, "if CIA was not directly involved in covert operations, it was aware of them."(34)

In addition to the CIA, the collaboration between the U.S. Navy and its South African counterpart also continued throughout the Carter administration, mainly focused on the communications intelligence of Soviet sub-marine and shipping activities.(35)

Apart from information sharing, the other function of the CIA's clandestine operations in South Africa had been to watch and gather information regarding the Republic's nuclear development and capabilities since the early 1970s. This, however, became much more active with the advent of the Carter administration. In February 1977 the U.S. intelligence community reported "that South Africa could make a nuclear weapon by 1981, or within a few months if it initiated a crash programme."(36)

It was during his administration that the agency

was ordered to photograph South Africa's nuclear installations. These clandestine operations were, however, discovered and responsible officers of the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria were given a week to leave the country. The South African Prime Minister announced on April 12, 1979 that "they [U.S.] had photographed some of the Republic's 'most sensitive military installation' by means of secret cameras installed in a diplomatic aircraft,"(37) and he demanded an apology from the U.S. government. The intrusion was not officially "denied by the Carter administration", but "a Pentagon official said that the plane was primarily used to keep an eye on South Africa's nuclear installations, particularly a test site in the Kalahari desert."(38)

In his unpublished memoirs, the then South African Ambassador to the United States, Donald B.Sole has revealed that "the matter of expulsion [of U.S. officers] was resolved by Botha government even without consulting its Embassy in Washington, D.C." According to him, he "pleaded with Botha for caution."(39) The question of whether the spy-plane incident was a genuine allegation or the Botha government wanted to derail and divert U.S. attention from the Namibian talks which in fact, were gaining momentum and progress caused much concern in Washington.(40)

In response to South Africa's "spy plane" allegation, the Carter administration refused to apologise and replied by ordering the immediate expulsion of two South African

diplomats based in Washington, D.C. Three days later, on April 15, 1979, Dr. A.J.A.Roux, then Chairman of the South African Atomic Energy Board, said in an statement that much clearer pictures could have been taken of the Valindaba uranium enrichment plant with its 'unique process' from a low flying aircraft than from satellite. (41) According to the Sunday Times (Johannesburg, April 29, 1979) report, the CIA had "for many years exchanged aerial photographs taken over Black African countries in exchange for secret information from the South African authorities, regarding the Soviet moves in the region." This report, however, was categorically denied by the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria.

Like most of the CIA covert actions, this operation had probably been carried out under the directions of the White House and the National Security Council (NSC). The Presidential Executive Order 12036 of January 1978, "allowed the president to order the CIA to do everything it had done in the past except political assassinations."

On the other end of the CIA's intelligence scale, it is difficult to assess the lengths of its involvement in espionage operations concerning the ANC, PAC, and other black leaders' activities, both inside and outside South Africa during and before the Carter administration because of the lack of information. Neverthless the involvement of the U.S. intelligence community in this regard cannot be ruled out given its past record. For example, in the assessment of Winter, the CIA was engaged to "groom Chief Gatsha [Buthelezi] for power with financial and political backing. Should a revolution come to South Africa the CIA would prefer him to be the national black leader rather than the Moscow-based Nelson Mandela."(42) Martin Dolinchek, also a former intelligence officer of the BOSS, disclosed in 1991 "that the U.S. CIA had been involved in promoting Chief Buthelezi's image overseas,"(43) as an 'acceptable' black South African leader.

Writing about the CIA's penetration within black nationalist movements, Winter has noted:

> At the much later date [probably after the Soweto uprising] Pretoria showed me conclusive proof that the CIA had also given covert support to such Black organizations as the Soweto Students' Representative Council (SSRC), the Black Community Program

> (BCP), the Union of Black Journalists (UBJ), the Black Allied Workers' Union (BAWA), the National Youth Organization (NYO), the South African Students' Organization (SASO), and the Black People's Convention (BCP). (44)

In his assessment, in the beginning these organizations were unaware of the CIA's involvement, because funds were comming through respectable liberal foundations and groups in the United States and Switzerland. Their support, however, was covering various forms, such as educational grants, cultural exchanges, 'study tours', and legal aid for black political prisoners.(45)

Quoting the then BOSS chief General Bergh concerning the CIA's infiltration in black organizations, Winter has noted:

> 'So you see, the CIA backs all the black horses in the race so that, whichever mount wins, America will have a share in the prize money____our strategic mineral deposits and, almost as important, our vast and cheap Black labour force.'(46)

However, since the 1970s the South African intelligence entity was narrowing its focus on the African National Congress. In July 1986 Seymour Hersh carried an article in the "New York Times" about intelligence cooperation between the U.S., the U.K. and South Africa in this respect. According to Hersh, a conference was held at Cheltenham in 1980 between the representatives of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) of the United Kingdom, the National Security Agency (NSA) of the United States, and the South African Directorate

of Military Intelligence. Among other things, the South African delegation requested: [1] the intelligence information about Oliver Tambo and ten members of the ANC high command staff; [2] information on any flights Tambo took abroad on Soviet and Cuban airlines; and [3] special attention to be paid by the NSA, and the GCHQ to the ANC communications.(47)

This kind of intelligence triangle was confirmed by Moose:

> I always suspected that the British intelligence was passing stuff on to the American intelligence. So we just got it through the British back door somehow, because the British certainly collaborating with the South Africans and with the Rhodesians and all about. I suppose our intelligence people got some of the [information], but it wasn't the policy of the U.S. government to do that.(48)

The ANC related cooperation between the CIA and its South African counterpart during the Carter administration thus continued despite the fact that it was considered as a "nationalist movement" by the Carter administration. When this author asked Moose about his administration's perceptions regarding the ANC, his response was:

> I think we understood there were Communist party members within the ANC. I never thought of the ANC anything other than the African movement. And they were native.....But I never thought they would be Marxist or under the control of, or even under the influence of the Soviet Union. I mean there were still.....the Soviet Communist party, Soviet Union, Russia, all have gone, these fellows are still there because they were quite inependent from the influence of Russians..... We had contacts with them. I used to see ANC people. I saw them.

> We didn't see them frequently. We didn't see them in South Africa. But we saw them outside from time to time.....I consider them as a nationalist movement. I consider them as a legitimate nationalist movement. Most of the members of our administration who believed and said Communist movement.(49)

In sum, the U.S. intelligence community continued to pursue its own policy independently and in collaboration with its South African counterpart, throughout the Carter administration, against the declared U.S. government policy, which only allowed information gathering activities in host countries.

5.3 Intelligence Cooperation During the Reagan Administration

The closer relationship between the U.S. intelligence community and its South African counterpart (Department of National Security (DONS), later the National Intelligence Service (NIS), once again mushroomed when Ronald Reagan became the President of the United States with the clear and firm idea of supporting the white minority regime of South Africa.

The intelligence cooperation between both countries during his administration was mainly concentrated on the activities of the African National Congress (ANC), because Washington did not want to see a 'Moscow-oriented' organization come into power in Pretoria. Their activities included for example, obtaining of information from the interception of communications between ANC headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia, its guerrilla training camps in Angola,

and its offices in Africa and Western Europe.(50)

This kind of cooperation between both the countries, however, was denied by Chester A.Crocker.

> We were not exchanging intelligence or as working together as partners on things related to black African parties. As such that was beyond the limits and constraints of our policy.(51)

Some of the important Africa specialists in the State and the Defence Departments I interviewed in Washington, categorically denied the cooperation between the intelligence entities of both the countries in this regard. For example, Ambassador James K.Bishop Jr.told the author:

> We shared them [South Africans] intelligence about the movement of our adversary [Soviet Union] in that part of the world. We didn't provide them intelligence that related to internal South African matters. And we did not engage with the South Africans in covert operations in that part of the world or anywhere.(52)

An official in the State Department said:

> .....then you are talking about internal South African [intelligence sharing]. And in my experience there was none. None. Absolutely none. We did not cooperate. There was no collaboration. (53)

A middle-echelon U.S. Defence Department officer:

> No. As far as I know they didn't [cooperate]. We didn't know the ANC movement either. I mean there wasn't lot of information to pass that. I know.(54)

The above interviewees, including Crocker, were putting emphasis on this particular issue despite the fact that throughout the Reagan administration the ANC

was considered as a terrorist organization. Their denial was motivated, partly because of restraints, and partly because it would cause an embarrassment to Washington vis-a-vis the African National Congress.

In addition to the ANC-related intelligence under the new administration in Washington, the meetings between senior U.S. officials and South African military personnel resumed once again on U.S. soil. So much so, that just seven weeks after the inauguration of Reagan as President, the U.S. permanent representative in the United Nations, J.Kirkpatrick had on March 15, 1981, a secret meeting in Washington with the South African head of military intelligence. Commenting on the meeting, the New York Times concluded that the visit was to "discuss matters of common interest with officials in the new administration." It further noted that the South African Defence Minister Malan cited it as an example of improved relations with the United States.(55)

In December 1981 the United Nations established a commission to investigate the South African based mercenary invasion to overthrow President Albert Rene' of Seychelles. The commission concluded in its report published in December 1982 that "the arms and ammunition for the attempted coup were supplied by the members of the South African Defence Force (SADF) and that the South African intelligence service, NSI was generally aware of the 'mercenaries' preparation."(56) According to the New York Times, the mercenary leader, Mike Hoare testified

that he informed a representative of the CIA in Pretoria about the plan and he told his men that the CIA had approved the plan.(57) Why did the CIA-NIS want to help topple the government of Albert Rene? Several aspects of this could be explained. First, in September 1980 the Seychelles government banned South African Airways planes from landing there as a protest against South Africa's policies of apartheid. Second, South Africa and the CIA were also wary of the presence of the Tanzanian soldiers on the island who helped Rene to overthrow the previous government in 1977, and therefore attempted to bring back the ousted president, James Manchan. Finally, according to the Seychelles government "the coup stemmed from superpower interest in the Indian Ocean oil tanker routes, which are near the islands."(58)

By the end of the Reagan administration's first term in office, the CIA and NIS were once again caught in an abuse. This time in their covert involvement in Iran-Contra scandal. The South African denial of involvement in this case was followed by George Shultz's statement in which he disowned CIA documents suggesting that he had approved William Casey's plan in 1984 to use South Africa covertly to provide aid to the Contra rebels.(59)

In another example of continuing cooperation in the field of strategic intelligence, both the governments had been exchanging information regarding the movement of Soviet ships in the Indian and the South Atlantic

Oceans. It was later disclosed by the former National Security officials of South Africa that a vast quantity of electronic equipment, including antennas and sophisticated interception receivers, were secretly shipped from Britain and West Germany to enable it to build more listening sites at Silvermine,(60) the South African military surveillance system.

The intelligence cooperation regarding the Soviet activities in the region was confirmed by Crocker:

> Well I think we did some degree of consultation and discussion on issues [during the Reagan administration] related to Soviet activities and Soviet presence, Soviet-Cuban presence. We would talk about Angola, particularly Angola, because that was the leading case. We would share and passions of Soviet decision-making and Soviet goals, and methods and that kind of things. We would talk about the facts in an effort, frankly to inform them because they [South Africans] tended to be very ill-informed. Historically ill-informed at the times. This is an isolated pariah state and sometimes one way to deal with them is to give them objective fact. It might make them more realistic.(61)

After the passage of the Comprehensive Anti Apartheid Act in 1986, the ANC-Reagan administration relations apprently took a different turn. By now the administration was divided between Secretary Shultz and Crocker on the one hand, and the White House and the intelligence community on the other. In Crocker's assessment:

> When [George] Shultz made an appointment to meet Oliver Tambo in January 1987, I said it was the right thing to do. It would set a good example for the South Africans themselves. It would give us a chance to

> speak directly to the top of the ANC about our problems, some of their positions and they could speak direct to us. And it was a smart thing to do. But Shultz got trouble with the extreme right here.....I met Tambo in London. I think it was October 1986. This was the first time that I had met any level. So we were doing this. Now it subsequently became known as you know that South Africans themselves were meeting the ANC Secretary during this time.(62)

However, the Shultz-Crocker "trouble with the extreme right" concerning the ANC, especially with the White House and the intelligence community, continued more or less until the very end of the administration. In November 1988 "the ANC was identified by the then Vice President George Bush's Task Force on Combating Terrorism as an official terrorist group."(63) "That was a joke", said the Bush administration's Under Secretary for Political Affairs in an interview with the author. He continued: "That was like saying that because Manachem Begin allegedly participated in terrorist acts, he is a terrorist. Then you can make Thomas Paine [1737-1809] and Thomas Jefferson [1743-1826] terrorists also on somebody's list."(64)

How far did the intelligence agencies pursue their own policies towards South Africa during the Reagan administration?

Crocker indicated that certain elements in the intelligence community were pursuing their own policy:

> Having said that I will have to add one point. That is interesting and that has [not] yet probably been revealed. And that is the Director of the CIA. Bill Casey was a man who was quite capable of conducting his own policy on occassions. And taking the initiatives that were not in fact approved. In some cases we learned about

> that. So that made my job interesting. Let me put that way.

He further said:

> Casey was very very activist and one might even say adventurist, forward leaning proponent of a certain approach to dealing with all parts of the world. All parts of the world with same perspective. Many of his colleagues were in fact uncomfortable. That's the reality.(65)

Casey and his intelligence community's "adventurism" became known to the public when the New York Times carried an article by mid 1986 which revealed that the "U.S. and the British intelligence agencies had been providing South Africa information about the exiled ANC's political moves as well as their planned attacks in return of the Soviet-Cuban activities in the region."(66) The Secretary of State, Shultz denied that report and said that Casey had assured him that the United States had not passed South Africa any intelligence concerning the anti-apartheid guerrilla groups.(67)

However, it is safe to say that the number of intelligence "outlaws" regarding South Africa policy in the Reagan administration was greater than that of the Carter administration, and that they were working with Casey's knowledge and approval.

On the policy-making front in general, unlike his predecessors, Nixon, Ford, and Carter, who did not include their intelligence chiefs within their inner circles,(68) President Reagan brought Casey into foreign policy channels and the decision-making process. Consequently, the U.S. intelligence entity started influencing foreign policy

decisions by covertly arming the U.S. 'friends and allies' in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

A middle-echelon Defence Department career officer on Africa agreed with the author regarding a certain degree of intelligence sharing between the U.S. intelligence entities and their South African counterpart during the Reagan administration:

> For example, during the late 1980s two Russian ships were blown up near Maputo harbour. We wouldn't pass that kind information to South Africans. We might say that we knew there were twenty Soviet ships in the South Atlantic and the South Indian Oceans and we wouldn't say that one of them was in Maputo, one of them was in Lobeto, and one of them was in Madagascar. So it was that kind of general trading of that level of intelligence.(69)

Thus, it was against the wishes of the Reagan administration that Congress passed the CAAA in fall 1986, which among other sanctions, prohibited intelligence cooperation with South Africa, except for activities "reasonably designed to facilitate the necessary collection of intelligence". The Act further says:

> It is the policy of the United States that no agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may provide any intelligence information to the government of South Africa which pertains to South African internal opposition group, movement, organization, or individual. Any change in such policy, or the provision of intelligence information contrary to such policy, shall be considered a significant anticipated intelligence activity for purpose of Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947.(70)

On the prohibition of intelligence cooperation between both the countries, the above-mentioned Defence

Department officer gave his Department's reaction:

> Our argument was that those guys are such important internal players [South African military] in South African politics then why blind us [U.S. Defence intelligence personnel in South Africa]. Why take away people who actually talk to them. Our argument always was that diplomats like to talk to diplomats. Soldiers like to talk to soldiers. And South African soldiers were likely telling the American soldiers something that might be even of intelligence interest not just for the Department of Defence, but for [U.S.] government.(71)

It is important to note that the Act does not completely sever the CIA's ties with South African intelligence services. The ban was imposed on intelligence sharing regarding the anti-apartheid movements. At least two reasons could be suggested in this regard. First, keeping the national security of the United States in view, the makers of the Act did not impose a ban on their regional intelligence cooperation. Second, the intelligence cooperation between both the countries was not in the limelight of the U.S. public. The anti-apartheid movements in the United States were mostly focusing on disinvestment and divestment from South Africa, and leaders of the anti-apartheid movement inside and outside Congress were of the opinion that the cut-off of economic links would break the back of the white minority regime.

David King, staffer to Congressman Howard Wolpe, a strong opponent of the apartheid system, told the author: "From our perspective the fundamental question was and is human rights [in South Africa]. Everything else is secondary."(72)

Historically, before the development of the mid -1970s, and the congressional interest to share foreign policy-making matters with the Executive branch, "Congress virtually knew nothing about U.S. intelligence operations, nor did they wish to know."(73) Therefore, from the creation of the CIA under the National Security Act of 1947 until the congressional anti-intelligence feelings of the mid-1970s, the Executive branch had virtually dominated the intelligence policy of the United States. As a result of the congressional assertiveness to check the activities of the unruly elements of the intelligence community, Congress amended "the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, usually known as the Hughes Ryan Amendment. This amendment require the Director Central Intelligence (DCI) to brief at least eight congressional committees in advance prior to any CIA action, apart from intelligence collection."(74)

The congressional Sub-Committee on Africa in its staff report in 1982 recommended an investigation by the House and Senate Intelligence committees into the CIA role which helped South Africa in 1975 to achieve the technology for the G-5 gun-howitzer system to counter the Soviet rocket launchers possessed by the Cubans in Angola. The report noted that at the least this suggested "serious negligence on the part of the Agency [CIA]. At the most there is a possibility that elements of the CIA purposefully evaded United States policy."(75) Thus, the House and the Senate Intelligence committees did not want

to open the CIA's Pandora's Box once again, as they had done during the mid-1970s. However, this time things were different. There was neither the Vietnam defeat, nor the Watergate scandal, nor Seymour Hersh's revealing articles in the New York Times regarding the covert and overt CIA operations inside and outside the United States, which compelled President Ford to appoint the Rockefeller Commission to investigate the alleged covert operations of the Agency, in addition to the Church and the Pike Committee reports of the mid-1970s.

Formally speaking the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies are not part of the policy-making process in Washington. Their job is to provide information to be utilized in policy formulation by those who make the policy. But in practice, because of their "knowledge" they usually have influence over the policy-making apparatus.(76) This, however, depends on the nature of the relationship between the President and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). If the DCI enjoys a close relationship with President, as in the case of Reagan and Casey, the intelligence agencies will certainly have a certain degree of influence on foreign policy-making. But this does not mean that in case of 'strained' relations between the President and the DCI, (as between Nixon and Richard Helms), the intelligence agencies do not try to influence policy. Like other Executive departments and agencies in Washington, the intelligence community had always remained in a constant bureaucratic

tug-of-war to influence foreign policy decisions, and have usually supported covert actions or preferred the military to the diplomatic solution of problems. According to the former CIA deputy director Bobby Inman's observation: "Every administration ultimately turns to the use of covert operations when they become frustrated because the lack of success with diplomatic initiatives and are unwilling to use military force."(77)

Conclusion

The above discussion suggests that it was the U.S. intelligence community, especially the CIA which trained and strengthened the South African intelligence agency, and later became considerably reliant for information on it, which was focused mostly on Communist subversion. As a result, the CIA's perspective on Southern Africa developed according to the information they had been receiving from BOSS, later the NIS, which in turn assisted the policy-makers in Washington to formulate and execute the anti-Communist policy towards the region, especially during the Nixon and the Reagan administrations. The South African intelligence entity had been instrumental to its country's policy to annihilate the national movements inside and outside the country. These movements were classified as pro-Moscow to gain Western support and "appl[ied] the CIA label"(78) to create rift within black organizations. According to Stephen Talbot, both the agencies have acted in secret operations outside the normal

review processes of the U.S. Congress and the South African parliament.(79)

One common thread which runs through all the successive administrations from Truman to Reagan, either with their explicit or implicit knowledge, was that the African National Congress had mostly remained the focal point of the CIA's covert operations.

In sum, the CIA-NIS involvement in the Congo, Nigeria, Angola, Muldergate, Seychelles, Iran-Contra, and against the ANC and the PAC is only the tip of the iceberg of their covert operations. The entire picture of their 'dirty tricks' perhaps will never come to surface because of the so-called national security reasons of both countries.

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9. Richard W.Hull, 'American Enterprise in South Africa: Historical Dimensions of Engagement and Disengagement', 'New York University Press, New York, 1990, p. 216.

10. Mohamed A-EL Khawas and Barry Cohen, 'NSSM: The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa', Lawrence Hill and Co., Westport, 1976, pp. 165-166.

11. Department of State Bulletin, Vol., LXXIV, No., 1948, October 25, 1976, Washington, D.C., p. 535. And, Kevin Danaher, 'The political Economy of U.S. Policy Toward South Africa', Westview Special Studies on Africa, Boulder, 1985, p. 80.

12. For further discussion see, Mohamed A-EL Khawas and Barry Cohen, op. cit., pp. 87-88, Richard W.Hull, op., cit., pp. 257-259, and Kevin Danaher, op., cit., pp. 8182.

13. Kevin Danaher, op., cit., p. 68.

14. John Raneiagh, 'The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA', Weiden Feld and Nicolson, London, 1986, p. 225.

15. Gordon Winter, 'Inside BOSS: South Africa's Secret Police', Penguin Books, England, 1981, p. 542.
16. ibid., p. 430.

17. ibid, pp. 296-297.

18. Stephen Talbot, 'The CIA and BOSS: Thick as Thieves', in Ellen Ray et al., op., cit., p. 167.

19. Interview with Richard M.Moose, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Washington, D.C., October 7, 1992.
Talking about the early Nixon period, Moose told the author, "that there was also a lot of intelligence exchange between Rhodesian intelligence and the British intelligence about what was going on in South Africa. The British coming on up to the period of Carter administration maintained the very active intelligence exchange with the Rhodesians which was, I was disturbed by, often bothered by because the Rhodesians were spying on everybody in the neighbourhood, spied on Zambia, Mozambique, and spied on everyone. And the British collaborated with them and this exchange of intelligence I came to know about later on. I dont't know how much the British gave them but the Rhodesians certainly gave the British a lot of information. I suppose the British had given them some quid pro quo. I suspect there was relatively a one-sided arrangement. But there was lot of. [Ian] Smith certainly knew it. The British government certainly knew it. It's not like between the American intelligence services outlaw elements of the American services and South African services....."

20. John Stockwell, 'In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story', W.W. Norton, New York, 1978, p. 187.

21. ibid, pp. 184-186.

22. Gordon Winter, op., cit., p. 557.

23. ibid.

24. In May 1986 Congress repealed the Clark Amendment to authorise the President to make foreign policy decisions without congressional restrictions.

25. Stephen Talbot, 'The CIA and BOSS: Thick as Thieves', in Ellen Ray, et al., (eds), 'Dirty Works 2: The CIA in Africa', 2nd print, Lyle Staurt Inc., New Jersey, 1980, p. 271.

26. John Prados, 'President's Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations From World War II Through Iranscam', Quill Williams, Morrow, New York, 1986, p. 349.

27. Africa Confidential, Vol., 14, July 7, 1978, London, pp. 1-2.

28. Africa News, May 29, 1978, p. 2.

29. Clair George is the former CIA Deputy Director. He was involved in Iran-Contra scandal, as a covert operations chief. Goerge was found guilty on December 9, 1992. (The Guardian, London, December, 10, 1992)

30. Interview with Richard M.Moose.

31. Anthony Sampson, 'The General's White Lies', The Observer Sunday, January 21, 1979.

32. According to the United Nations Centre Against Apartheid (August 1984), between 1973 and 1978 at least U.S. $ 70 million was spent by the South African Department of Information for secret projects aimed at improving South Africa's image abroad. The United States was the major focus of this campaign.

33. According to Gordon Winter, in mid 1977 F.W.Botha and his Military Intelligence leaked some documents which appeared in The Citizen, Johannesburg, under the heading 'The Secret U.S. War Against South Africa', to bring down Prime Minister Vorster and his BOSS Chief, General Bergh.
Gordon Winter, op., cit., p. 429.

34. Sean MacBride, in Ellan Ray et al., (eds), op., cit., p. XVI.

35. Seymour M.Hersh, quoted in Jeffrey Richelson, 'The U.S. Intelligence Community', 2nd edition, Ballinger Publishing Co., Massachusetts, 1989, p. 282.

36. Dan Smith, 'South Africa's Nuclear Capability', World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, in cooperation with UN Centre Against Apartheid, February 1980, p. 10.

37. Kessing's Contemporary Archieves, Vol., XXV, August 10, 1979, p. 20766 A.

38. For excerpts of Donald B.Sole's unpublished memoirs see, Brian Pottinger, Sunday Times, Johannesburg, November 17, 1991, p. 23.

39. Newsweek, April 23, 1979, op., cit.

40. Kessing's Contemporary Archieves, op., cit., p. 20766 A.

41. ibid.

42. Gordon Winter, op., cit., p. 429.

43. Guardian Weekly, August 18, 1991, p. 11.

44. Gordon Winter, op., cit., p. 432.

45. ibid., pp. 432-433.

46. ibid., p. 434

47. Seymour M.Hersh, quoted in Jeffrey Richelson, op., cit., pp. 282-283.

48. Interview with Richard M.Moose.

49. Interview with Richard M.Moose.

50. Seymour M.Hersh, quoted in Jeffrey Richelson, op., cit., p. 282.

51. Interview with Chester A.Crocker, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Washington, D.C., September 15, 1992.

52. Interview with Ambassador James K.Bishop, Jr., acting Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Washington, D.C., July 30, 1992.

53. Interview with Robert Cabelly, Regional Specialist on Africa, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., August 11, 1992.

54. Interview with Vincent D.Kern, Director Africa Region, International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defence, Washington, D.C., August 17, 1992.

55. New York Times, May 10, 1982.

56. George Houser, 'The International Impact of the South African Struggle for Liberation', United Nations Committee Against Apartheid, New York, January 1983, p. 20.

57. New York Times, April 22, 1982.

58. Africa Report, Vol., 27, No., 4, July-August 1982, p. 33.

59. ibid.

60. New York Times, July 23, 1986.

61. Interview with Chester A.Crocker.

62. Interview with Chester A.Crocker.

63. 'Preparing for a Post-Apartheid South Africa', The Backgrounder, No., 802, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., December, 31, 1990, p. 10.

64. Interview with Herry Thompson, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., October 7, 1992.

65. Interview with Chester A.Crocker.

66. New York Times, July 23, 1986.

67. New York Times, July 24, 1986.

68. Martin E.Goldstein, op., cit., p. 322.

69. Interview with Vincent D.Kern.

70. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, United States Statutes at Large, 1986, Vol., 100, Part 4, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., pp. 3191-3192.

71. Interview with Vincent D.Kern.

72. Interview with David King, Staffer, Congressman Howard Wolpe, Washington D.C., September 17, 1992.

73. Thomas M.Franck, and Edward Weisband, 'Foreign Policy By Congress', Oxford University Press, New York, 1979, p. 115.

74. John Raneiagh, op., cit., p. 610.

75. J.D.L.Moore, 'South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation: South Africa's Nuclear Capabilities and Intentions in the Context of International Non-Proliferation Politics', Macmillan Press, London, 1987, p. 125. And, U.S. Congress, Sub-Committee on Africa, 'The Space Research Case and the Breakdown of U.S. Arms Embargo', Staff Study, March 24, 1982, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1982.

76. Martin E. Goldstein, 'America's Foreign Policy: Drift or Decision', SR Scholarly Resources Inc., Delware, 1984, pp. 309-310.

77. Bobby Inman, quoted in Charles W.Kegley Jr., and Eugene R.Wittkopf, 'American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process', 4th Edition, St. Martin's press, New York, 1991, p. 379.

78. Gordon Winter, op., cit., p. 483.

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CHAPTER VI

U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA: ORIGINS AND IMPLEMENTATION

Introduction

The Cold War issues discussed in the previous three chapters, which shaped the U.S. perceptions in its relations with South Africa, for a time overshadowed the issue of human rights violations in the Republic. This does not mean that the issue emerged abruptly and only became the center of the debate during the mid 1970s. It was there in U.S. government policy, though symbolic, since the early 1960s.

The major break-through in this regard commenced with the efforts of the Carter administration in 1977 to get away from the traditional Cold War practices of the Nixon and the Ford administrations, which "showed that there is still life in the 1776 tradition of promoting rights which governments exist to ensure."(1) This tradition, moreover, did not fade away completely with the emergence of the Reagan administration in 1981. Responsible officials of the administration had been denouncing the South African apartheid, keeping the Reagan philosophy in mind that "human rights means working at problems, not walking away from them," publicly known as "quiet persuasion".

The object of this chapter is to look first at the

origins, meaning, and various definitions of the term human rights; then the influence of human rights considerations in the making of U.S. foreign policy; and finally to examine the emergence of human rights issues in the making of U.S. policy towards South Africa.

6.1 Origin of Human Rights

The question of human rights has come to occupy a prominent place in international relations, a field that was once dominated by controversies over thrones and territories.(2) It became the focus of world attention after the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 and one of the dominant issues of international concern since the Second World War. Since then human rights have been promoted through the United Nations Declaration, Covenants, and regional arrangements, such as the European Convention on Human Rights of 1953, the Helsinki Accord of 1975, and the Inter-American Conventions on Human Rights.

The emergence of modern human rights, which has its roots in the form of natural rights, goes back at least to the philosophy of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), a Dutch jurist, whose 'On the Law of War and Peace', (1625) became the foundation of international law. Following his writings there emerged two schools of thought about natural rights. A conservative school, headed by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), the English political theorist and philosopher, and a radical one led by John Locke (1632-1704), also an English philosopher. The Hobbesian

view of rights tends to diminish their authority by arguing that they are in effect surrendered in return for the security of civil society,(3) which is to be maintained through a supreme power and authority. As opposed to Hobbes, John Locke was of the opinion that "every person by virtue of the law of nature is entitled to life, liberty, and property",(4) which have not been abandoned by man. He argues that governments exist to maintain such rights and lose legitimacy when they fail to do so.(5)

The seventeenth century debate about natural rights was received by the eighteenth century as a philosophical heritage. The Lockian view of individual rights and the constitutional form of government on the basis of natural rights was developed and extended in the 18th century through the American Declaration of Independence of 1776, and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789. The U.S. Bill of Rights of 1791, and the French Declaration of 1789, promulgated in their respective constitutions may be considered as examples of contractual documents.

The idea of natural rights embodied in the French Declaration was challenged by a range of anti-human rights thinkers, such as the English philosopher, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), the Irish philosopher and statesman, Edmund Burke (1729-1797), founder of the modern conservatism, and to some extent, by Karl Marx (1818-1883), the major theorist of modern socialism. The central point of their respective critical studies of natural rights is

individualism versus community, but their relative conceptions of community are very different.(6)

The philosopher who challenged the idea of natural rights and the social contract theory was Jeremy Bentham, the founding father of utilitarianism. The events of the 1789 French Revolution provoked Bentham to write an outstanding piece of work, the 'Anarchical Fallacies'. In this caustic study, commenting on Article 1 of the French Declaration which reads: "Men are born and remain free, and equal in respect of rights", Bentham argued that all men are born in subjection, and the most absolute subjection_____the subjection of a helpless child to the parents on whom he depends every moment for his existence.(7) After the political failure of the French Revolution, Bentham was convinced that talk of natural rights was merely non-sense,(8) "from real law came real rights; and from imaginary law, such as the law of nature, came imaginary laws."(9) He stood for the idea that human beings had no other rights except those written in the books of law. Being a utilitarian, he saw the total happiness of the community as the sole aim of law. Rosenbaum has argued that Bentham did not reject rights altogether, but only their transcendental conceptions.(10)

Another famous philosopher who questioned the concept of natural law and natural rights was Edmund Burke, founder of modern conservatism. Two major occurances of the eighteenth century: the war of American Independence, and the French Revolution of 1789 captivated the mind

of Edmund Burke. It was Burke who "cheered the rebels in America"(11), but in the case of France "found the very idea of equality a monstrous fiction."(12) In his observation both events were not similar. The American rebels were not seen by him as revolutionaries in the extreme sense, whereas the French Jacobins were revolting against an "ancien regime", attacking property and commerce rather than defending them.(13) Professor Vincent has argued that here Burke was as frightened of anarchy as Bentham.(14) Thus, the post-French Revolution events, which set the stage for the rise of Napoleon, seemed the fulfillment of Burke's revelation.(15) But the Revolution became the everlasting legacy of mankind, as seen by his contemporary Thomas Paine (1737-1809) an English-born outlaw and one of the leaders of the American Revolution.

Burke's argument for inequality of rights traces its roots to Plato and his 'Republic' in which men were not equal. But here "Burke is quick to deny the Divine Rights of Kings."(16) Before him inequality was unavoidable in society. Being a critic of individualism, Burke considered the family, not the individual as the basic unit of social order. His idea of inequality of rights thus has no place in the modern concept of human rights and in the contemporary international and regional instruments of human rights.

The last philosopher to be discussed here briefly who criticised the theory of natural rights was Karl Marx (1818-1883). As against the welfare of an individual,

Marx talked about collectivism, which could be accomplished in a classless society by abolishing private property and the individual competition for livelihood.(17) Private property, according to Marx, not only creates division among classes in society but the conditions of alienation as well. Classless social relations would "guarantee all members the equal rights to satisfy basic needs and to contribute to the collective effort of production."(18)

At the intellectual level then the general tendency in debate about the theory of natural rights, despite powerful criticisms, has developed towards a view of the universality of the rights of man everywhere whether they are protected and guaranteed by law or not.

Until recently, the relationship between the state and people living within its territorial jurisdiction and the human rights issues were considered to be an internal matter beyond the interference of sovereign states. The state had complete sovereignty over its people. The nineteenth century Western involvement in the Middle East to protect the rights of Christian minorities there, and the legislations by,(19) and the agreements among the prominent Western countries to abolish slavery and slave trade were few exceptions of interference by other sovereign governments in this regard. In the twentieth century, the League of Nations provided protection in its Covenant for religious and linguistic minorities, care of refugees, and fair employment, conceived of as human rights.(20) But in practice, the political situation

during the inter-War period (1919-39) did not seem to be one in which human rights had much chance to success.

It was not until the Second World War that human rights entered the mainstream of Western political practice.(21) The Lockian view was exemplified in the Atlantic Charter of August 1941, followed by the creation of the United Nations in 1945, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. The Atlantic Charter was perhaps the first twentieth-century international instrument which emphasized the importance of "defending life, liberty, justice, in their own land as well in other lands."(22) This was followed by the UN Declaration of 1942, and the UN Charter of 1945, to preserve and promote human rights among other things. The promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights indicated that rights are not limited to any particular state or community but are rather universal. With the growing number of member states in the United Nations since the late 1950s, Marx's collectivism and his central emphasis on group rather than individual started affecting the Western liberal conceptions of rights. As a result of this debate, the rights outlined in the Declaration were further described in detail in two separate UN covenants of 1966, which reflect the Marxian philosophical approach in this regard. Article 1.1 of the Civil-Political and Article 1.1 of the Socio-Economic covenants reads:

> All people have the right of self- determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural

development.(23)

The question that arises from this is whether: states have duties beyond their borders to interfere in the human rights violations of other sovereign states?

There are always two sides to this debate. In one view the promotion of human rights interferes with the proper business of the traditional states system. Vincent argues that it could provide an excuse for "humanitarian intervention". "The problem with this doctrine lies not on its identification of the evil to be removed, but in the trust it must place in those who are to act for international society."(24) He further claims that:

> the domestic conduct in regard to human rights .....is under the scrutiny of international law. This does not issue a general license for intervention. International society is not yet as solidarist as that. But it does expose the internal regimes of all the members of international society to the legitimate appraisal of their peers. (25)

Against this view however a "moral internationalism" or quest to "reform the world", has been wide spread in the U.S. academic and political world. This school advocates that the traditional concept of the state having complete sovereignty over its nationals, especially in the area of human rights, is not acceptable in the world. "No member of the United Nations", said former U.S. President Jimmy Carter in an speech in General Assembly "can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business."(26) This view finds expression in the fact that all member states of the United Nations have

treaty obligations to encourage the protection of human rights. Article 55 and 56 of the UN Charter require member states not only promote human rights in their respective countries but take "joint affirmative action on human rights,"(27) violations anywhere in the world. In addition, the optional protocol of the International Covenant on Civil-Political Rights of 1976 authorizes individuals to submit written communications regarding the human rights violations in their respective countries to the Human Rights Committee for consideration. Further, "certain human rights beliefs such as freedom from racial discrimination and right of self-determination have become peremptory norms of international law"(28) today.

In sum, states in contemporary international law do have obligations beyond their borders to expose the human rights violators, and the question of human rights violations has become an accepted issue area of international politics today.

6.2 Definition of Human Rights

The above discussion suggests that human rights stemmed from Western liberalism, and focus on the individual's civil and political rights in relations to the state. To some extent the Western individualist tradition has been challenged by some Third World and other countries. The rights universalized through the Declaration include the right to life, the freedom of movement, the freedom of association, the right to a fair

trial, the right to take part in the government. The adoption of the Declaration, however, marked the beginning of differences between the Western and non-Western definition of rights. As a result, Belorussia SSR, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia abstained from voting in the General Assembly.

In response to the East-West argument, the UN Human Rights Commission prepared two separate covenants on civil-political and socio-economic rights. The primary purpose of these covenants was to discuss in more precise terms the rights outlined in the Declaration. Both covenants were passed by the General Assembly in 1966. What differentiate them from the Declaration is particularly article 1.1 of both the covenants, discussed earlier. Many in the United States believe that "economic, social, and cultural rights.....fit into the program[me] of Franklin D.Roosevelt rather than Karl Marx or Lenin."(29) In Hedley Bull's assertion the Western countries "see these rights as a broadening and filling out of civil and political rights....."(30)

In addition to these two major disagreements, which some consider to be part of a "semantic trap"(31), there also exists the third category, what Bull calls the "human rights empirical sense", to be known from "experience and observation.....of 'human rights conditions' in various countries."(32) This is the domain of the non-governmental organizations, such as Amnesty International, which is concerned with the "integrity

of the person." Its efforts, however, are directed towards torture, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment, and murder of political opponents.

Is this the end of the debate? Certainly not. Still there are those who put emphasis on "the right to a clean environment, and the right to die," for example, known by some theoreticians as a third generation of human rights.(33) And there are many in the academic world who are the champions of the single rights, which they assert is the only valid form of right, such as "right to liberty", "right to freedom from torture", and "right to participate."(34)

In such a maze, can human rights be universalized? There is no easy answer to the question. The former U.S. Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance enunciated three categories of human rights, which could provide the basis for an answer:

> Those relating to the integrity of the person (freedom from torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment; from arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; from denial of a fair public trial; and from invasion of home); economic rights (the right of food, shelter, health care, and education.....in other words, the right to fulfillment of basic human needs); and civil and political liberties (freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, country and to take part in government).(35)

Secretary Vance's speech was an effort to "bridge the gap between Western and Third World concepts of human rights,"(36) and appear to represent the gist of the UN covenants.

In sum, it is difficult to decide whether the concept

is universal, but in practice more than economic rights, world attention is focused on the rights concerning "the integrity of the person" and "civil-political liberties."

6.3 Place of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy

The concept of human rights as a concern for U.S. foreign policy is not a new development. Its roots goes back to the early days of the Republic. As has been mentioned earlier, the United States has stood for classical liberalism as a political belief based on democracy, equality, and freedom expressed in its founding documents. Therefore in the course of 200 years history these beliefs have become closely identified with the "American way of life". Professor Schlesinger Jr. argues that "Americans have agreed since 1776, that the United States must be the beacon of human rights to an unregenerate world".(37) This kind of moral alignment has its foundation in the American Protestant past where religious groups were viewed as purely voluntary organizations, which served to strengthen the introduction of religious morality in politics.(38)

The American tradition to protect human rights abroad goes back at least to the mid-nineteenth century, when Senator Lewis Case introduced an unsuccessful Bill to cut off diplomatic relations with Austria, because of its troops' suppression of the Hungarian revolution of 1848.(39) This praxis, however, appeared in the post World War II era in the shape of Roosevelt's Four Freedoms of 1941, and Truman's fostering of the 1948 UN Human Rights Declaration.(40) However, Roosevelt's and Truman's ideas of human rights were placed on the "back-burner" of U.S. foreign policy, in the wake of 1947 Greek civil war,

with the subsequent announcement of the Truman Doctrine, which assured that the United States would "support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside [Communist] pressures." In the 1950s, the United States, for all practical purposes, withdrew from its multilateral efforts to advance human rights and never really returned to it.(41)

Cingranelli has divided the moral positions of the post-World War II presidents of the United States in their foreign policy behaviour towards the Third World into Nationalists and Progressives. In his opinion nationalists believe that the "main societal interests that government should advance through foreign policy are its military security and macroeconomic prosperity or, in other words, its national self-interest." They have accordingly often supported "military intervention and covert actions." Cingranelli places Franklin Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush in this category.

On the other hand the progressive presidents ".....give relatively greater weight to universal ideals in the making of foreign policy. He identifies Harry Truman, John Kennedy, and Jimmy Carter in this group.(42) In practice, however, it is sometimes difficult to draw a line when the same administration, whether headed by a "nationalist" or "progressive" president, is engaged in policies of more than one type.(43)

The nationalist trend, however, reached a climax

during the Nixon presidency. For Henry Kissinger, his Assistant for National Security Affairs, and later the Secretary of State, the "constituencies" of human rights and foreign policy were different. In his confirmation hearing before the Senate in 1973, Kissinger rejected the inclusion of human rights objectives in American foreign policy:

> I believe it is dangerous for us to make the domestic policy of countries around the world a direct objective of American foreign policy.....The protection of basic human rights is a very sensitive aspect of the domestic jurisdiction of governments.(44)

Donald F.McHenry, the Carter administration's Ambassador to the United Nations (1979-81), told the author that human rights "had moved so far back under realpolitik of Nixon and Kissinger.....These guys came over as people who would sell grandmother. No, I don't believe that's true. But that's sort of perception."(45)

It was during Nixon's presidency that events such as the growing U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the secret bombing of Cambodia, the Watergate scandal, the CIA and FBI violations of human rights, coupled with the Nixon-Kissinger attitude towards Congress, caused deep congressional concern and dissatisfaction about the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. As a result, "Congress lit the human rights candle",(46) during the first half of the 1970s. The congressional interest in the human rights factor was well defined by David King, staffer to Congressman Howard Wolpe, "I think because Congress does not have as large a foreign affairs role, [that's why]

we [Congress] are talking about human rights. That's a sub-section of foreign affairs."(47)

During the late 1960s and the early 1970s, it was some of the ordinary Congressmen, who took the initiative to bring the human rights factor into the conduct of U.S. foreign policy even though the congressional leadership of the time was fairly suspicious, and considered it somewhat impractical.(48) As a result of these sporadic initiatives, the congressional Sub-Committee on International Organizations and Movements under the chairmanship of Don Fraser held a series of hearings on the human rights factor in the making of U.S. foreign policy. This Sub-Committee was among the most active groups to link the human rights factor with U.S. foreign policy. These hearings were followed by a Sub-Committee report on the subject in March 1974, which made 29 specific recommendations to "treat human rights factor regularly in U.S. foreign policy decision-making".(49) Unlike the administrative multilateral efforts during the 1940s, this time the Congress selected a unilateral and bilateral approach to protect human rights abroad.(50)

The Executive branch has generally opposed U.S. interference in human rights violations of other sovereign states on the grounds that that kind of interference would accelerate the chances of outside intervention in U.S. domestic affairs. They always advocate that U.S. society is not flawless as well in respect to human rights issues.

Thus the above-mentioned factors of the first half

of the 1970s were the reasons that propelled human rights into the foreign policy debate in the presidential campaign in 1976.(51) Roberto Cohen, before joining the Carter team, wrote in 1978 that "President Carter has broken the conspiracy of silence that so long dominated U.S. policy toward[s] international human rights questions".(52) In this respect Carter shifted away from his predecessor's approach to the different "constituencies" of human rights and foreign policy. He adopted moral idealism, placed human rights on top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda, and created the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in 1977, with its own assistant secretary to deal with human rights, refugees and migration, and prisoners of war affairs. In addition, the Carter administration directed all U.S. ambassadors to report to Washington on human rights conditions in their respective host countries on a regular basis. "Carter asserted that a foreign policy based on fundamental American values will serve the U.S. national interests".(53) Thus, human rights became not the only goal of his foreign policy but one of the more important ones. In his speech in the United Nations Carter admitted that "preserving national security, achieving arms control, and building better economic order were more important to the United States than advancing human rights around the world."(54)

The vital point to be noted here is that the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was established within the State Department rather than as an independent

agency. The Bureau was created despite the fact that the State Department has generally taken a strong position that human rights is a domestic matter which has nothing to do with establishing U.S. bilateral relations. In addition, the effectiveness of the newly created Bureau and its access to the State Department and the White House in making U.S. foreign policy, appeared to be limited. For example, throughout the Carter administration, the Inter-Agency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance was chaired by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State rather than the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Another example of the peripheral role of the Bureau in the making of human rights foreign policy was when "in mid 1978 President Carter sent a 'personal' letter to President Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua congratulating him for certain human rights improvements. Here, too, the Bureau was not consulted."(55) When the author raised this issue with an official, his response was:

> Fifteen years ago when the Bureau was established many of the bureaucratic immune systems of the State Department flashed red alert, and there were attempts to ward off this intrusion. The process was complicated by the manner in which the intrusion took place a very strident individual.....
>
> Over the course of the last fifteen years human rights has been internalized as one of our most important foreign policy objectives, so that our senior diplomats recognized that monitoring human rights situations, calibrating our relationships to reflect human rights conditions, are the central tasks for diplomats accredited to foreign governments, so that there is much less resistance.(56)

Stephen Cohen has rightly pointed out in this regard that "the Bureau of Human Rights was defeated in the bureaucratic battle within the State Department during Carter's presidency because of its alleged lack of experience on such arcane matters as that of national security."(57) Another factor which weakened the Bureau's capability in foreign policy-making was the "single-minded views" of its Assistant Secretary Patricia Derian, which "conflicted with the pursuit of other national interests."(58)

Thus, it was during the Carter administration that one of the major pieces of human rights legislation, the Multilateral Banks Act was passed in 1977 to promote human rights in U.S. foreign policy. However, the differences of images between the "globalists" and the "regionalists" regarding the international system within the Carter administration since its inception in office, coupled with U.S. security and commercial interests all over the world made Carter reluctant to take up a firm position on delicate and sensitive issues, such as human rights. Confronted with this broad range of resistance and criticism within his own administration, he had to tone down his criticism of human rights abuses in his second year in office. In addition, the U.S. political system with several policy-making nucleuses (discussed in chapters I and II), was another hindrance for the administration in its efforts to form a coherent human rights policy. On the other hand, because of these inconsistencies

Congress "perceived the Carter administration as highly disorganized and unclear in its human rights policy".(59)

Talking about the inconsistencies of the Carter administration's human rights foreign policy, the administration's Ambassador to the United Nations (1979-81) told the author:

> It [human rights] has always been an enormous part though we can be amazingly hypocritical on occasions, that is we are able sometimes to rationalize the continued existence of a policy which we don't like. This was particularly true during the Cold War. Countries found we didn't like, but we turned a blind eye to because of some larger interests. I think in the long term our large interests are best served by a consistency in policy. (60)

Yet for all its weakness and inconsistency, and a selective human rights policy, such as the U.S.-China human rights policy, toning down on the Soviet Union (since the late 1977), the Philippines, Zaire, and Pakistan's human rights violations, the Carter administration's human rights policy certainly affected the political atmosphere in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The Reagan administration came into office "committed to oppose aggressively real and apparent Soviet ambitions throughout the world".(61) Therefore, the importance given by his predecessor to human rights factor in the conduct of foreign policy declined in general. Secretary of State, Alexander Haig in a speech made to Trilateral Commission on 31 March 1981 said:

> Let us be clear on one human rights issue: the U.S. opposes the violation of human rights

> by ally and adversary, friend or foe.....The point to be made is that we must be discriminating in our action with an eye to the impact of our protest on the violator.....The first imperative is to strengthen the U.S., its allies and friends, the main safeguard against the spread of totalitarian aggression.(62)

Secretary Haig's "totalitarian" aggressors were Communist regimes all over the world which had to be countered. And among his friends and allies were many of the authoritarian regimes spread through Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which he wanted to and, in fact did support and strengthen militarily, economically, and politically to check the growth and influence of international Communism, despite their poor human rights record. The Reagan administration argued that the strengthening of friends and allies, in turn, had contributed to the security of the United States.

During his administration the human rights issue was regarded as a domestic affair of authoritarian allies and friends. On the other hand, the administration highlighted the Soviet Union and the Communist states' human rights issues to embarrass the Soviet Union. This policy shift in human rights by the Reagan administration met with strong resentment in Congress when its first nominee for the post of Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, Dr. Earnest Lefever had to withdraw due to congressional opposition, mostly because of Dr. Lefever's anti-Communist ideas. In the case of South Africa, he publicly stated that the United States was not concerned with the Republic's racial policies but to make it a

fulfledged partner of the United States in the struggle against Communist expansion.(63)

Throughout its first tenure, the Reagan administration terminated or reduced no economic and security assistance for human rights reasons. On the contrary, security assistance rose 300 percent(64) during that period, founding its way to authoritarian but friendly regimes. The security assistance was provided by the administration on the basis of Section 502 B of the Security Assistance Act. This Section on the one hand, prohibits military assistance to those countries which are involved in gross violation of human rights, and on the other, allows the President to provide aid in "extraordinary circumstances".(65)

However, during its second term the administration took strong actions in 1987 in countries like Panama, and South Korea against their human rights violations. On the other hand, for example, the Philippines (under Marcos), and Zaire continued to receive economic and military assistance from Washington.

Since its inception, the administration distanced itself from its predecessor's human rights policies which were perceived by the Reagan team as one of the great failures of the Carter administration. Unlike Carter's perceptions, Reagan saw Communism as the worst human rights violation in the world. The former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick declared that "authoritarian repression is better than totalitarian",(66)

without realizing that repression is repression, which cannot be classified as good, better or, best. It is a condemnable act whether committed by authoritarian or totalitarian regimes against their people. Kirkpatrick's idea was that authoritarian regimes could be replaced by democracy, whereas totalitarian regimes could not. Ms Jeri Laber, Executive Director, U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, in her testimony before the House Sub-Committee on Human Rights rightly pointed out that : "Distinguishing between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, may have a place in the history class room, but it hasn't much place in the making of foreign policy."(67)

In defending the Reagan administration's human rights policy the then Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Elliot Abrams, in his testimony before the House Sub-Committee on Human Rights on March 3, 1983 described it as a two-track policy: the negative track; and the positive approach. The negative track was described as responding to abuses by using all available diplomatic tools from quiet diplomacy to aid cut off, to signal disapproval of human rights violations. In Abram's view the positive approach was building and strengthening democracy abroad on the theory that popular control of government reduce the likelihood of human rights violations.(68) Under the "positive approach" the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was created. Thus, the effectiveness and purposes of the NED will be discussed with reference to South Africa in the final section of

this chapter.

In the contemporary world different countries raise their concern regarding human rights violations by using different methods. The most frequently used approach is the public condemnation through speeches from various forums, and statements. In the case of the United States at least three different methods have been used by the successive administrations since the mid-1970s. These include for example, the Carter administration's approach of public condemnation; the Reagan administration's modus operandi of "quiet diplomacy"; and the enactment of economic sanctions.

The vital point to be noted here is that of 7 non-treaty human rights instruments, and 44 human rights treaties and agreements, which are currently in force in the world, the United States has ratified only 13 treaties so far (see Appendix H). It has not yet ratified some important human rights instruments, such as the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1976; and the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights of 1976. In addition, the United States has not signed the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of Crime of Apartheid of 1976. In this regard certain constitutional obligations always come in the way of Senate ratification of these treaties. For example, Article 20.2 of the Civil and Political Covenant of 1976 says:

> Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to

> discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.(69)

The Senate opposes the ratification of the Civil-Political Covenant on grounds that it is against freedom of speech, association, and press in the United States. So far as the Socio-Economic Covenant is concerned, economic and social rights are not considered as rights and are not equated with traditional U.S civil and political rights, based on individualism and equality. They are being considered as societal goals. So far as the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid is concerned, it binds the signatories to "declare illegal any organization which advocate racial discrimination". The Senate argues that the treaty is against the concept of freedom of speech and press in the United States.

With this brief analysis of the human rights factor in U.S. foreign policy-making initiated by Congress in the early 1970s, we focus our discussion on U.S. human rights policy towards South Africa, under both the Carter and the Reagan administrations.

6.4 U.S.-South Africa Human Rights Policy

In the previous section we have shown that human rights "candle lit by Congress", during the first half of the 1970s was subsequently, embraced by presidential candidate Jimmy Carter, and his administration when it entered the White House in 1977. We also suggested that the Carter administration's human rights foreign policy was based on a country-by-country basis, keeping U.S. national interests in view. Like its "Nationalist" predecessors, the Reagan administration's foreign policy was a realpolitik, in which human rights issues had secondary place.

As has been discussed at the outset, human rights violation is a condemnable act and "freedom from racial discrimination has become an essential norm of contemporary international law". The task in this section is to analyse the factors behind the congressional and public push to include human rights in U.S.-South Africa policy, which had been more widely discussed by both Congress and the public than any other human rights violations in the world.

Although it is difficult to be precise about the fundamental change in U.S. human rights policy towards South Africa, the congressional hearings on human rights during late 1973 and the early 1974 could be regarded as the beginning of human rights policy towards the Republic. Part two of the congressional Sub-Committee on International Organizations and Movements' report on

human rights in March 1974 discussed and examined racial discrimination in certain Southern African countries, including South Africa. The eighteenth recommendation of the report reads:

> The governments of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Portugal should fully implement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in particular:
> (a) to eliminate the practices of racial discrimination and apartheid;
> (b) to ensure the right of everyone to take part in the government of his country, including the right to vote;
> (c) to ensure the right to work, free choice of employment, equal pay for equal work, and to join trade unions; and
> (d) to ensure the rights to education at all levels without regard to race, colo[u]r, sex, language, national or political and other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.(70)

As against the Sub-Committee report, South Africa's human rights issue was considered by the Nixon-Kissinger administration as an exclusively internal matter of the Republic. The first apparent change in policy tactics towards black Africa came to light during the Ford administration when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Southern Africa in April 1976 and called for majority rule in the region.

None of the U.S. presidents have been as personally engaged with South African matters as Jimmy Carter. With human rights at the top of his foreign policy agenda, South Africa became a matter of foreign policy principle. The new administration in its early days openly supported the elimination of injustice and majority rule in the Republic to break away from U.S. perceptions which had

developed under the Nixon administration, and which preferred to work through white rule. The new administration in the White House adopted a tougher stance against the white minority regime and became actively engaged in encouraging peaceful transformation towards majority rule. The Carter administration's stance was two pronged: at the diplomatic level; and in the United Nations.

During its early part, the Carter administration protested on human rights violations in South Africa at the highest levels. For example, the issue was raised during a meeting between the U.S. Vice President Walter Mondale and the South African Prime Minister Vorster in Vienna in May 1977. The major purpose of this meeting was to let Vorster know that apartheid was not only discriminatory, but if South Africa were to persist in its ideology their paths would diverge and their policies would come in conflict.(71)

This significant priority of American policy met with a strong response from the South African government. In August 1977, Prime Minister John Vorster attacked Carter's policy as an interference in his country's internal affairs. He further accused the United States of blaming South Africa so as to gain the political support of black African states in the United Nations on the one hand, and to please black Americans on the other.

What is still not known is why did Walter Mondale go to that extreme in the very first top-level meeting

with the South African leadership? Did he do it on his own? Or was it done with presidential consent? According to Brzezinski's memoirs, Mondale was 'authorized' to focus on the South African issue.(72) Therefore, it can be assumed that he took the tough stand with South African leaders in Vienna, certainly with Carter's understanding. Richard Moose told the author:

> .....because he [Vorster] was up for election, maybe we timed it very badly. Maybe we shouldn't have rushed into that, in restrospect we shouldn't have rushed into that. We should have let him get himself elected. Then when he had a firmer base, then perhaps we should have come back, waited to make our move then.....But we wanted to get busy on a busy agenda in Africa. There were a lot of things that we wanted to do. We knew that we had to deal with South Africa. So in American fashion we setout first things first.(73)

On the basis of "first things first" the top level meeting with South Africans not only backfired and put the administration in a defensive position, but opened up new flood gates of criticism against it. The critics argued that the administration was not attempting to engage in a diplomatic process with South Africa that would lead to the resolution of a problem in the region.

Moose, however, categorically denied that his administration's policy was confrontational:

> Because of the way Vorster used that meeting for his own internal political purposes, the impression came about that from the very first the Carter administration adopted a confrontational posture. That's not true. That is not an accurate reading of what happened. The very decision to meet Vorster was a very important one and it said we want to have a dialogue with you. We want to work

> with you. Here is what we believe, here are our objectives. We didn't pull any punches about that.(74)

The ultimate result of the early hardline approach was deterioration of relations between both the countries. This attitude, however, lost momentum when the administration entered its second year in office. By then it had started focusing more attention on the Rhodesian settlement and the Namibian independence issues rather than majority rule in South Africa. Washington recognized South Africa's importance in helping negotiations with the Smith regime in Rhodesia and in achieving the Namibian settlement. As a result, the administration had to lower its tone, in order not to prejudice the Rhodesian talks and the Namibian settlement.

Beyond diplomatic discourse, and apart from U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young's vocal attacks against South Africa, the United States supported the UN mandatory arms embargo on South Africa in November 1977. The Carter administration knew that the arms embargo against South Africa would be symbolic, since many countries including the United States had already imposed voluntary embargoes. However, the major purpose of the administration in joining the UN arms embargo was to avoid the mounting Afro-Asian pressure in the United Nations for economic sanctions against South Africa. Like its predecessors, the Carter administration was also against the U.S. disinvestment and divestment from the Republic. In the following year the administration tightened the

procedures on the sale of civilian aircraft to South Africa. Furthermore, it was his administration which publicly denied the existance of the so-called independent homelands of Transkei, Bophthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei (TBVC).

At the Legislative level, Congress also took certain steps to disentangle the United States from South Africa. In the economic sphere, legislation was passed in 1978 to limit Export-Import Bank loans to those firms which followed fair employment practices in South Africa. In fact, this step was first recommended by Congressman Edward J.Markey to Congress and the President in hearings before the Sub-Committee on Africa on October 26, 1977. In addition, Markey recommended two more steps against South Africa: the withdrawal of U.S. military and Chief Commercial Attaches' and a halt to "grey area" military sales to South Africa.(75) In 1978, the Carter administration introduced regulations to ban all exports to the South African military and police forces.

It was during this time, when Congress was caught in the crossfire, that some of the newspapers in the United States reported in 1979 that the South African government offered bribes and free trips to members of Congress as part of a worldwide campaign to improve its overseas image.(76) Staff investigators found that at least 17 House aides and 13 members had trips to South Africa between 1973 and 1978 paid for either by the South African government or a front for the government.(77) No names,

however, were supplied by the investigators.(78)

At the public level, when the Carter administration entered the White House in 1977, the U.S. anti-apartheid movement was still in its formative phase. Thus, the congressional activism in the field of human rights, coupled with the inauguration of President Carter brought a new life and enthusiasm to the U.S. anti-apartheid movement. From 1981 onwards the anti-apartheid movement entered into a phase of broad-based coalition to influence U.S-South Africa policy (discussed in chapter VII).

Although the Carter administration in its approach of open condemnation did succeed on cooling down domestic pressures, both inside and outside Congress, its regional policy aimed at getting all Southern African problems solved simultaneously was certainly an ambitious strategy. It later proved to be impossible and beyond the control of the Carter administration, which was then compelled to address the issues independently, as it did in the case of Rhodesia.

The Reagan administration which entered into office in 1981, rejected the Carter administrations's public diplomacy in the field of human rights in favour of "quiet diplomacy". The Republic of South Africa was seen by the new administration through these lenses. This policy approach, however, caused widespread concern both inside and outside Congress as to whether the United States was going to continue its leadership role in human rights campaign. By this time the situation was different from

that of the Nixon-Kissinger era. The promotion of the human rights factor in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy had become the law of the land in the shape of the series of Acts passed by Congress between 1973 and 1980. In addition, the administration's fresh modus operandi helped to gain momentum both within Congress and the U.S. anti-apartheid movement.

During the first Reagan term (January 1981 to January 1985) in addition to stormy relations between the United States and the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Central America were centres of tension and conflict which took precedence over the issue of apartheid and human rights in South Africa. The Republic was seen by the Reagan administration within the context of the East-West conflict. Personally, Reagan showed very little concern in African affairs, and in fact he "allowed the Carter administration's Africa policy to be dismantled", said Moose.(79) The new administration in the White House relaxed the trade restrictions which had been imposed by the Carter administration, and opened up loopholes in the Commerce Department regulations over the sales of non-military goods to the South African military and police.(80) During fiscal year 1982-83, the U.S. State Department licensed the export to South Africa of goods on the munition list worth more than U.S. $ 28 million, as compared to the entire value of U.S. $ 18.6 million in military exports to South Africa between the period 1950-1980.(81)

In response to the continued growing domestic pressure against the administration's human rights policy President Reagan proposed the National Endowment for Democracy in 1983 funded by bipartisan support of Congress to help develop the human rights and democratic institutions not only in South Africa but in other countries as well which were seeking to develop their democratic practices.(82) Through the Endowment the human rights grants programme, known as the Kassebaum-Percy Human Rights Fund was created for equal civil and political liberties for all South Africans. At the very end of 1983 $ 1.5 million were approved by Congress for private and community organizations in South Africa working for the cause of human rights.(83) The Reagan administration like its predecessors resisted the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa, therefore demonstrating, it was claimed, U.S. opposition to the system of apartheid through assistance to black South Africans. The administration's belief was that imposition of economic sanctions "would harm blacks more than help them". By the end of 1984 both the House and Senate Conference Committee agreed on an unprecedented ban on bank loans to the South Africa government and parastatals.(84)

At the time when Americans were preparing for presidential elections, the third wave of violence began in South Africa in August 1984 (after the Sharpeville shooting of 1960, and the Soweto uprising of 1976) in response to the introduction of a new constitution in

the country. Unrest in black townships grew during the following weeks into a nationwide uprising surpassing that of 1976. Those events quickly and directly affected the United States which has its own troubled history. The racial and ethnic constituencies started expressing their interest and concern about the black insurgency in South Africa. The ethnic composition of the United States was different from the rest of the major trading partners of South Africa. In fact the situation in the Republic was linked with that of the civil rights movement in the United States.

By this time the U.S. policy-makers were facing a situation different from that the mid-1970s. The "Congress stood at moral crossroads in modern history".(85) The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and other major figures in both the parties were linking South Africa with Marcos' Philippines. These Congressmen were pressing for a major shift in U.S. policy towards South Africa so as not to repeat the same mistake. Thus "the human rights issue in South Africa became the absorbing question of the day, pushing questions of security and commercial interests in one side".(86) This was partly because of the administration's attitude towards Congress and anti-apartheid organizations, and partly because of the Republic's cross-border attacks (87) and brutal suppression of its black majority uprising. All these factors thus, combined to produce a political reverberation in the United States. In the wake of these events President Reagan

had to break his silence on the issue.(88) In his annual speech on International Human Rights Day, delivered on December 10, 1984, President Reagan felt the "moral responsibility" to show his "concern and grief over the human and spritual cost of apartheid in South Africa."

Senator Kennedy's visit to South Africa in early 1985, and sit-ins in colleges, universities, and corporation offices throughout the United States, plus the demand for congressional action made "South Africa as one of the most prominent and decisive foreign policy debates of the Reagan period."(89) The struggle against White South Africa by Congress and public was considered as a "moral war"(90) to help black South Africans in their struggle to secure human dignity. Ambassador McHenry told the author "that the anti-apartheid forces in the United States drew their strength [during the mid 1980s] not from here [U.S.], they drew it from South Africa. I take the position that South Africans passed the [Comprehensive] Anti-Apartheid Act."(91)

Apart from South Africa's institutionalized discrimination rejected by the world community, at least three more factors made the South Africa issue special and different in the United States from the rest of the human rights violations in the world.

First, unlike the U.S. congressional response to other issues of gross violation of human rights in the world, the individual members of Congress continued to keep the South African issue alive at least from 1971.

This process, however, was further accelerated when the Congressional Black Caucus was established during the same year. The Black Caucus, in addition to other Congressmen sympathetic towards the black cause in South Africa had been preparing for a legislative package on South Africa through draft legislation between the period 1971 and the passage of the CAAA of 1986. The congressional activism reached a climax in 1985 "when 41 separate Bills, amendments and resolutions dealing with South Africa were introduced into Congress between January and September 1985".(92) In addition to the importance of black voters kept by Congress in view, memories of the civil rights struggle in the United States made many Congressmen sympathetic to the sufferings of black South Africans. In this regard the South Africa case was unique and special before Congress.

Second, among all human rights violators in Africa, South Africa was the biggest trading partner of the United States. In 1983 American banks had a total of $ 343 million in outstanding loans to the South African government and $ 4.6 billion to the private sector. Over 350 U.S. companies controlled approximately 70 percent of the South African computer industry, 50 percent of its petroleum industry, and 25 percent of the automobile industry.(93) The financial link with South Africa was considered by Congress and public as one of the major factors to help strengthen the system of apartheid. Therefore, the pressure was focused on disinvestment and divestment so as to cut

off commercial connection with South Africa.

Finally, the issue of white domination in South Africa and Namibia came under focus more than ever before in the United States when the independence of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola brought an end to European colonial rule in Africa during the mid 1970s. As the crisis in South Africa broke into U.S. public visibility during late 1984, the anti-apartheid supporters rolled up their sleeves for "moral war" against South Africa's repugnant system. In this regard anti-apartheid groups, especially the Free South Africa Movement, a broad-based coalition, formed in 1984, played a prominent role in launching a movement to make apartheid a major public issue in the United States (discussed in chapter VII).

Conclusion

The human rights policy is certainly a difficult area of foreign policy for a variety of reasons, such as the lack of a generally agreed definition of rights, its clash and competition with national strategic, and commercial interests and the difficulties of implementing human rights policy, etc. With all its complexities and problematic nature, rights such as "the racial discrimination and the right of self-determination" are internationally protected. Since the early 1970s, each successive U.S. administration had its own attitudes to human rights issues, such as Carter's early policy of

open condemnation of violators, and Reagan's attitude of "quiet diplomacy". The execution of a coherent human rights policy in a country like the United States with a wide and complex nature of political and economic interests worldwide is difficult. In the post-World War II period South Africa appears to be an exceptional case because of the reasons discussed earlier in which Congress established and applied a consistent human rights policy to demonstrate U.S. opposition to the system of apartheid.

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73. Interview with Richard M.Moose, former U.S Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Washington, D.C., October 7, 1992.

74. ibid.

75. For further details see, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 'Restrictions to Investigate Steve Biko's Death', Hearings Before the Sub-Committee on Africa, 95th Congress, 1st Session, October 26, 1977, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., PP.2-5.

76. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, 1980, Vol. XXXVI, Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C., 1980, p. 526.

77. ibid., p. 526.

78. The scandal known as Infogate or Muldergate in which some high ranking officials were involved for secret projects aimed at improving South Africa's image abroad. The United States was major focus of the campaign.
According to Randall Robinson, the Executive Director of TransAfrica, "over the past eleven years [throughout

the 1980s], 11 American lobbying firms received more than $ 2 million for doing de Klerk's work with Congress, the executive branch, the media, the U.S. banks and business.....Washington lobbyist John Sears admitted that he was paid by de Klerk to inform on TransAfrica's activities."(Newsweek, July 29, 1991, p. 8).

79. Interview with Richard M.Moose.

80. Anne Forrester, 'Congressional Initiatives on South Africa', in Gerald Bender et al., (eds), 'Africa Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy', University of California Press, Berkely, 1985, p. 92.

81. National Action/Research in the Military Industrial Complex (NARMIC), 'Military Exports to South Africa', A Report on Arms Embargo, Washington, D.C., 1984, pp. 9-10

82. George Shultz, Department of State Bulletin, Vol., 84, No., 2085, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1984, p. 18.

83. ibid., p. 10.

84. Christopher Coker, 'The United States and South Africa, 1969-1985: Constructive Engagement and its Critics', Duke University Press, Durham, 1986, p. 229.

85. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 'South Africa Racial Discrimination Policy: U.S. Sanctions Intensification', 100th Congress, 2nd Session, July 12, 1988, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1988, p. 40.

86. R.J.Vincent, 'Human Rights and International Relations', op., cit., p. 137.

87. Just ten days after Ronald Reagan's inception in the White House, South Africa launched an attack against neighbouring Mozambique to target the alleged African National Congress (ANC) bases in Maputo. It was the first South African military action against Mozambique since its independence in 1975. Another major attack was launched by South Africa against the alleged South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas in Angola, six days before Chester A.Crocker's major South Africa policy speech of August 1981. These attacks were followed by a South African raid against the ANC headquarters in Maseru, capital of Lesotho in December 1982, and a second raid against the ANC camps in Maputo in May 1983. South African military strikes against Angola continued throughout the Reagan era. The prime object of these attacks against the ANC, SWAPO, and Angola

was to stop the infiltration, and to cut off the supply line of black activists in South Africa and Namibia on the one hand, and to assert its regional hegemony, on the other.

88. It was in June 1983, that the U.S. Under Secretary Lawerence Eagleburger documented his administration's tilt in his speech and criticized South Africa in strong and specific terms, and declared the South African political system as morally wrong. He further announced that "By one means or another South Africa's domestic racial system will be changed.

89. Pauline H.Baker, 'The United States and South Africa: The Reagan Years', Ford foundation, U.S.A., 1989, p. 4.

90. Margaret P.Doxey, 'International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective', Macmillan Press, London, 1987, p. 94.

91. Interview with Donald F.McHenry.

92. Helen Kitchen quoted in Colin Legum (ed), 'Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1985-1986', Africa Publishing House, New York, 1987, pp. A285-A286.

93. Figures taken from U.S. News and World Report, June 17, 1985, p. 10.

CHAPTER VII

THE ROLE OF SANCTIONS IN U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS

Introduction

Sanctions have always been an instrument in U.S. foreign policy in the post-World War II period. Since the early 1970s, it has usually been used as a means to encourage/compel a recipient country to improve its human rights record. Many actions of this type have been taken by successive administrations. The case of South Africa is, however, different from these examples in which all the successive administrations had been resisting the public demand for sanctions against the Republic on the grounds that sanctions would be "counterproductive".

Since the African National Congress' (ANC) call for sanctions against South Africa in 1950, the centre of the world sanctions debate had always been in the United States. It was partly because of the presence of the United Nations headquarters in New York, and partly because of the initiatives taken by anti-apartheid movements there since the early 1960s, which became effective because of the fragmented political system of the country.

This debate, however, finally found its way to Congress and became an important domestic political issue affecting U.S. foreign policy during the mid-1980s. In response to congressional and public pressure the United

States has been the first country among South Africa's major trading partners to impose sanctions against it in 1986.

The task in this chapter is to address the following questions: [1] How were the sanctions movements developed in the United States? [2] Why was there a congressional consensus on sanctions against South Africa? [3] How were sanctions policed?

7.1 Definition of Sanction

According to the Oxford dictionary the literal meaning of sanction is an "action taken by a country to penalize and coerce a country or organization that is considered to have violated a law or code of practice or basic human rights." "Webster's dictionary defines the term as "coercive measures applied eg to a nation taking a course of action disapproved by others." Or "motive for obedience to any moral or religious law." In a broader perspective sanctions means

> an action initiated by one or more international actors (the "senders") against one or more others (the "receivers") with either or both of two purposes: to punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/or to make the receivers comply with certain norms the senders deem important."(1)

In 1938 the British Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) defined sanctions as an "action taken by the members of international community, against an infringement, actual or threatened, of the law."(2) These

actions include the rupture of diplomatic relations, cultural and sports boycotts, commercial sanctions both on imports and exports, and naval blockades. Of all these measures, the most widely used are economic sanctions.

Lloyd Brown John says that economic sanctions may be grouped into three types: embargoes, boycotts, and blockades.(3) Daoudi and Dajani have defined that embargo means a ban on export of goods to any sanctioned country by one or more countries. Boycotts on the other hand have been defined by them as actions imposed by one or more countries to stop the importation of some or all goods from the sanctioned country.(4) Finally, blockade means the closure of territorial waters of the target country to deprive it from import and export facilities, for example, the current blockade of Iraqi waters by allied countries.

In addition, we have to look into the place of sanctions in international law composed "of rules and norms that governs relations between states."(5) The pre-World War I principles of the balance of power in international relations which asserted "that any increase in the military capacity of one side must be met by an equal increase in military expenditure on the other side, else the 'balance of power' will be disturbed",(6) was replaced by a system of international organizations to provide collective security to prevent war. This system is based on the mutual cooperation of member states of the international organization to resolve their differences within its framework. The creation of the League of

Nations in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 was the first step and experience in this regard. Under its Covenant the maintenance of international peace and security was the 'obligation' of the "peace loving states". Article 16 of the Covenant authorized the member states to impose economic, financial, and political sanctions against any state which would violate its obligations. During the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, the economic and financial sanctions were imposed on Mussolini's Italy by the League but did not become much effective because of the growing military might of Hitler and the unwillingness of France and Great Britain to press for strict and comprehensive sanctions.

However, after the Second World War the League of Nations was replaced by the United Nations in 1946____a more comprehensive body. Chapter seven of the UN Charter specifies the legal basis for sanctions to be imposed on violators to avoid the "use of force". Article 39 authorizes the Security Council to "determine the existence of any threat to the [world] peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression," for the maintenance of international peace and security and to "avoid the use of force". In addition Article 41 of the Charter reads:

> The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effects to its decision, and it may call upon the members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruptions of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

This, however, suggests that sanctions are vital in international law in support of a social order regulating human behaviour.(7)

7.2 The Sanctions Movement Against South Africa: An Overview

The imposition of India's ban on trade with South Africa in July 1946 was probably the first example of sanctions history in the post-World War II era, employed against an independent country active in the formation of the United Nations. This was followed by the closure of the Indian High Commission in South Africa in 1954.(8) However, two years after apartheid was officially introduced in South Africa in 1948, the African National Congress (ANC) in its conference held in Accra in 1950 appealed for an economic boycott, and called it a non-violent weapon against the racist regime of South Africa.(9)

In the United States, in response to the ANC's appeal for sanctions against South Africa it was the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), founded in 1953 under the leadership of George Houser, a white liberal,(10) which made early calls for sanctions during the 1950s. In addition to ACOA, the African Liberation Support Committee (ALSC) was another organization which came into being in the late 1960s. The ALSC not only opposed Portuguese colonial rule in Africa but demanded economic sanctions

against South Africa as well.

Most of the anti-apartheid groups and organizations in the United States came into existence in the early 1960s, in the aftermath of the Sharpeville shooting. Notable in this regard are:

[1] American Coordination Committee for Equality in Sports and Society (ACCESS), New York City.

[2] International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa-U.S. Committee (IDAF), Cambridge, Massachusetts.

[3] South Africa War Resisters, New York City.

[4] TransAfrica, Washington, D.C. (predominantly black organization).

[5] Washington Office on Africa, Washington, D.C.

[6] American Friends Service Committee-Southern Africa Programme (AFSC), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

[7] Association of Concerned Africa Scholars, East Lansing, Michigan.

[8] Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law___Southern Africa Project, Washington, D.C.

[9] National Black United Front, New York City (predominantly black organization).(11)

These organizations are comprised of various social, political, and religious groups aiming to influence U.S. policy formulation towards South Africa in particular, and Africa South of the Sahara, in general. It is important to note that many of these organizations came out of the civil rights struggle of the United States.

In addition to these groups and organizations, the National Council of Churches (NCC), Interfaith Centre

of Corporate Responsibility, with its headquarters in New York city, was also active. Its activity included pressure on banks to end lending to South Africa and pressure on U.S. corporations in South Africa to:

[1] disclose relevant information;

[2] commit themselves to a policy of no expansion;

[3] end sales to the South African government of strategic equipment, such as computers;

[4] end sales to South African policy and military of products such as oil and trucks which are still being sold despite a U.S. government embargo; and

[5] terminate operations in South Africa and withdraw from the country.

This approach, however, was considered by the NCC not as "a policy of pressures" rather "an indication of American values" in non-cooperation with the white minority regime.(12) The activities of these organizations ranged from marches, demonstrations, and campaigns to attack apartheid,(13) to put pressure on their respective legislators and companies, and banks doing business in South Africa, which signified the rejection of institutional cooperation with apartheid.(14)

The anti-apartheid movements' efforts started gaining fruit since the mid-1970s, when the institutional investors, such as local governments, universities and colleges, churches, labour unions, and foundations started pursuing their own policies towards South Africa, through disinvestment and divestment activities. One of the early

examples in this regard was the "East Lansing local authority of Michigan which adopted a measure for selective purchasing in August 1977 which would favour firms not linked with South Africa."(15)

It was during this time that the State Attorney General of Wisconsin ruled in 1977 that investment of state educational funds in corporations with South African ties violated the civil rights Act.(16) It is noteworthy that during the mid-1980s' uprising in South Africa some of the investors started a second divestment action from firms with a South African involvement. From 1977 through 1987, more than 80 U.S. universities and colleges divested business in South Africa and funds of almost $ 4 billion were withdrawn.(17) Unlike some of their European counterparts who did not succeed in the disinvestment and divestment struggle because of legal constraints, the U.S. local governments and institutional investors were able to be more effective in their struggle to put pressure on South Africa because of the structure of government in which power and authority are diffused between the federal government, state governments, and municipalities all over the country.

In addition to non-governmental organizations' activism, the bells of the anti-apartheid movement started ringing on the Capitol Hill in the early 1970s in the shape of sporadic actions and legislation introduced by some individual Congressmen sympathetic to black majority rule in Southern Africa. In the case of Rhodesia,

in response to the Byrd Amendment which allowed the United States to import Rhodesian chrome in violation of UN resolutions, the anti-apartheid organizations launched a campaign to influence Congress, which finally resulted in the repeal of the Amendment in 1973.(18)

Under the influence of lobbying and information provided by ACOA and ALSC, a black-American Congressman, Ronald V.Dellums introduced an unsuccessful resolution in the House of Representatives in 1971 for disinvestment from South Africa, which marked the beginning of the sanctions debate in Congress. This was a year when the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), comprised of nine black American legislators was formed, but it certainly lacked unity and common consensus on the sanctions issue. Congressman Charles Diggs, leader of the CBC, following his visit to South Africa in 1971, instead of putting pressure on the U.S. government, stressed the possibility of influencing events in the Republic through U.S. companies regulating their wage policies in their South African subsidiaries.(19) In addition, Congressman Andrew Young from Georgia (1973-77) had also tried to influence events in South Africa through U.S. companies doing business there. It was at Young's suggestion that Rev. Leon Sullivan formulated the Sullivan principles in 1977, the backbone of the Carter administration's South African policy.(20) The Sullivan principles, were 'rejected' by black South Africans on grounds that equal employment was not the issue. The main issue was to put pressure on Pretoria for political change in which every South African would participate. The principles required U.S. companies among other things to introduce "equal and fair employment

practices for all employees". Ambassador Young's statements throughout his affiliation with the Carter Cabinet (1977-79) suggest that the CBC, until the early 1980s, lacked a common strategy on sanctions issue.

In addition, the black-American legislators were radical in their approach to South African race issues only. Their attitude in this regard was well illustrated in the statement of Congressman William H.Gray III in the House of Representatives in 1986:

> It is not my intention to destroy South Africa and in any event, these sanctions are not capable of destroying South Africa. It is not my intention to cut off communications for leverage. It is my intention to cut off the economic fuel for the political engine of apartheid.(21)

However, the famous hearings in Congress during the 1970s regarding U.S. business relations with South Africa were held in 1976, on the initiative and interest of Senator Dick Clark, then Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Africa of Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Because of his anti-apartheid attitude, the South African governmet through its "influence buying" tactics, generally known as the Muldergate scandal, started a secret campaign against his Senate election in 1978. As a result, he was opposed by a number of special interest-groups, and lost the election. The South African campaign against Clark continued and he lost his reelection bid in 1980. These tactics, were also applied to some other Congressmen, opponents of South Africa's racial policies. For example, Senator John Tunny of California, who in 1975 "pressed

through an amendment in Congress that stopped U.S. involvement on the South African side in Angola" also lost the election, allegedly because of South African "influence buying" tactics. The same ploys, however, were used against Representative Howard Wolpe, a strong opponent of apartheid, in 1982 but he won the election. During the late 1980s, anti-apartheid groups lost important allies, such as Senators Dick Clark and George McGovern and Representative Charles Diggs,(22) (there is no evidence of South African involvement in McGovern's and Diggs's election defeats). Inside Congress the anti-apartheid and sanctions issue started gaining momentum with the inception of the Reagan administration in 1981, mostly as a result of the administration's pro-South Africa posture.

As opposed to the anti-apartheid and congressional activism and demands for sanctions, successive administrations from Kennedy to Reagan were against disinvestment and divestment demands, and advocated a "communication" approach towards South Africa. The Kennedy and the Johnson administrations neither "encouraged or discouraged" U.S. investment and trade links with South Africa. According to George Ball an Under Secretary of State under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, "sanctions would hurt those whom it is meant to help___the Blacks___and would sour internal and international relationships, preventing constructive negotiations."(23) The Kennedy administration, despite claims to distance

itself from the white minority regime and its racial policies, granted official loans of $ 15 million to South Africa in 1962.(24)

The issue of apartheid was considered by the Nixon administration as an internal matter of South Africa; therefore it did not pay attention to sanctions calls made by some Congressmen, non-governmental anti-apartheid organizations and groups, and Afro-Asian countries. David Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (1969-74), described the administration's policies in his speech in late 1971:

> .....punitive economic measures are unpopular in this country. We have had experience in the problems of enforcement and control. These experiences do not ecourage us to believe that such measures are workable against countries which are important economic entities. By their wealth such entities are able to cushion themselves against economic pressures and encourage non-compliance by others to weaken and thwart these pressures.(25)

Throughout the Nixon administration South Africa was treated as a trustworthy ally in the struggle against the international Communism.

The Carter administration, despite its open condemnation of human rights violation in South Africa, was reluctant to impose economic sanctions. It preferred to give "preference to promote an accelerated rate of economic growth. The administration found that economic prosperity would create a situation in which racial conflicts had no relevance."(26) The administration further argued that sanctions would be counter-productive. It

"would result in South Africa's virtual isolation, possibly drive its government to even greater defiance, seriously reduce whatever influence we [U.S.] might have to bring about peaceful change."(27)

However, during its tenure the administration limited the Export-Import Bank's credit to South African purchasers in 1978, discussed in chapter VI, and imposed a ban on sales of computers to the South African government, including sales of other items to its police and military.(28)

7.3 Reagan Administration and the Sanctions Movement

The inception of the new administration in the White House in 1981 with public support for engagement in the South African economy, coupled with the presidential style of Ronald Reagan, provided fuel for the anti-apartheid movement. On the basis of this policy approach, the administration not only opposed sanctions demands but also increased trade links with the Republic. For example, by the end of 1983 the United States had opened a new trade promotion office in Johannesburg with the aim of boosting trade with South Africa.(29) Further, the Commerce Department issued 1,864 licenses in 1984, valued at $ 672.9 millions more than the Carter administration issued in three years.(30)

Most of the critics of Crocker's Southern Africa policy quote him that: "Constructive engagement does not mean waging economic warfare against the Republic; nor does it mean erecting foolish pinpricks that only erode the American position in South African and world markets."(31) But they usually ignored the complex nature of regional problems.

The overall position of the Reagan administration, like previous administrations, both "nationalist" and "progressive", on this issue was not to isolate the Republic, "rather to continue the dialogue with the South African leaders, necessary for the United States to achieve her objectives in Southern Africa."(32)

The Reagan administration's approach was also against

international boycott of South Africa. Table 1.7 illustrate the U.S. votes against the United Nations' General Assembly resolutions calling for sanctions against the Republic during its first three years in office.

Table 1.7

U.S NEGATIVE VOTES IN THE UNITED NATIONS CALLING FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

Year	General Assembly Resolution	Votes of UN Members			U.S Vote
		Yes	No	Abstain	
1981	Sanctions against S.A (No.36/172D)	109	18	13	NO
	Against Military and Nuclear collaboration (No.36/172E)	119	19	04	NO
	For the cessation of new foreign investment in South Africa (No.36/1720)	138	01	07	NO
1982	Asks IMF not to grant credit to South Africa (No.37/2)	121	03	23	NO
	Call for international action against apartheid (No.37/69B)	135	03	08	NO
	Sanctions against South Africa (No.37/69)	114	10	19	NO
	Against military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa (No.37/69D)	120	08	16	NO
	For the cessation of new investment in South Africa (No.37/69H)	137	01	09	NO
	Oil Embargo against South Africa (No.37/69J)	125	06	13	NO
1983	Sanctions against South Africa (No.38/39D)	122	10	18	NO
	Against military and nuclear collaboration				

	with South Africa (No.38/39G)	122	09	17	NO
1983	For the cessation of new foreign investment in South Africa (No.38/391)	140	01	09	NO
	Oil embargo against South Africa (No.38/39J)	130	06	14	NO

Note In 1985 after the Uitenhage killings, the United States did vote to support a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning to killing and detention of the South African government's opponents,but that resolution did not propose sanctions.

Source: The New York Times, and Dan Jamison cited in, Ann Seidman, 'The Roots of Crisis in Southern Africa', Africa World Press, Trenton, 1984, pp.94-95

By the end of the first Reagan term, the total U.S. financial involvement in the shape of bank loans, direct corporate investment and shares owned by Americans in South Africa was as high as $7.6 billion worth of stocks in South African companies and had bought about $600 million worth of Krugerrand (South African gold coins). Over 350 American companies had a total of $ 2.3 billion invested in South Africa and employed 120,000 South Africans. The American companies controlled 70 percent of the South African computer industry, 50 percent of its petroleum industry, and 25 percent of automobile industry. (33)

The U.S. investment supported by the successive administrations was vital for the South African economy.(34) For example, in early 1981, the South African Minister of Finance Owen Horwood said:

> The story of the economic development in this country is intimately bound up with foreign capital, technology, and expertise. Significantly investments usually bring all three. It allows us to do what we want to rather more quickly. It allows us to do something better than we would other wise do.(35)

In Danaher's view the demand for disinvestment and sanctions was not only considered "interruption in relations between both countries but an interruption in relations between specific classes, institutional actors, and individuals."(36) In contrast, the first Reagan administration had already imposed economic sanctions against countries, such as Libya, Nicaragua, and Poland

because of the lack of commercial interest of these actors.

However, these "classes, actors, and individuals" who were influential in U.S.-South Africa policy formulation started losing ground between 1983 and 1986, and were replaced by other actors, such as the anti-apartheid organizations.

More than any organization discussed earlier, TransAfrica was the most effective in lobbying Congressmen and in mobilizing public opinion from its creation in 1977. Before the inception of the Reagan administration in 1981, TransAfrica undertook two major projects to contact black legislators across the United States. In May 1978, TransAfrica Director Randall Robinson, with an insider's knowledge of the American political process, began to lobby the Representatives whose congressional districts consisted of a considerable number of black voters.(37) In 1980, TransAfrica again contacted over seventy black legislators throughout the country to inform them about the organization's anti-apartheid activities nationwide, and provided them with the text of a model disinvestment bill.(38)

TransAfrica gained prominence, especially as a result of peaceful demonstrations at the South African Embassy in Washington beginning November 21, 1984. Two days later, Randall Robinson, the U.S. Civil Rights Commissioner, Mary Frances, and Congressman Walter Fauntray, who then represented the District Columbia in Congress, announced the formation of the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM)

on November 23.(39) The FSAM, led by TransAfrica, was a multi-racial and broad-based movement, represented in every state, and major religious and ethnic groups. By this time the anti-apartheid activists "won over such prominent leaders as Jesse Jackson, Congressman Charles Rangal, Stephen Solarz and Howard Wolpe, and Senator Edward Kennedy."(40)

The real tug-of-war between the Executive and the Legislature to impose sanctions against South Africa started in 1983 when a major sanctions bill was passed by the House of Representatives. But it failed to find passage in the conference between the House and the Senate on the Export Administration Act.(41) The presidential election compaign of 1984 also played a role. During the election campaign "the Democratic platform contained a highly detailed Africa policy statement longer than the Middle Eastern section."(42) This was coupled with anti-apartheid statements made by presidential candidate Rev. Jesse Jackson during his election campaign.

The sanctions bill was re-introduced in 1985. One month before the passage of the bill by the House in June 1985, the House Sub-Committee on International Policy and Trade on Africa held hearings regarding U.S.-South Africa relations. In his well -articulated statement Congressman William H.Gray III, who later introduced the sanctions bill, described:

> Arguments about loss of economic opportunities [in U.S.] miss the point completely, and is similar to arguing that

> slavery should not be abolished because this would cause unemployment. Unemployment is not the issue in South Africa. The virtual political, economic, and social enslavement of the 80 percent majority is the issue.(43)

Before the same Sub-Committee, Chester Crocker was pulling the sanctions issue in a different direction:

> We have no intention of waging economic warfare on South Africa and its people. On the contrary we firmly believe that economic growth has been and will continue to be a main engine of constructive change in all fields in that country.(44)

Contrary to his above statement of April 1985, Crocker told this author in an interview:

> .....and I argued inside our administration [1985-1986] that we should in fact be doing more. As you know we did something. We had a sanctions initiative on our own in 1985 [Presidential Executive Order, September 1985] which bought sometime. But by mid [19]86 it got worse again.(45)

However, during the same period, in response to killings at Uitenhage in March 1985, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under the Chairmanship of Senator Richard Lugar, reported out a bill S.995, which required the imposition of sanctions against the government of South Africa if, within two years, significant progress had not been made towards ending the policy of apartheid.(46)

In addition to growing violence in South Africa, at the hight of tension between the Reagan administration and Congress regarding South Africa policy, President Reagan in his public statement in August called the government of President P.W.Botha a "reformist administration" that had made "substantial changes in

eliminating some form of racial discrimination." Later Reagan apologized that he "carelessly gave the impression that racial segregation had been eliminated in public places in South Africa."(47)

In this political environment the House of Representatives was prepared to act. The sanctions bill introduced by William H.Gray III in March 1985, was passed in June 5, 1985 by the House. The bill prohibited loans to the South African government and all new investment in the Republic. In addition, it banned the importation of South African gold coins into the United States and restricted the sale of computers to the South African government.(48) Instead of showing some leniency, the Botha government declared a partial state of emergency in July 1985, which widened the powers of police to crackdown on the activities of black organizations.(49)

A few hours before the Senate was scheduled to vote on the sanctions bill on September 9, 1985, President Reagan signed the Executive Order (EO) imposing a set of sanctions against South Africa. The EO banned the import of South African gold coins, and prohibited the export of computers, nuclear technology and weapons to the South African government and its agencies.(50) The EO, in fact was not the "administration's sanctions initiative", as Crocker suggested but rather it was the result of the congressional and public pressure. At the time of signing of the EO, eleven states and thirty-five cities across the United States had already taken some kind of economic

actions against South Africa. (51)

However, the EO demonstrated the success of Congress and the public at least in two ways. First, it marked the shift in the administration's anti-apartheid attitude towards South Africa. Second, one of the provisions of the EO directed the Secretary of State to establish an Advisory Committee on South Africa. The Committee submitted its report in January 1987 which concluded the failure of the constructive engagement and recommended a fresh U.S. policy towards the Republic.(52)

On the other hand, the administration's change in approach was at least twofold. First, to cool down the simmering congressional and public pressure against its policy towards South Africa. Second, to assert its influence on South Africa policy-making. Throughout the mid-1980s, said Crocker,

> it was a kind of a tug-of-war between not only Republicans and Democrats, but more importantly between two branches of government, Congress and the Executive. And the battle was really.....you know it looks like.....it was a battle over the content of our policy. But in fact, a lot of it was over the issue of who should control it.(53)

With the passage of the EO, the sanctions issue did not fade away and was back on the congressional agenda in 1986. Some Republican Senators were also putting pressure on President Reagan for the appointment of a special envoy to consult the governments of Great Britain and Federal Republic of Germany, the key black leaders in South Africa, and to present privately to the government

of South Africa the views of the United States on the situation.(54) This, however, did not materialize because of policy chaos within the Reagan administration on this issue.

In addition, with regard to coordination between the Reagan administration and the European allies on the sanctions issue, an official in the State Department said: "The sanctions were a congressional mandate. So it was not a question of consulting European allies."(55) But the Reagan speech of July 22, 1985 shows that the administration was in constant touch with its European allies on this issue, especially with the United Kingdom, West Germany, and France. President Reagan said: "I urge the Congress and the countries of Western Europe to resist this emotional clamo[u]r for punitive sanctions."(56)

However, the disappointed Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) in September 1986. Instead of signing the Act, President Reagan vetoed it on September 26. Three days later, the House of Representatives overrode the veto, followed by the Senate on October 2, 1986. This kind of rebuff of a Chief Executive is very rare in U.S. political history. Similar sort of bipartisan force were used during the early 1970s when Congress overrode the presidential veto and passed the War Powers Act in 1973.

The sanction measures taken by the United States in the CAAA to undermine apartheid were following:

Title II___Measure to assist victims of apartheid

Title III___Measure by the United States to undermine apartheid (**see Appendix I**)

Title IV___Multilateral measures to undermine apartheid

Title V___Future policy towards South Africa
Title VI___Enforcement and administrative provisions.(57)

These measures were taken by the United States to urge South Africa to scrap the apartheid laws and allow the exercise of political freedom, the release of political prisoners, etc. In addition to the internal changes within the Republic, the Act encouraged the Republic to stop the cross-border attacks on the neighbouring countries.(58)

Apart from sanctions imposed against South Africa, some positive measures were also taken in the CAAA as well. These included, scholarships to the victims of apartheid; financial assistance for disadvantaged South Africans; legal assistance to political prisoners and detainees; and a human rights fund for families of the victims of apartheid.(59) These measures were taken to help blacks prepare for leadership in post-apartheid South Africa.

The passage of the Act, however, was the first congressional overturning of a presidential veto in the foreign policy field since the passage of the 1973 War Powers Act. The CAAA sent a warning that the future of U.S.-South Africa relations would depend on South African efforts to eliminate apartheid. For all its weakness and

loopholes, the passage of the Act was the best example of conflict between the Executive and the Legislative. In this process Congress exercised its authority, not only linking the human rights issue in the U.S.-South Africa policy but "tied the hands of a [popular] president."(60) as well.

The weakness of the Act was that it permitted the president to allow the importation of South African products considered to be essential for the United States. On the basis of this clause, the Reagan administration exempted ten non-fuel minerals from the sanctions list. These minerals were considered strategic by the administration for the national security of the country. The Reagan administration, which felt the CAAA practically unfeasible, failed in some areas to implement it against South Africa. Crocker told the author in an interview: "But frankly when it was all over we went back and started to pursue our own policy again. Sanctions or no sanctions."(61)

In his October 1987 report, President Reagan told Congress that there was not any noteworthy progress towards the abolition of apartheid in South Africa despite the U.S. sanctions. The disappointed Congress tried once again in 1988 to amend the CAAA to impose some tough sanctions against South Africa. An influencial black American congressman, Ronald V.Dellums sponsored a bill in 1988, that called for six more sanctions against the Republic, and this was passed by the House on August 1, 1988. The

sanctions included the ban on:

[1] U.S. investment in South Africa;

[2] all imports from South Africa; except for strategic minerals essential for the economy or defence, publications, and imports from businesses 90 percent owned by black South Africans;

[3] all exports to South Africa; except for agricultural commodities, and U.S. public and private aid for South Africa;

[4] new Federal coal, gas and oil leases for the U.S. subsidiaries or U.S. affiliates under control of a foreign company..... invest in or export oil to South Africa' oil industry;

[5] U.S.-owned, controlled or registered ships transporting oil to South Africa; and

[6] U.S. intelligence and military cooperation with South Africa.(62)

In addition, for keeping the violations in the implementation of the CAAA, the amended act required the Inter-Agency Coordination Committee on South Africa to coordinate and monitor the implementation of the act. The act set out the composition of the Committee of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defence, Commerce, and Agriculture; the Attorney General; the U.S. Trade Representative and the heads of such other agencies as the President deemed appropriate. The Secretary of State was to be the chairperson of the Committee.(63)

But the bill did not succeed in achieving a bipartisan consensus in the Senate on the issue as it did in 1986. Several factors had contributed to the congressional failure. For example, by this time more than half of the leading American companies, such as the

IBM, Ford, Agfa, General Motors, Coca Cola etc, had already withdrawn from South Africa.(64) Out of a total of 285 U.S. firms operating there in December 1984, only 136 remained by mid-1988.(65) Second, the political crises within South Africa were not of that intensity as those of the mid-1980s. The level of township unrest had declined significantly. In addition, a number of reforms had already been announced between 1986-87, including the removal of influx control and pass laws and the restoration of South African citizenship to millions of blacks. This was followed by the release of a senior African National Congress (ANC) leader, Govan Mbeki from prison, and some positive moves started to take place for the Cuban and South African withdrawal from Angola in 1988. Finally, on top of these factors, the most important consideration which created hindrance in achieving bipartisan consensus was that in a few months time a new administration had to enter the White House. The Reagan administration, became successful in its persuasion and manoeuvring so that most of the Senators did not take to extreme measures in the final months of the administration to create policy problems for the incoming administration.

As has been mentioned earlier, changes in U.S. policy towards South Africa during this period offer an excellent example of the impact of public opinion on policy formulation, which in turn was "energized" by events in South Africa, the lack of presidential leadership,

the bureaucratic friction, and the 1984 presidential election campaign.

The deepening internal crisis in South Africa in the wake of the new constitution and the introduction of a tricameral parliament which excluded blacks from the country's main political stream resulted in nationwide protests. These crises were given widespread coverage by U.S. media.

"Millions and millions of Americans had been traumatised watching South Africa's white police beating up black South Africans", recalled Ambassador James K.Bishop Jr.(66) The issue went beyond conventional political differences and Congressmen from both sides of the aisle came under pressure to work for sanctions. The public pressure in the shape of demonstrations in colleges, universities, states, etc was so immense that Congressmen from Kensas, Texas, Montena, etc. who had no connection whatsoever with South Africa, had to help policy formulation. ".....The politicians felt a need to do something", told Crocker to the author, "and to be seen doing something. That's the dynamics. They didn't know what [anything] else to do".(67)

Further, the lack of presidential leadership and bureaucratic friction within the Reagan administration also palyed an additional role in the passage of the sactions Act. Crocker told the author:

> Unfortunately, Reagan was simply not credible on this issue, even to some in his own party. So when the vote came as you know he had

> lost many Republicans. He lost the huge faction of his own party in the Senate. There never would have been the sanctions because he would have been able to sustain veto.(68)

Among many Republican Senators, President Reagan also lost Senator Nancy L.Kassebaum on this issue, who was then a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. When the author raised this issue with Senator Kassebaum, her respose was:

> .....myself included would have liked to see President Reagan to speak out with stronger voice against the apartheid and to urge the South African government to step forward and to undertake the initiative on its own.....As the President just clearly believed that we shouldn't be telling him what to do.(69)

Crocker further added:

> that if Reagan had managed to organize his public performances better on South Africa, he could have provided the cover for many politicians who would say well the President is doing the right thing and we support the Executive on this. We think he is basically right. They pushed him some but they let him lead.(70)

I asked him further: are you saying that he damaged the South Africa policy? His response was: "Yes, the President."(71)

A middle-echelon bureaucrat in the Bureau of African Affairs told the author:".....President Reagan had so misrepresented in his public statements the sentiments of American people that they had to do something dramatic to prove that was not just....."(72)

Crocker, in his book 'High Noon in Southern Africa'(73), and in an interview with the author, and

Hedrick Smith in his book, 'The Power Game: How Washington Works' have identified at least three persons_____William Casey, Director Intelligence Agency; Donald Regan, the White House Chief of Staff; and Pat Buchnan, the Director of Communications____"who encouraged President Reagan to face down Congress over economic sanctions against South Africa."(74)

Above all there was a lack of communications between the White House and the Capitol Hill on this issue, even with many of the Republicans who sought the White House's opinion at various stages of the process. Members were not certain at a given moment who in the White House was responsible for the issue, or whether responsibility at the time lay with the State Department.(75)

The laws and acts passed by Congress are left in the hands of bureaucracy which makes the Legislature unable to monitor their implementation process, partly because of the involvement of various agencies, and partly because of the large number of congressional commitments.

Like other acts, the CAAA required the administration to make various government agencies and departments responsible for implementing the provisions of the Act. The main agencies and departments involved in implementing sanctions were: the Department of State; the Department of Treasury; the Department of Commerce; the Bureau of Customs; the Department of Energy; the U.S. federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In addition, to a certain degree the Department

of Justice was also involved with overseeing the implementation of sanctions. Among the above-mentioned agencies, the Department of Treasury, the Bureau of Customs, and the Department of Commerce were the main enforcers.

However, the responsibilities assigned to these agencies varied from agency to agency. For example, there was an office within the State Department, whose responsibility was to oversee that no prohibited item be allowed to go to South Africa. The Commerce Department was responsible for administering the list of goods which were subject to exchange control. The Bureau of Customs, which is the part of the Treasury Department, was authorized to look into the documentation of goods subject to export to South Africa. The Department of Energy had a responsibility for an enforcement of control on exports of nuclear materials. In addition to these agencies some of the U.S. embassies were also involved in conducting investigations into possible irregularities.(76)

It is difficult to pinpoint the effects of economic sanctions on the country's economic health. Haider Ali Khan has argued that theoretical and empirical research have not yet become successful in assessing the effects of economic sanctions on a target country.(77) In the case of South Africa it is also difficult to identify the effects of U.S. sanctions on the Republic, and its impact on the behaviour of the government. But what sanctions in fact did was to deliver a psychological

blow against the white minority regime. Further, it encouraged the black population inside South Africa and the anti-apartheid organizations in the United States to fight to end the repugnant system of apartheid.

In addition, "it had some real effects in terms of companies that left South Africa. It had real effects in terms of providing the Europeans and Japanese to reevaluate [their financial links] and take some limited steps which further increased the anxiety of the business people in South Africa",(78) explained Robert Brauer, the special counsel to Congressman Ronald V.Dellums. The South African business leaders, such as the Standard Bank, the Investment Corporation, the Trust Bank Ltd., and the Rand Mines Ltd., had expressed their anxiety and accepted that sanctions had contributed towards the economic problems of the country. A study done by the Scandinavian Institute of African Affairs Uppsala, Sweden, indicated in 1988 a total loss of at least U.S. $ 3 billion annually to South Africa in foreign exchange.(79)

In the political arena sanctions "played a real part in the reevaluation by Nationalist Party of what was the possible outcome."(80) It is also safe to argue that the mid-1980s congressional move also played an important role which prevented the South African government from taking a tough action against its black population. Therefore, the Republic announced a series of reforms including the scrapping of influx control, the hated pass laws, and the restoration of South African citizenship

to millions of blacks.

Conclusion

The discussion in this chapter suggests that in the post-World War II period sanctions have been used as an instrument of foreign policy, and most of these actions in the world have been initiated by the United States. In the case of South Africa the sanctions issue had always appeared in the United States in response to events inside the Republic, such as during the Soweto roits of the mid-1970s, and the mid-1980s insurgency.

However, with all its strength and weakness, the CAAA had proved to be effective, non-violent measures to express and convey U.S. public feelings against the apartheid system. The passage of the Act had also encouraged other trading partners of South Africa to take such actions. The imposition of Japanese economic sanctions against South Africa in 1987 is the best example in this regard. In addition, the passage of the Act had provided 'moral satisfaction' to the public and the Legislature, which never wanted to be a "part of the evil conspiracy that kept the status quo in South Africa."(81)

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apartheid enforcing agencies; air transportation with South Africa; loans to South African government; import of uranium ore, uranium oxide, coal, and textile, iron and steel; ban on new investments in South Africa; ban on promoting U.S. tourism in South Africa; export of munition list items; import of South African agriculture products; export to South Africa of crude oil and refined petroleum products; ban on cooperation with South African government armed forces; and sugar imports.

According to the Newsouth Africa Bulletin (July 1993) the remaining federal U.S. economic sanctions on South Africa are to be repealed and U.S. investment supported under U.S. legislation to be offered by Senators Nancy L.Kassebaum and Paul Simon.

Source: Africa Research Bulletin, Vol., 28, No., 7, July 1-31st, 1991, p. 10200. Africa Confidential Vol., 32, No., 16, August 9, 1991, p. 1. And, Newsouth africa, Vol., 1, Issue 7, July 1993, Published by South African Embassy, London, p. 2.

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CHAPTER VIII

Conclusion

This thesis has been concerned with examining in detail the development of the United States' policy towards South Africa in the period roughly 1970 to 1986, paying special attention to the broader context of the policy-making process towards the Republic. To this end a number of seperate policy fields and questions have been examined in detail both in terms of their general characteristics and in the way they influenced relations between the two countries. It is time to conclude the discussion, and to identify the areas of future research which flow from this study.

In the post-War period U.S. foreign policy was driven by the Cold War imperatives of competition for influence and the containment of international Communism, which gave successive presidents an almost 'imperial' role in the field of foreign policy. The enormous discretionary powers became possible for a variety of reasons, including Constitutional ambiguties, the development of nuclear weapons, and congressional inactivism. As a result, the 'high' politics of the great strategic issues of the Cold War remained the exclusive domain of the President and his immediate entourage, (often with close links to big corporations, and banks), not necessarily, as this study shows, the foreign policy

'professionals'. The routine 'low' politics of relations with other states was left to a large number of departments and agencies which constantly generated great problems of coordination because of bureaucratic struggles to influence decisions.

The various bureaucratic agencies involved in the foreign policy-making process can in part be seen as permanently institutionalized representatives not only of 'interests' but also approaches to policy. So that for example the Commerce Department can generally be seen as the 'voice of business' but also as instinctively opposed to sanctions in almost any circumstances. "The Commerce Department always opposes trade embargoes" said Richard Moose "no matter who the object of trade embargo is. Whether it is Sadam Hussain or [Fidel] Castro or [Colonel] Kadaffi or the South Africans. They are always against trade embargoes."(1) While the Central Intelligence Agency would always seek to have cooperative relations with the intelligence agencies of 'friendly' nations, irrespective their form of government, even sometimes against the U.S. government policy. At the other end of the spectrum Congress remained largly dominated by powerful committee chairmen and presidents usually cultivated good relations with powerful congressional figures so as not to run into difficulties, at least on foreign policy issues. Similarly, agency heads also tended to develop relations with key congressional figures for the purposes of routine bureaucratic infighting over resources.

The general effect of this balance of institutional forces meant that Cold War considerations prevailed in relations with South Africa at least until the late-1970s. Presidents took little interest in African issues generally, with the exception of the inaugural policy action taken by the Kennedy administration towards black Africa, which in part was the result of the domestic civil rights movement and partly because of the changing map of Africa. But under Lyndon Johnson the growing U.S. military involvement in Vietnam caused the administration to move away from open confrontation with the Republic. Despite its preoccupations in the Far East, the administration restricted U.S. Import-Export financing to South Africa in 1964. The new Republican administration under Richard Nixon in 1969, adopted a policy of "quiet persuasion" towards Southern African issues. The white states of Rhodesia and South Africa, alongwith the Portuguese colonial power in the region were considered by Henry Kissinger to be a stable political force there. The Portuguese coup of 1974 and the subsequent independence of Angola and Mozambique in 1975 marked the end of the Nixon-Kissinger approach of covert actions in Southern Africa.

Operating within the framework of Cold War objectives, the government agencies responsible for foreign policy-making, strove to attain what they perceived through their respective organizational lenses to be the most advantageous arrangements for the United States, whether

it was the purchase of uranium or the securing of intelligence data. This was made easier by the fact that most of Africa remained part of European colonial empires until the 1960s and the U.S., despite its anti-imperial tradition, had accepted the reality of European colonialism as a bulwark of its anti-Soviet position. In this scenario, business interests sought profits where they could be found and were generally encouraged to do so by the government.

However, both the U.S. domestic and the international parameters shifted dramatically in the 1970s. The 1960s saw the huge erruption of race in American politics which for the purposes of this discussion had two important effects. Firstly, race became a key dimension of political virtue accross the U.S. political spectrum. Secondly, and more practically, one of the effects of the civil rights struggle was to give black voters some real voice and to make it easier to elect black legislators. As has been suggested it does not have to be assumed that such legislators would necessarily take 'progressive' positions on all political questions but on all racial questions, including racial questions overseas, they could not but be radical. It is here that one can find the roots of alignment in the American mind with the civil rights struggle in the U.S. itself and the position of Africans in South Africa.

Internationally the end of European colonialism changed the circumstances in which the United States and

(South Africa) operated. The newly independent African states focused their attention and criticism on the apartheid policies of South Africa. But the peculiar structure in Southern Africa delayed the full effects though African voices were loud enough at the United Nations throughout the 1960s, which time and again created pressures for policy-makers in Washington. It was not until the mid-1970s collapse of the Portuguese empire which proved the failure of Kissinger's dictum of "whites are there to stay", followed by the final surrender of white Rhodesia in 1979 did South Africa stand alone both as a now vulnerable state because of the breakdown of white safety belt in the north, and as an international pariah.

It was exactly the same time that the underground shifts in U.S. domestic politics brought about by the civil rights movement bore fruit in terms of Presidential politics, when Jimmy Carter, the first Southern candidate to be elected to that office where narrow majority win was made possible by black votes. For the first time in American political history Carter brought a significant number of black-Americans into government at the highest level. The President himself also had a genuine revulsion towards apartheid. As has been pointed out though it would be wrong to see the new importance of human rights as being solely a Carter initiative. Congress had already begun to link human rights issues to a number of policies in the shape of foreign economic and defence aid since

the early-1970s, in apparent revulsion against the Nixon-Kissinger approach to U.S. foreign relations, and their attitude towards Congress. However, the centrality of the president in the American political system means that his initiatives tend to energize the whole system in a way that Congress cannot.

This was certainly the effect on South Africa policy most dramatically in the U.S. inspired UN arms embargo in November 1977, the first such (mandatory) embargo to be imposed on any state by the United Nations. The early activism of the Carter administration, however, produced difficulties because the logic of pressure on South Africa seemed to conflict with the logic of Cold War, a point that the South Africans, as has been noted, constantly sought to exploit. Within his administration South Africa's importance as a supplier of key minerals and as a staunch ally in the Cold War was regularly cited by those who thought Carter's approach confrontational. But it should be noted that in case of South Africa the policy was more a source of disagreement than of conflict at the level of elite politics. During the presidential election of 1980 between Carter and his opponent these, however, were the terms of debate. It had been generally argued by opponents of Carter's Southern Africa policy that his administration pursued a policy of disengagement towards the region. However, his administration was much engaged to get the regional issues solved alongwith other major issues on top of the administration's foreign policy

agenda. In addition, as against the general perception that during the second half of the administration its pressure became diffused on South Africa, because of problems in Afghanistan and Iran, Moose told this author: "I think that's not really correct...I was still trying to put a lot of pressure on South Africans up to the very end." Did it work, I asked. "It didn't do any good. They were optimistic people as world knows," said Moose.(2)

But for reasons we have suggested by the 1980s it was impossible for American politicians of any stripe to argue that apartheid and the country's political system were purely South Africa's internal matters. Thus for a sophisticated Reaganite like Chester Crocker the key issue was the form of alignment of the Cold War logic with the anti-apartheid logic, not only to secure the abandonment of apartheid but also regional stability and the exclusion of radical regimes, (most importantly from Pretoria, even a blackruled Pretoria). In the quest for the solutions of the Namibian problem and the removal of the Cubans from Angola, pressure on South Africa had to be traded. It is noteworthy, however, that neither the Carter nor Reagan administration made the domestic political change in South Africa as corner-stone of their respective policies. But to her credit, the United States continued to keep the condemnation of apartheid actively alive and in successive policies towards Southern Africa vis-a-vis other major trading partners of South Africa.

The mid-1980s circumstances, both in the United

States and South Africa, however, contributed to upset the finely calculated manoeuverings of Chester Crocker when, as he put it a "very unfortunate episode [which] distracted the attention and infact reduced our influence"(3) in South Africa. P.W. Botha's reforms, particularly his constitutional reforms, in which the black majority was excluded resulted in a huge wave of disturbances on a much greater scale then Sharpeville and Soweto, which required considerable repression and for a while became constant television fare in the United States until the South African government decided to expell television teams from the country. "But by then the damage has been done", recalled Ambassador James Bishop Jr.(4)

All the international and domestic factors, which we have tried to discuss, suddenly came together. A vocal group of black American politicians, both inside and outside Congress, in addition to many white liberals were able to present U.S. relations with South Africa as tantamount to support for apartheid and a betrayal of basic American values of freedom and human equality. Immense pressures, stoked by well run campaigns at the local state and federal levels, built up "to do something". Congress as a unified force started to argue that U.S. national interests would best be served by imposing economic sanctions against Pretoria. The commercial links with South Africa were considered as "fuel for the apartheid engine." One of the major driving forces behind the congressional enthusiasm, as has been noted, was the multi-ethnic composition of the United

States, which was not shared by any of the South Africa's major trading partners. Within the presidency, however, there was massive indecision as different factions at the top-level struggled for influence and threatened to overwhelm Schultz's and Crocker's grip on policy. But the basic problem remained that, as Crocker suggested in interview, Reagan was "simply not credible on these issues."

There was thus both crisis, presidential indecision and public pressure, conditions in which we have suggested Congress tends to intervene to fill the policy vacuum. The Constitution allows Congress to override a presidential veto and thus gives the legislature a salience in foreign policy-making rare in Western states. But the strength of the Executive lies in implementation and knowledge. Also Congressmen essentially play to a public gallery, a gallery which might be suggested in the United States to be notoriously fickle. The influence of the American public on foreign policy has often been disregarded. It has been argued that public opinion has no place in foreign policy-making. But the findings in this study has proved that the mid-1980s public pressure changed the course of the Reagan administration's South Africa policy.

The findings in this study further show that there seems to be no basic difference in successive U.S. policies towards the Republic. What was different was the change in strategies, emphasis, philosophy and personnel, rather than any basic shift in U.S. national goals in the region. All the administrations, with exception of the early Carter

administration, treated South Africa as an ally in the struggle against international Communism. The priorities were to ensure that South Africa did not shift into the Soviet orbit, that the Soviet Union gain control or access to its strategic minerals or be able to disrupt shipping lanes in the Indian and the South Atlantic Oceans. Any of these would have been a direct challenge to Western economic survival. Almost all the administrations of the time were concerned about growing violence in the region which would damage U.S. national interests____economic and military/strategic in the region. They were concerned also that continuing crisis in South Africa would produce strained relations between the United States and African countries in which it had economic and political stakes. Further all the administrations openly opposed the imposition of economic sanctions against the Republic.

On the policy-making front, major decisions during the Nixon administration were usually initiated from the White House under the direction of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger. In the case of Southern Africa after some broad policy framework at the National Security Council (NSC) level, was left to lower-echelon officials in the NSC and the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs, because of the lack of top-level interest in African affairs. Throughout the Nixon-Kissinger era the involvement of the Defence Department and the Central Intelligence Agency was pretty significant in the making of South Africa policy

because of its geo-strategic location. In addition, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) also had some role in South Africa policy-making because of its interests in the Republic, such as space tracking stations.

During the Ford administration, with Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State, the 'foreign ministry' was shifted away from the White House basement to the Foggy Bottom. It was during this time that a high-level interest in the State and the Defence Departments and the CIA was developed in Angola in 1975. The decision taken by Kissinger and his close officials to provide covert military support to the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was resisted in the State Department. As a result, Kissinger's own appointee Nathaniel Davies resigned in August 1975 from the post of Assistant Secretary of African Affairs. "Like John Foster Dulles, the former U.S. Secretary of State (1952-59) Kissinger neglected the State Department bureaucracy and turned to a small group of close associates"(5) concerning foreign policy decisions, including Africa.

The Carter administration's policy-making style was different from that of its Republican predecessors. At least during the administration's first two years in office normally influential foreign policy-making players, such as the Defence Department, the CIA, and the NSC were kept to a peripheral role in South Africa policy formulation. The administration further tightened

clandestine operations and information sharing of the CIA with its South African counterpart. In the State Department "Cyrus Vance had limited interest in the problems of Southern Africa...he was content to leave Southern African problems in the hands of his Deputy Secretary of State or Don McHenry"(6), deputy to Ambassador Andrew Young, and Assistant Secretary Richard Moose. The involvement of the President's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and the NSC staff in conduct of South Africa policy, at least until the resignation of Ambassador Young in 1979 seemed to be marginal as well.

In addition the role of the Carter administration's Commerce Department in making of South Africa policy seemed to be marginal. For example, in 1978 the administration imposed the restrictions on loan capital through Export-Import Bank for U.S. companies doing business in South Africa. These restrictions were imposed without consulting the Commerce Department. This, however, was confirmed by Moose in an interview: "Commerce has never been a very strong department in our government. And I am sure that's right." The role of the Agriculture Department, which is concerned about the interests of U.S. farmers, had also been peripheral. In the opinion of Ambassador Sole, the "Commerce and Agriculture Departments were considered as South Africa's friends."(7) Both Departments were in favour of trade and commercial links with the Republic.

It was first time in the history of U.S.-South Africa

relations that the Labour Department was given response by the State Department in policy-making process when the administration began to articulate a policy of fair employment in the Republic based on Sullivan voluntary code of conduct for U.S. business in South Africa.(8) The Labour Department was a bridge between U.S. companies doing business in South Africa and the Department of State which in turn "certified to Congress that loan recipient followed policies of racial integration in their labour and management practices."(9) After the passage of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act in 1978 the Energy Department also stepped in South Africa policy-making with respect to nuclear matters.

Although these departments were charged with various tasks having a foreign policy dimension, it was not impossible for such departments to affect the detailed implementation. In Moose's account

> ...the Commerce Department would get its revenge when some of the arms embargo regulations were formalized and published in the Federal Register, the Commerce Department people behind the backs of the lawyers and against the explicit decision of the President of the United States inserted some language that left loopholes to export certain kind of computers to South Africa. But this is Mickey mouse.(10)

In sum, at least until the resignation of the Secretary of State Vance, almost all South Africa policy decisions were made in the Bureau of African Affairs under Assistant Secretary Moose and his close associates.

During the first Reagan term main player involved in South Africa policy formulation was the State

Department. Other Executive Departments and agencies including the NSC, the Defence and the CIA had a marginal impact on the process. In the State Department most of the policy work was done within the Bureau of African Affairs under Chester Crocker. Unlike the Carter administration, which was well-endowed with knowledgeable senior officials about Africa Crocker was the only notable African specialist appointed at the Assistant Secretary level during the Reagan administration. Within the State Department "South Africa issue didn't really affect other parts of the State. This was not an issue like the Middle East peace talks or the callapse of the Soviet Union. In this case other parts of the State didn't energize", said an official.(11) During the second Reagan term South Africa was going to be more a public issue day-by-day in the United States, and eventually decreased only to the White House and Congress because of reasons discussed in the study.

Future Research

Researching on a period where there is little documentary evidence, this study has been based on interviews with those who were involved in the policy-making process. Further, the study will be helpful for researchers interested in the U.S.-South Africa policy-making apparatus. The research flowing from the results of this project has identified at least two areas on which future research could be carried out.

As the findings in this study point towards the conclusion that South Africa policy formulation has been usually left in the hands of lower and middle-level bureaucrats in the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs during the period under discussion, further research on this subject from the policy-making angle could be carried out by interviewing responsible officials of the Bureau of the time from assistant secretaries to desk officers. Special attention should be focused on desk officers from where the policy papers are initiated. The comprehensive data of the Bureau officials has been provided in Appendix C of this study.

A second area which still has to be explored in detail is the successive South African governments' "influence buying" tactics which continued until the very end of the de Klerk government. The main focus of this campaign, however, had been to influence the U.S. bureaucracy and Congress, and to keep an eye on anti-apartheid movements. This kind of penetration was made possible by the fragmented nature of the U.S. political system where lobbies play an important role in promoting the political and economic objectives of foreign governments in Washington D.C.

Notes and References

1. Interview with Richard M.Moose, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Washington, D.C., October 7, 1992.

2. ibid.

3. Interview with Chester A.Crocker, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Washington, D.C., September 15, 1992.

4. Interview with Ambassador James K.Bishop Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Washington, D.C., July 30, 1992.

5. New York Times, December 9, 1970.

6. Donald B.Sole, 'A Former Ambassador Reviews the Carter Administration', American Review, Vol., 11, 1991, Johannesburg, pp. 21-22.

7. Donald B.Sole, op., cit.

8. [a] Nonsegregation of the races in all eating, comfort and working facilities;
   [b] Equal and fair employment practices for all employees;
   [c] Equal pay for all employees doing equal work for the same period of time;
   [d] Initiation and development of training programmes that will prepare in substantial number, blacks, coloured, Asians for supervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical jobs;
   [e] Increasing the number of blacks, coloured and Asians in management and supervisory positions;
   [f] Improving the quality of employees' lives outside the work environment in such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation, and health facilities.

   Sourse: Ann Seidman, 'The Roots of Crisis in Southern Africa', Africa World Press, New Jersey, p. 97.

9. David P.Forsythe, 'The Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered', University of Florida, Gainesville, 1988, p. 37.

10. Interview with Richard M.Moose.

11. Interview with Vincent D.Kern, Director Africa Region, International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defence, Washington, D.C., August 17, 1992.

APPENDIX A

Assistant Secretaries of State for African Affairs

NAME	RESIDENT	APPOINTMENT	ENTRY ON DUTY	TERM OF APPT.
1. Joseph C.Satterthwaite	Mich.	Aug. 23, 1958	Sept. 2, 1961	Jan. 31, 1961
2. G.Mennen Williams	Mich.	Jan. 30, 1961	Feb. 1, 1961	March 23,1966
3. Joseph Palmer II	Md.	April 1, 1966	April 11, 1966	July 7, 1969
4. David D.Newsom	Cal.	July 8, 1969	July 17, 1969	Jan. 13, 1974
5. Donald B.Easum	Va.	Feb.27, 1974	March 18, 1974	Mar. 26, 1975
6. Nathaniel Davis	N.J	March 17,1975	April 2, 1975	Dec. 18, 1975
7. William E.Schaufele Jr	O	Dec. 11, 1975	Dec. 19, 1975	July 17, 1977
8. Richard M.Moose	Ark.	June 16, 1977	July 6, 1977	Jan. 16, 1981
9. Chester A.Crocker	D.C	June 9, 1981	June 9, 1981	Jan. , 1989
10.Herman J.Cohen	N.Y	Feb.28, 1989		
11.George E.Moose	N.Y	March 22, 1993		

Sources: U.S. Department of State, Principal Officers of the Department of State and U.S. Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1986, p. 7.

CSIS Africa Notes, No., 128, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., September 30, 1991.

CSIS Africa Notes, No., 153, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., October 1993.

APPENDIX B

Africa Specialists and Policy-makers

1976-94

THE FORD ADMINISTRATION

1. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State.

2. Donald Easum, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 1974-75.

3. William Schaufele, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 1975-77.

4. Lord Winston, Director Policy Planning Staff.

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

1. Andrew Young, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, 1977-79.

2. David Newsom, Under Secretary of Political Affairs. (Newsom served as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs under the Nixon administration).

3. Richard M.Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 1977-81.

4. Anthony Lake, Director Policy Planning Staff.

5. Donald McHenry, Principal Deputy to Ambassador Andrew Young.

6. Ambassador William Bowdler, Director of the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Bowdler served as U.S. Ambassador to South Africa.

7. William Maynes, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations.

8. Frank Wisner, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State.

9. Donald Petterson, Southern Africa Office of the State Department. (Petterson helped draft Kissinger's Lusaka speech of April 1976, in which he talked about the majority rule in Southern Africa).

10. Tom Thorn, South Africa expert.

11. Paul Henz, Horn of Africa.

12. William Quandt, Handled North African issues.

13. David Aaron, Chief aides of Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Adviser.

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

Department of State (1986)

1. Dean Curran, Special Assistant for Africa to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

2. Nelson Ledsky, and Richard Kauzlarich, African Specialists, Policy Planning Council.

3. Yvett Wong, Africa Specialist, Bureau of Political/ Military Affairs (PM).

4. Anthoney Dalsimer, Director, and Martin Lowen Koph, Deputy, Office of Analysis for Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).

   Division Chiefs: Lars Hydle: Central and West Africa
   Mary S.Seasword: Southern Africa
   Lars Hydle: Eastern Africa.

5. Elizabeth Spiro, Legislative Management Officer for Africa, Bureau of Congressional Relations (H).

6. Steve Maloney, African Specialist, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (HA)

7. John Willet, African Specialist, Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

8. Nancy H.Ely, Edward Cummings, and Linda Clarizo, Assistant Legal Advisers for Africa, Legal Adviser (L).

9. Mark L.Edelman, Assistant Administrator for Africa. Deputies: Lois Richards, Larry Sair, and Alexander Love, Agency for International Development (AID).

10. Leonard Lefknow, African Director, John Garner Deputy, and James Haley, Policy Director, U.S. Information Agency (USIA).

Bureau of African Affairs (A/F)

11. Robert Cabelly, Ned McMahon, and Larry Palmer, Special Assistants to Chester A.Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

12. Chas W.Freeman Jr., Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary.

13. James K.Bishop Jr., Deputy Asistant Secretary.

14. William B.Robertson, Deputy Assistant Secretary.

15. Roy Stacy, Deputy Assistant Secretary.

16. J.Douglas Holladay, Director, and Allan Van Egmond, Deputy Director, South Africa Working Group (AF/SAWG).

17. James B.Morgan, Executive Director, and Jack M.Bryant, Deputy, Office of the Executive Director (AF/EX)
Post Management Officers: Michael J.Hinton, Raymond Boneski, Harry Young Jr., Frank Coutler, and Donald Rek.

18. Nancy E.Morgan, Director, Beatrice Russell, Deputy, and Mary Swann, Public Affairs Office, Public Affairs Staff (AF/P).

19. David Passage, Director; Richard Tierney, Deputy; Jean Gardner, Bernadette Allen, Raymond Pardon, International Relations Officers; Lt. Col. Charles Snyder, Political/Military Adviser, and Gregory Bradford, Special Security Assistance, Regional Affairs (AF/RA)

20. E.Gibson Lampher, Director Southern African Affairs (AF/S).
Deputy Director: Larry Napper.

    Country Officers: Gerard Gallucci (Angola), Barbra Hughes (Botswana), Kenneth Kolb (Lesotho), Robyn Hinson Jones (Malawi), Greg Fergin (Mozambique), Nambia, vacant, Ashley Wills (South Africa), Robyn Hinson-Jones (Swaziland), Robyn Hinson-Jones (Zambia), Kenneth Kolb (Zimbabwe).

21. Edward L.Killham, Director Central African Affairs (AF/C).
Deputy Director: Vittorio Brod.

    Country Officers: Judith B.Cefkin (Burundi), T.Dennis Reece (Cameroon), Judith B.Cefkin (Cen. African Rep.), Robert Ayling (Chad), Russell L.Frisbie (Congo), T.Dennis Reece (Gaboon), Russell L.Frisbie (Equatorial

Guinea), Judith B. Cefkin (Rwanda), Jack Audert (Zaire).

22. David J.Fischer, Director East African Affairs (AF/E).
Deputy Director: Robert E.Bribbin II.

Country Officers: Eunice S.Reddick (Comoros), Jean Szymanski (Djibouti), Jean Szymanski (Ethiopia), Steve Eisenbraun (Kenya), Eunice S.Reddick (Madagascar), Eunice S.Reddick (Mauritius), Dale Dean (Seychelles), Dale Dean (Somalia), Eric H.Madison (Sudan), Eunice S.Reddick (Tanzania), Steve Eisenbraun (Uganda).

23. Howard K. Walker, Director West African Affairs (AF/W).
Deputy Director: David Halsted.

Country Officers: Hugh F.Williams (Benin), Deborah M.Odell (Burkina Faso), John O.Cook (Cape Verde), Anthony Benesch (Gambia), John A.Hedges (Guinea), John O.Cook (Guinea-Bissau), John A.Hadges (Cote d'Ivoire), Constance J.Freeman (Liberia), Deborah M.Odell (Mali), Anthony Benesch (Niger), Robert A.Proctor (Nigeria), Ronald A.Trigg (Sierra Leone), Anthony Benesch (Senegal), Hugh F.Williams (Togo), Anthony Benesch (Western Sahara).

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION

Department of State

1. Karl Hofman, Special Assistant for Africa to Under-Secretary for Political Affairs.

2. Robert Gosende, Director Office of African Affairs, U.S. Information Agency.

3. Scot M.Spangler, Assistant Administrator for Africa, Agency for International Development (AID).

4. Ross Wilson, Special Assistant for Africa, Deputy Secretary of State.

5. Marc Nicholson, African Specialist, Bureau of Political and Military Affairs (PM).

6. Robert Cabelly, Regional Specialist Africa, Policy Planning Staff (S/P).

7. John Byerly, Assistant Legal Adviser for Africa.

8. Llyod George, Legislative Management Officer for African Affairs, Legislative Affairs.

9. Vincent Farley, Director Office of Analysis for Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).

10. Raymond Pardon, Division Chief East, Central and West Africa, Office of Analysis for Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

11. Richard Ristaino, Division Chief Southern Africa, Office of Analysis for Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

12. Steve Eisenbraum, African Specialist, Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO).

13. Gary Fuller, Regional Officer Africa, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.
14. Sheila Gwaltney, Regional Officer Africa, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.

Bureau of African Affairs

15. Herman J.Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

16. Alison Rosenberg, Deputy Assistant Secretary.

17. Jeffrey Davidow, Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary.

18. Leonard H. Robinson Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary.

19. Robert G.Houdek, Deputy Assistant Secretary.

20. F.Allen ("Tex") Harris, Director Office of Regional Affairs.

21. Clyde Bishop, Deputy Director Office of Regional Affairs.

22. Charles Snyder, Senior political-Military Affairs Adviser, Office of Regional Affairs.

23. Robert Hess, Political-Military Affairs Adviser, Office of Regional Affairs.

24. Peter R.Chaveas, Director Office of Southern African Affairs.
Deputy Directors: Richard Roth and Jim Carraghar.

Country Officers: Lois Cescarini (Angola), David Fetter (Botswana), David Fetter (Lesotho), Moosa Valli (Malawi), William Jackson (Mozambique), Barbara Bowie-Whiteman (Namibia), Gerard Gallucci, Mary Grace McGeehan,and James Bond (South Africa), David Fetter (Swaziland), Andrew Parker (Zimbabwe).

25. Alan R.McKee, Director Office of Anglophone and Lusophone West African Affairs.
Deputy Director: Ollie Anderson.

Country Officers: Kevin Richardson (Cape Verde), Karl Olson (Gambia), Kevin Richardson (Ghana), Kevin Richardson (Guinea-Bissau), Charles Gurney (Liberia), Leon Weintraub (Nigeria), Karl Olson (Deputy country officer Nigeria), Karl Olson (Sierra Leone).

26. Robert M.Pringle, Director Office of Central African Affairs.
Deputy Director: Robert C.Porter Jr.

Country Officers: Carol Fuller (Burundi), Janet Beik (Chad), Carol Fuller (Rwanda), Joseph Gregoire (Zaire).

27. Mark Johnson, Director Office of East African Affairs.
Deputy Director: James Ledesma.

Country Officers: Lora Berg (Comoros), Lora Berg (Diego Garcia), Herb Thomas (Djibouti), Gennie Pratt (Ethiopia), Lucien Vandenbrouke (Kenya), Lora Berg (Mauritius), Gary Gray (Seychelles), Herb Thomas (Somalia), Gary Gray (Sudan), Lora Berg (Tanzania), Lucien Vandenbroucke (Uganda).

28. William Dameron, Director Economic Policy Staff.

29. Lawrence Garufi, Director Public Affairs.

30. Andrew Winter, Executive Director Office of the Executive Director.

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION

Department of State

1. Richard M.Moose, Under Secretary for Management.

2. John Hicks (acting), Assistant Administrator for Africa.

3. Bruce E.Thomas, Special Assistant for Africa, Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

4. Lionel C.Johnson, Policy Planning Staff.

5. Vincent Farley, Director Office of Analysis for Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

6. Janean Mann, Division Chief East, Central, and West

Africa, Office of Analysis for Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

7. Richard Ristaino, Division Chief Southern Africa, Office of Analysis for Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Bureau of African Affairs

8. George E.Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

9. Robert Cabelly, Adviser to Assistant Secretary.

10. Prudence Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary.

11. Edward Brynn, Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary.

12. Peter R.Chaveas, Director Office of West African Affairs.
Deputies: Jacquelyn Briggs (Francophone), and Jeff Millington (Lusophone).

Country Officers: Timothy Andrew (Nigeria), Gayleatha Brown (Guinea, Mauritania, Senegal, Western Sahara), William Jackson (Gambia, Sierra Leone), Geeta Pasi (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger), Ann Syrett (Benin, Togo).

13. April Glaspie, Director Office of Southern African Affairs.
Deputies: Martin Brennan, and Dan Mozena.

Country Officers: Philip Egger (Malawi, Zambia), Dennis Hankins (Angola), Mary Elizabeth Hayas (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland), Robert P.Jackson (Zimbabwa), Sue Keogh-Fisher (Officer-in-Charge for South Africa), Deborah Malac (South Africa, Economic/Sanctions), Chris Riche (Mozambique), Alan Yu (South Africa, Human Rights/Visas).

14. Arlene Render, Director Office of Central African Affairs.
Deputy: Reed Fendrick.

Country Officers: Kevin Auston (Burundi, Rwanda), Mary E.Grandfield (Central African Republic, Chad), Steven A.Honley (Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea), Lori Magnusson (Congo, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe), Terrence P.McCulley (Zaire).

15. David Shinn, Director Office of East African Affairs.
Deputy: Raymond J.Pardon.

Country Officers; Ted Andrews (Djibouti, Somalia), George Colvin (Eritrea, Ethiopia), Joe Fishbein (Sudan), Oliver Griffith (Comoros, Diego Garcia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania), Chris Wilson (Kenya, Uganda).

Office of National Security Affairs (NSC)

16. Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. (Lake resigned in protest because of his differences with Henry Kissinger over the U.S. invasion of Cambodia. He later became the Director of the Carter administration's Policy Planning Staff).

17. Samuel R.Berger, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
18. Nancy Soderberg, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Staff Director of the National Security Council.

19. Jennifer Ward, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for African Affairs.

Department of Defence

20. Les Aspin, Secretary of Defence.

21. William Perry, Deputy Secretary of Defence.

22. Frank Wisner, Under Secretary for Policy.

23. Charls W.Freeman, Assistant Secretary Regional Security Affairs.

24. Morton Halperin, Assistant Secretary Democracy and Peace-Keeping.

25. Lt. General Thomas G.Rhame, Director Defence Security Assistance Agency.

26. Col. Victor Rapheal, Director Middle East, Africa, American Division, Defence Security Assistance Agency.

27. Ann Smoot, Security Assistance Analysis (Africa), Defence Security Assistance Agency.

28. James L.Woods, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defence.

29. Vincent D.Kern, Director Africa Region.

30. Bernd McConnell, Deputy Director and Assistant for Southern Africa.

31. Lt. Col. Mike Harvin, Assistant for Central Africa.

32. Therasa Whelan, Assistant for West Africa.

33. LTC. Mike Johnson, Assistant for East Africa.

34. Major Chuck Ikins, Assistant for Somalia.

35. Major Pete Jordan, Policy Analysis.

36. General John Shalikashvili, Chairman The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

37. Richard C.Macke, Director The Joint Staff.

38. Lt. General James R. Clapper, Director Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA).

39. J.J.Sloan, Director, Directorate for Policy Support, DIA.

40. William G.Thom, Defence Intelligence Officer Africa, DIA.

41. William T.Sloakley, Deputy Defence Intelligence Officer Africa, DIA.

42. Michael R.Kramer, Director RADM, Current Intelligence, Joint Staffs and Command (J-2).

43. Geralde Dye, Director National Military Joint Intelligence Centre, J-2.

44. Lt. General Barry R.McCaffrey, Director Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5).

45. Frank L.Bowman, Deputy Director Political-Military Affairs, J-5.

46. Col. Perry F.Baltimore, Middle East, Africa, Division Chief, Political-Military Affairs, J-5.

47. Lt. Col. Alison Poitter, Africa Branch Chief, Political Military Affairs.

Department of Commerce

48. Sally K.Miller, Director Office of Africa.

49. Gerald M.Feldman, Deputy Director, Office of Africa.

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3. Who's Who and Where: A Guide to Key Personnel in U.S.-African Diplomatic Relations, No., 64, November 22, 1986, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C.

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APPENDIX C

Foreign Affairs Responsibilities of Standing and Select Committees in the House of Representatives and Senate

SENATE COMMITTEE	YEAR OF ESTB.	FOREIGN AFFAIRS RESPONSIBILITY	HOUSE COMMITTEE	YEAR OF ESTB.
Agriculture	1825	Foreign agriculture policy and assistance	Agriculture	1820
Appropriations	1867	Appropriation of revenues, rescission of appropriations.	Appropriations	1865
Armed Services	1816	Defence, National security aspects of nuclear energy.	Armed Services	1822
Banking, Housing, Urban Affairs.....	1913	Foreign commerce, int'l economic policy, export and foreign trade promotion	Banking, Finance Urban Affairs.....	1865
Budget	1975	Budgetary matters	Budget	1975
Commerce, Science and Transportation..	1816	Merchant marine, marine fisheries, oceans, coastal zone management, nonmilitary science, and aeronautics	Merchant Marines and Fisheries.....	1887
Energy and Natural Resources.....	1816	Int'l energy affairs, global climate changes nonmilitary aspects of nuclear energy	Energy and Commerce	1975
Environments and Public Works.....	n.a	Environmental policy ocean dumping, environmental aspects of outer continental shelf lands	Science and Astronautics.....	1958
Finance	1816	Revenue measures, customs, foreign trade agreements, tarrifs, import quotas	Ways and Means	1802

CONTINUED

Foreign Relations	1816	Relations with foreign nations, treaties executive agreements int'l organizations, foreign assistance, intervention abroad, declaration of war, terrorism	Foreign Affairs	1822
Governmental Affairs.....	1842	Organization and reorganization of the executive branch, organization and management of nuclear export policy	Government Operations.....	1816
Intelligence*	1976	Intelligence activities, covert operations	Intelligence*	1977
Judiciary	1816	Immigration and refugees	Judiciary	1813
Labour and Human Resources	1869	Regulation of foreign labourers	Education and Labour	1867

* Select Committees

Sources: Charles W.Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R.Wittkopf, 'American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process', Fourth Edition, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1991, p. 423.

Guide to Congress, 4th Edition, Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C., 1991, p. 452.

APPENDIX D

Senate and House Sub-Committees on Africa

SENATE SUB-COMMITTEE ON AFRICA OF FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 1976-1992	HOUSE SUB-COMMITTEE ON AFRICA OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 1976-1992
94th Congress (1975-1976)	**94th Congress (1975-1976)**
Dick Clark of Iowa James B.Pearson of Kensas	Not Available
95th Congress (1977-1978)	**95th Congress (1977-1978)**
Dick Clark of Iowa James B.Pearson of Kensas	Charles C.Diggs Jr. of Michigan Charles W.Whalen Jr. of Ohio
96th Congress (1979-1980)	**96th Congress (1979-1980)**
George S.McGovern of South Dakota S.I.Hayakawa of California	Stephen J.Solarz of New York William F.Goodling of Pennsylvania
97th Congress (1981-1982)	**97th Congress (1981-1982)**
Nancy L.Kassebaum of Kensas Paul E.Tsongas of Massachusetts	Howard Wolpe of Michigan William F.Goodling of Pennsylvania
98th Congress (1983-1984)	**98th Congress (1983-1984)**
Nancy L.Kassebaum of Kensas Charles McMathias Jr. of Maryland Charles H.Percy of Illinois Paul E.Tsongas of Massachusetts Christopher J.Dodd of Connecticut	Howard Wolpe of Michigan George W.Crockett Jr. of Michigan Howard L.Berman of California Harry M.Reid of Nevada Edward F.Feighan of Ohio Ted Weiss of New York Toby Roth of Wisconsin Ed Zschan of California
99th Congress (1985-1986)	**99th Congress (1985-1986)**
Nancy L.Kassebaum of Kensas Jesse McC Mathias Jr. of Maryland Larry Pressler of South Dakota John F.Kerry of Massachusetts Paul S.Sarbanes of Maryland Claibore Pell of Rhode Island	Howard Wolpe of Michigan George W.Crockett of Michigan Stephen J.Soralz of New York Howard L.Berman of California Ted Weiss of New York Robert Garcia of New York Mark D.Siljander of Michigan Michael DeWine of Ohio Dan Burton of Indiana Robert K.Dornan of California

100th Congress (1987-1988)	100th Congress (1987-1988)
Paul Simon of Illinois	Howard Wolpe of Michigan
Terry Sanford of North Carolina	Geo W.Crockette Jr. of Michigan
Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York	James McClure of North Carolina
Nancy L.Kassebaum of Kensas	James H.Bilbray of Nevada
Jesse Helms of North Carolina	Fofo I.F.Sunia of American Samoa
	Wayne Owens of Utah
	Dan Burton of Indiana
	Donald E.(Buz) Lukens of Ohio
	Ben Blaz of Guam
	Robert K.Dornan of California
101st Congress (1989-1990)	**101st Congress (1989-1990)**
Paul Simon of Illinois	Howard Wolpe
Alan Craston of California	George W.Crockett Jr. of Michigan
Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York	Mervyn M.Dymally of California
Nancy L.Kassebaum of Kensas	Donald M.Payne of New York
Connie Mack of Florida	Eliot L.Engel of New York
	Frank McCloskey of Indiana
	Dan Burton of Indiana
	Donald E. (Buz) Lukens of Ohio
	Amo Houghton of New York
	Ben Blaz of Guam
102nd Congress (1991-1992)	**102nd Congress (1991-1992)**
Paul Simon of Illinois	Mervyn M.Dymally of California
Terry Sanford of North Carolina	Howard Wolpe of Michigan
Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York	Jaime B.Fuster of Puerto Rico
Nancy L.Kassebaum of Kensas	Stephen J.Solarz of New York
Jesse Helms of North Carolina	Edward F.Feighan of Ohio
	Donald M.Payne of New Jersey
	Dan Burton of Indiana
	Ben Garrido Blaz of Guam
	Amo Houghton of New York
	Toby Roth of Wisconsin

Source: Congressional Directories, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

APPENDIX E

Operating Mines of Strategic Minerals in South Africa as at January 1983

Mine	Location	Material Produced
Mapuchs	Transvaal	Vanadium
Hotazel	Cape Town	Manganese
Lohathla	Cape Town	Manganese
Mamatwan	Cape Town	Manganese
Mancrop Mines	Cape Town	Manganese
Middleplaats	Cape Town	Manganese
Wessels	Cape Town	Manganese
Kilokong	Transvaal	Chromium
Grasvally	Transvaal	Chromium
Grootbroom	Transvaal	Chromium
Grouthoek	Transvaal	Chromium
Hendriksplaats	Transvaal	Chromium
Henry Gould	Transvaal	Chromium
Jagdiust	Transvaal	Chromium
Millsell	Transvaal	Chromium
Mooinooi	Transvaal	Chromium
Nthuane	Bophuthatswana	Chromium
Ruighuek	Bophuthatswana	Chromium
Strydfontein	Bophuthatswana	Chromium
Winterveld	Transvaal	Chromium
Szartkop	Transvaal	Platinum
Amandelbult	Transvaal	Platinum
Atok	Transvaal	Platinum
Bafokeng North	Bophuthatswana	Platinum
Bafokeng South	Bophuthatswana	Platinum
Rustenburg	Bophuthatswana	Platinum
Union	Bophuthatswana	Platinum
Western Platinum	Transvaal	Platinum
Wildebeestfontein-	Bophuthatswana	Platinum
North	Bophuthatswana	Platinum
Brits (Ucar)	Bophuthatswana	Vanadium

Source: Rae Weston, 'Strategic Materials: A World Survey', Croom Helm, London, 1984, pp. 160-161.

APPENDIX F

Operating Mines of Strategic Minerals in the United States as at January 1983

Mine	Location	Material Produced
Sterling	New Jersey	Manganese
Uravan	Colorado	Vanadium

Major New Projects in the United States known at January 1983

Company	Location	Material
Anaconda	Stillwater, Montana	Platinum
Manville Corp./ Chevron	Stillwater, Montana	Platinum
California Nickle	Gasquet Mt.	Chromium
Union Carbide/ Hecla	Moab, Utah	Vanadium

Source: Rae Weston, 'Strategic Materials: A World Survey', Croom Helm, London, 1984, pp. 156-164.

APPENDIX G

Uranium Enrichment Exports to South Africa

For SAFARI-I Research Reactor

The following is list of shipments of highly enriched uranium supplied to South Africa for the operation of the SAFARI-I research reactor. Material supplied by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Agency (UKAEA) was of U.S. origin. It was originally shipped to the United Kingdom especially for fabrication into SAFARI-I elements, and authorized by the United States.

DATE	U	U-234	FABRICATOR/SHIPPER
February 1965	4.315	3.874	Babcock and Wilcox
May 1965	3.446	3.096	Babcock and Wilcox
October 1967	2.526	2.273	UKAEA,Harwell,U.K.
November 1967	8.299	7.469	== == ==
December 1967	2.541	2.286	== == ==
December 1969	7.558	6.806	== == ==
June 1970	5.767	5.190	== == ==
December 1970	.976	.878	== == ==
July 1971	13.334	12.001	== == ==
September1971	.663	.596	== == ==
May 1972	.971	.874	== == ==
December 1972	4.641	4.177	== == ==
June 1973	2.139	1.925	== == ==
August 1973	3.167	2.850	== == ==
April 1973	.300	.270	== == ==
October 1973	3.089	2.780	== == ==
January 1974	5.217	4.696	== == ==
April 1974	3.691	3.322	== == ==
May 1974	3.092	2.782	== == ==
June 1974	3.530	3.177	== == ==
November 1974	4.299	4.006	U.S. Nuclear
December 1974	3.437	3.203	== == ==
March 1975	3.444	3.203	== == ==
April 1975	4.879	4.552	== == ==
Total	95.320	86.288	
Less Returns	(34.251)	(28.154)	
Less Burn up thru 12/31/73	(11.473)	(13.897)	
Less Burn up 12/31/75 at o.333 kg/mo	(5.473)	(6.460)	
Inventory	44.263 k.g	37.777 k.g	(May 22, 1975)

Source: U.S. Congress Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Government Operations' 94th Congress 1st Session, April 24, 30 and May 1, 1975, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C, 1975, p.68 and p.100.

APPENDIX H

I. Human Rights Treaties and Agreements to Which the U.S. is a Party .....

1. The United Nations Charter, signed June 26, 1945, entered into force October, 24, 1945.

2. Slavery Convention, concluded September 25, 1926, entered into force March 9, 1927. Entered into force for U.S. March 21, 1929.

3. Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention, entered into force December 7, 1953. Entered into force for U.S. March 7, 1956.

4. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, done September 7, 1956. Entered into force for U.S. December 6, 1967.

5. Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Political Rights to Women, opened for signature May 2, 1948, entered into force March 17, 1949. Entered into force for U.S. May 24, 1976.

6. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened for signature March 31, 1953, entered into force July 7, 1954. Entered into force for U.S. July 7, 1976.

7. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva I) opened for signature August 12, 1949, entered into force October 21, 1950. Entered into force for U.S. February 2, 1956.

8. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva II), opened for signature August 12, 1949. Entered into force for U.S. February 2, 1956.

9. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva III), opened for signature August 12, 1949, entered into force October 21 1950. Entered into force for U.S. February 2, 1956.

10. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva IV), opened for signature August 12, 1949, entered into force October 21, 1950. Entered into force for U.S. February 2, 1956.

11. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done January 31, 1967, entered into force October 4, 1967. Entered into force for U.S. November 1, 1968.

12. Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States, opened for signature February 27, 1967. Entered into force February 27, 1970.

13. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, December 9, 1948, entered into force January 12, 1951. Entered into force for U.S. February 23, 1989.

II. Human Rights Treaties and Agreements Which the U.S. Has Signed But Not Ratified .....

14. Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, adopted June 25, 1957. Entered ito force January 17, 1959.

15. Convention on the Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, opened for signature December 10, 1962. Entered into force December 9, 1964.

16. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 1969.

17. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, adopted December 16, 1966. Entered into force March 23, 1976.

18. International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted December 16, 1966. Entered into force January 3, 1976.

19. American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature November 22, 1969. Entered into force July 18, 1978.

20. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature December 12, 1977. Entered into force December 7, 1978.

21. Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature December 12, 1977. Entered into force December 7, 1978.

22. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted December 18, 1979. Entered into force September 3, 1981.

III. Human Rights Treaties and Agreements Which the U.S. Has Not Signed.....

23. Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Civil Rights to Women, opened for signature May 2, 1948. Entered into force April 22, 1949.

24. Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Rights to Organize (ILO No. 87), adopted July 9, 1948. Entered into force July 4, 1950.

25. Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Rights to Organize and to Bargain Collectively (ILO No. 98), adopted July 1, 1949. Entered into force July 18, 1951.

26. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, adopted December 2, 1949. Entered into force July 25, 1951.

27. Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of equal Value, adopted June 29, 1951. Entered into force May 23, 1953.

28. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951. Entered into force April 22, 1954.

29. Convention on the International Rights of Correction, opened for signature March 31, 1953. Entered into force August 24, 1962.

30. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, done September 28, 1954. Entered into force June 6, 1960.

31. Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, done February 20, 1957. Entered into force August 11, 1958.

32. Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (ILO No. 111), adopted June 25, 1958. Entered into force June 15, 1960.

33. Convention Against Discrimination in Education, adopted December 14, 1960. Entered into force May 22, 1962.

34. Convention Concerning Equality of Treatment of Nationals and Non-Nationals in Social Security (ILO No. 118), adopted June 28, 1962. Entered into force April 25, 1964.

35. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, concluded August 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 1975.

36. Convention Concerning Employment Policy (ILO No. 122), adopted July 9, 1964. Entered into force July 15, 1966.

37. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted December 16, 1966. Entered into force March 23, 1976.

38. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, adopted November 26, 1968. Entered into force November 11, 1970.

39. Convention Concerning Protection and Facilities to be Afforded to Worker's Representatives in the Undertaking (ILO No. 135), adopted June 23, 1971. Entered into force June 30, 1973.

40. Convention Concerning Basic Aims and Standards of Social Policy (ILO No. 117), adopted June 22, 1964. Entered into force April 23, 1964.

41. Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (ILO No. 29), adopted June 28, 1930. Entered into force May 1, 1932.

42. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, adoptd November 30, 1973. Enterd into force July 18, 1976.

42.1 International Convention against Apartheid in Sports, adopted December 10, 1985. Entered into force April 3, 1988.

42.2 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, opened for signature December 9, 1985. Entered into force February 28, 1987.

42.3 Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted November 20, 1989.

42.4 Second Optional Protocal to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the abolition of the Death Penalty, adopted December 15, 1989.

42.5 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature November 17, 1988.

Source: Richard B. Lillich, 'International Human Rights Instruments', Williams Hein Company, New York, 1990.

APPENDIX I

Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986

Title III Measures by the United States to Undermine Apartheid

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Source: U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, June 10, 1986, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1986, p. 21.

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